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Far-right extremists use the internet to recruit and connect with other radicalised individuals and spread their propaganda online, with them being prolific users of online forums and social media. Such online data can be analysed using linguistic tools to identify markers of radicalisation in social media, forum posts, and other extremist texts. Few studies have examined how language and sentiment online evolves in extremist forums, which provides insight into how radicalisation into extremism unfolds overtime. To address this gap, we examine how the extremist language used by Australian members of the online far-right forum Iron March changed in relation to the level of engagement on the forum, as well as assessing whether any relationship existed between online extremist sentiment and offline violence. Forum data were computationally coded and analysed using the Grievance Dictionary, which is designed to identify psycholinguistic indicators of extremism. Results indicate that while extremist language changes over time, there was no support for the suggestion that greater forum engagement results in higher levels of extremist sentiment. The results found that a high level of online extremist sentiment is associated with offline violence. Findings are linked to existing literature, and limitations in the study design are acknowledged.

VOX-Pol Blog post.

Following America’s “War on Terror,” al-Qaeda and its affiliates became highly decentralized in terms of organizational and media operations. Though mass media outlets continue to play a significant role in drawing attention to al-Qaeda’s transnational campaign, Salafi Jihadists have recently begun to rely on new media for purposes of legitimization and promotion. The Internet serves as a suitable platform for these groups’ media objectives since it is inherently anonymous and absent of censorship. Most importantly, the Internet facilitates al-Qaeda in reaching a global audience, which is made evident by the growing amount of Salafi Jihadist media that is translated or created for English speakers. The latter change may seem paradoxical to the groups’ anti-Western sentiment, but it underscores an important shift in al-Qaeda’s recruitment strategies. The proliferation of English content promoting the Salafi Jihadist cause may imply that al- Qaeda is shifting its attention towards the Muslim diaspora in the West with the intent to recruit, radicalize, and promote acts of terror.
This study analyzed a variety of online publications that were disseminated by al- Qaeda and similar Salafi Jihadist groups. The sample included speech and video transcripts, digital magazines, and articles that were analyzed for the intent to radicalize readers through the employment of Albert Bandura’s eight mechanisms of moral disengagement. The analysis provided substantial support for the latter claim, indicating that many of the digital publications disseminated by Salafi Jihadist groups are intended to both radicalize and recruit readers through the promotion of moral disengagement.

The main purpose of this policy brief is to highlight the risks of radicalization by utilizing statistical analysis. The main question interrogated here is to determine the relation between the level of social reaction and ISIS’s attacks. These reactions are measured through Google Trends of news, web searches, and video ratings. Methodologically, Turkey, France, Belgium, the United Kingdom and Germany are picked as the sample countries. In order to derive consistent data from Google’s database, the keywords “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant,” and its some acronyms such as ISIS, ISIL, Islamic State, and DAESH are utilized.

This analysis revealed that Internet media might function as a recognition tool for terrorist organizations considering the fact that following ISIS’s attacks, people of both the target country and other countries progressively search ISIS on Google. Thus, one way or another, ISIS gains reputation and takes the opportunity for radicalization. Furthermore, the level of these searches differs among the aforementioned countries due to specific reasons, which are elaborated in this policy brief.

The first aim for the GIFCT Academic and Practical Research Working Group (APRWG) Sub-Group 1 was to produce a written assessment of the key barriers to research and knowledge transfer, along with opportunities and models for addressing them. The six GIFCT Working Groups – Academic and Practical Research; Content-Sharing Algorithms, Processes, and Positive Interventions; Crisis Response; Legal Frameworks; Technical Approaches; and Transparency – depend on reliable research and practice. As a result, the APRWG inhabits the unique position of identifying research needs that may ostensibly impact these working groups at a foundational level. This paper aims to assess the knowledge gaps and barriers that affect multiple stakeholders within the field of preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) to begin moving towards holistic, coordinated solutions.

It has been established by leaders of the Australian national security community, such as the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation and the Australian Federal Police, that young people are being increasingly recruited into extremism. To date, few Australian studies have examined this issue using primary source data. This article seeks to understand the conditions which may make vulnerable young Australians more susceptible to recruitment, recruitment pathways, and forms of recruitment. To address this, primary sources were consulted, and frontline countering violent extremism (CVE) practitioners were interviewed. It was found that there is no typical pathway for young Australians to be recruited to extremism and that recruitment can be both foreign (informed by transnational networks and organisations) and/or familiar (within the immediate domestic environment of the young person). We identified the continued significance of online vectors, but further established the ongoing relevance and power of offline engagement for the recruitment of young people. Finally, we suggest that multiple intersecting vulnerabilities render young people more susceptible to recruitment, with data that suggests they may be naïve to their being recruited in the first place.