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The rise of the ‘alt-right’ (alternative right) and their communications on the Internet are not unique to the West. This study follows a mixed-methods approach combining topic modeling, social network analysis, and discourse analysis to analyze the discursive and network structure of an online Chinese alt-right community on Weibo. We summarize the topics Chinese alt-right influencers discuss and examine how these topics are interrelated. We find that the Chinese alt-right discourse can be deemed as both an extension and localization of the global alt-right: they frequently discuss global alt-right issues and also hold alt-right ideologies on domestic issues. Meanwhile, influencers in the community are densely connected, suggesting a high level of coordination and cooperation. We particularly identify two discursive strategies that alt-right influencers employ to reproduce the transnational alt-right discourse, namely invented common crisis of majority culture and transnational metaphor usage. These findings provide insights into the transnational aspect of the rise of global alt-right.

This paper provides an overview of the evolution of the concept of jihadism as it presently exists in cyberspace. From its roots during the Chechen conflict to the current use of social media by the Islamic State (IS), this paper identifies and examines three highly significant paradigm shifts: (1) the emergence of rudimentary Web 2.0 platforms and jihadist forums; (2) the advent of advanced Web 2.0 and social media platforms as methods of spreading jihadism; and (3) turn towards ‘lone wolf’ terrorism. In this paper, the author argues that IS’ extensive reliance on unaffiliated sympathizers, who either re-tweet or re-post content produced and authorized by the IS leadership can be seen as a groundbreaking paradigm shift in the evolution of jihadism in cyberspace. Furthermore, it is also argued that IS’ strategy of empowering of unaffiliated sympathizers represents a further development in the evolution of jihadism in cyberspace and can best be understood as an attempt to normalize and legitimize IS’ existence through its efforts to dominate the ‘IS narrative’ across social media platforms.

The apocalyptic narrative of the Syrian civil war promoted by the Islamic State (IS) terrorist group in 2014 had galvanised around a hundred radicals in Malaysia who subsequently migrated to Iraq and Syria. At least forty-five of them propagated their jihadist cause online resulting in the mushrooming of online extremism in the country. The growth spans over five years (2013-2017) in two phases, one led by Muhammad Lotfi Arifin’s network of online followers and the other by Muhammad Wanndy Muhammad Jedi’s online supporters and sympathizers. Lotfi and his network popularised the concept of ‘jihad’ from the perspective of militant groups, while Wanndy lured vulnerable online followers deeper into the later stages of violent radicalisation. The trajectory of Malaysia’s online violent radicalism from Lotfi to Wanndy was coincidental rather than deliberate, signifying the ‘funnel’ process of radicalisation. This process is synced with the terrorists’ switch from online public platforms to encrypted and private ones.

VOX-Pol Blog post.

An empirical study by the Israel Internet Association analyzes the manner and quality of response by various social media platforms to 447 verified and confirmed reports of harmful content. These reports were submitted to the platforms by the Association’s Internet Safety Hotline, recognized by most platforms as an official Trusted Flagger, after meticulously confirming that all content reported explicitly violated the relevant platforms’ content policies.  The study considers all reports verified and sent to the platforms by the Hotline team between October 7 and December 7, 2023 (the first two months of the Israel-Hamas war) through official channels, the response received from the platforms to these reports, and actions taken or not taken by the platforms in response to the reported content. Parameters evaluated include: response time, the nature and quality of response as a function of content type, and whether the platforms’ actions matched their public commitments to addressing online threats in the wake of the Hamas attacks.

The findings are troubling, and show that response times were exceedingly slow, with little to no action on weekends. Handling of content requiring manual review or contextual understanding was notably poor, revealing significant differences between content types and across different platforms. We show that the same platforms have succeeded in similar situations in other countries, suggesting that success is possible when appropriate resources are channeled into achieving it. We present detailed recommendations as to how to remedy the present situation, and emphasize that responsibility lies not only with the platforms but also with governments and legislators, who permit these companies to operate with minimal transparency and accountability.

VOX-Pol Blog post.