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The Syrian conflict led to a resurrection of ISIS in terms of recruitment, financing, propaganda, and enlisting itself as an actor in the Middle East. ISIS’s ability to use both social media and other traditional methods of recruitment requires countries like Turkey to adopt multi-faceted approaches in order to be more effective. Cyberspace, and particularly social media, is very critical to understanding how ISIS sustains its recruitment and propaganda activities.

This report entitled ‘ISIS in Cyberspace: Findings from Social Media Research’ focuses on social media and terrorism by analyzing how pro-ISIS Twitter users see and legitimize ISIS and its ideology in cyberspace. Following an extensive review of literature on ISIS’s historical background along with its capabilities in various fields, the research analyzes tweeting patterns of sampled pro-ISIS Twitter accounts and examines the contents of messages posted by those accounts.

The increasing use of online social networks (OSNs) by extremists for the spread of radicalization have been a great concern for law enforcement agencies across the world. Today, they are being increasingly used by radical groups for spreading ideologies, recruitment, influencing and planning their activities. However, many of such groups remain hidden within the social fabric and can only be discovered by analyzing the related content posted by them. This article addresses the missing line of research by analyzing hidden online Radical networks along three dimensions—element level, group-level, and network level and addresses the gap which the present metrics for social network analysis fail to address as we graduate toward the dynamic network analysis. We propose new metrics to analyze the evolving topic-centric network and present our findings about the understanding of properties of such complex networks in the information network of Twitter with the existing as well the new proposed metrics.

Dr Leah Farrall from the National Security College, ANU in conversation with Dr John Coyne, Head – Border Security Program – ASPI.

Who is likely to view materials online maligning groups based on race, nationality, ethnicity, sexual orientation, gender, political views, immigration status, or religion? We use an online survey (N = 1034) of youth and young adults recruited from a demographically balanced sample of Americans to address this question. By studying demographic characteristics and online habits of individuals who are exposed to online extremist groups and their messaging, this study serves as a precursor to a larger research endeavor examining the online contexts of extremism.

Descriptive results indicate that a sizable majority of respondents were exposed to negative materials online. The materials were most commonly used to stereotype groups. Nearly half of negative material centered on race or ethnicity, and respondents were likely to encounter such material on social media sites. Regression results demonstrate African-Americans and foreign-born respondents were significantly less likely to be exposed to negative material online, as are younger respondents. Additionally, individuals expressing greater levels of trust in the federal government report significantly less exposure to such materials. Higher levels of education result in increased exposure to negative materials, as does a proclivity towards risk-taking.

Combating ISIS Online Panelists talked about *ISIS’ use of the Internet and social media to recruit supporters. They also addressed the U.S. government’s efforts to combat the terror group online. Other topics included whether internet and social media companies should be forced to identify and/or ban those suspected of promoting terror.

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), or DAISH/DAESH in Arabic is a militant group that has called itself the Islamic State.

Financiers and fundraisers for al-Qaida and Islamic State (ISIS) are active
users of popular social media platforms, such as Facebook, Twitter,
YouTube and Instagram, in some cases even after being placed on a
United Nations or US government sanctions list. Terrorist financiers
and fundraisers have utilized social media to attract and direct funding
to procure weapons, pay salaries, strengthen infrastructure and operate
civil and social services. While the amount of funding raised via social
media is far less in comparison to revenues from oil sales or taxation,
al-Qaida and ISIS fundraisers have taken credit for millions of dollars
raised using social media-based campaigns—significant amounts by
any standard.
Terrorist financiers and fundraisers for al-Qaida and ISIS have relied on
social media services to communicate with colleagues and supporters,
attract new followers globally, and promote aligned causes and
organizations. With their potential to spur viral content growth, social
media services enable fundraisers to more quickly and effectively solicit
support and reach larger audiences.
Social media companies have actively terminated the accounts of
terrorist facilitators—including a number of designated terrorist
fundraisers and financiers—citing violations of their respective terms
of service restrictions that prohibit support for violence or hate speech
[see pg.12]. For example, in early February 2016 Twitter announced the
closure of more than 125,000 accounts “for threatening or promoting
terrorist acts, primarily related to ISIS,” noting that social media platforms
are “forced to make challenging judgment calls based on very limited
information and guidance.”1 Facebook has also stepped up its efforts
to remove users who back terror groups, and YouTube has taken down
content and terminated users who post terrorist material.2