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Whereas modern communication strategies have been celebrated for promoting ease of interaction, this chapter highlights that they have been deployed by some terrorist groups in Africa to threaten human security. It defines religious extremism in terms of the expression of extreme or violent actions or jihad on the basis of particular interpretations or understanding of religious teaching or scripture, especially the Quran. The chapter examines the (online) communication behaviours of extremists/terrorist groups in West Africa and Somalia that are often associated with Islam. It also examines religious extremism and its relation to violent conflict and describes the extremist violent activities of some identified African terrorist groups, and how contemporary media and the Internet have provided dynamic platforms for disseminating their message and ideology. Liebman views religious extremism as the desire to expand the scope, details and strictness of religious law, social isolation and the rejection of the surrounding culture.

VOX-Pol Blog post.

The increased online presence of jihadists has raised the possibility of individuals being radicalised via the Internet. To date, the study of violent radicalisation has focused on dedicated jihadist websites and forums. This may not be the ideal starting point for such research, as participants in these venues may be described as “already madeup minds”. Crawling a global social networking platform, such as YouTube, on the other hand, has the potential to unearth content and interaction aimed at radicalisation of those with little or no apparent prior interest in violent jihadism. This research explores whether such an approach is indeed fruitful. We collected a large dataset from a group within YouTube that we identified as potentially having a radicalising agenda. We analysed this data using social network analysis and sentiment analysis tools, examining the topics discussed and what the sentiment polarity (positive or negative) is towards these topics. In particular, we focus on gender differences in this group of users, suggesting most extreme and less tolerant views among female users.

From London to Ontario to Northern Virginia and beyond, young men and women have felt compelled to find belonging in a community ideologically grounded in opposition to the modern world—a community that utilizes violence as a solution to its grievances. Whether the self-proclaimed “Islamic State” (IS) ultimately proves to be a temporary phenomenon or not, IS’s success in engaging Western audiences with deliberate and dangerous propaganda will, without question, be modeled by future non-state (and state) adversaries.
For the United States and other Western governments, the root of the problem is that the potential for non-state actors to execute propaganda campaigns of this scale and effectiveness is new to geopolitics. The information front against terrorist organizations is now of vital strategic significance, and the U.S. government was initially caught unprepared. Foreign policy leaders will not be effective in the 21st century, however, if they do not understand how the nuanced use of media is fundamental to the formation of our foreign policy, and not just in explicating and justifying policies.
While the United States continues to emphasize state-level diplomacy and messaging to global publics, IS represents a case study in the strategic significance of a targeted, audience-centric, modern communication campaign. IS has succeeded not because their audience is predisposed to join, but rather because of their sophistication in shaping information environments which exploit their audience’s vulnerabilities.
Like all sophisticated modern media operations, IS knows how to use media technologies deftly to produce content that is relevant, localized, and targeted to segmented audiences. They are in tune with audience interests and media consumption patterns, and take an audience-first approach in content creation, distribution, and engagement. This is to say: they understand their audiences and local media environments better than we do, and leverage this as an input in their use of media and technology tools. It all works to create a powerful message that is intoxicating to people who are looking for a difference in their lives.
To adapt to this new environment, the United States must recognize that adversary information campaigns have a significant “first-mover” advantage, connecting with their audience first and, in doing so, delegitimizing the U.S. response before it can even launch. To counteract this, the United States must enhance its communication strategy with an understanding of our audience and how U.S. communication capabilities can engage them, improve their lives, and strengthen local media environments to nullify (in this case) IS’s formidable offensive-advantage in this information competition.
Terrorist organizations existed before digital media and will continue to exist. An effective U.S. communication strategy can, however, ensure that the strategic impact of information competitions favors the United States, not its adversaries.

Propaganda is a common element in many, if not all, terrorist incidents. Objectives are usually to instil fear in the target population but may also include winning approval from associates and inspiring new adherents. The advent of social media has greatly expanded opportunities for achieving these objectives. The attacks on worshipers in two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand, on 15 March 2019 resulting in the murder of 51 people and the live streaming of the attack on Facebook were met with responses from governments in New Zealand, France and Australia that sought international cooperation in finding effective counter-measures to the propaganda value of the attacks. Australia’s ambitious regulatory approach is problematic when considered in an international context particularly in relation to the need to take account of free speech guarantees. However, since it recognises the need for international solutions in this area, there are opportunities to explore other ways of achieving its objectives.

While it has become increasingly common for researchers, practitioners and policymakers to draw from the insights of former extremists to combat violent extremism, overlooked in this evolving space has been an in-depth look at how formers perceive such efforts. To address this gap, interviews were conducted with 10 Canadian former right-wing extremists based on a series of questions provided by 30 Canadian law enforcement officials and 10 community activists. Overall, formers suggest that combating violent extremism requires a multidimensional response, largely consisting of support from parents and families, teachers and educators, law enforcement officials, and other credible formers.