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As terrorist, extremist, and hateful content has become widespread on social media, platforms have responded with content moderation – the flagging, review, and enforcement of rules and standards on user-generated content online. This chapter provides an introduction to contemporary content moderation practices, technologies, and contexts and outlines key debates in the field. The chapter explores the changing regulatory context around hate speech and terrorist content online in the EU. This changing context, such as Germany’s NetzDG law and the EU’s 2021 regulation on terrorist content online, is setting new standards and statutory requirements for platforms and websites. While content moderation is a form of self-regulation run by companies themselves, the regulatory context is shifting towards multistakeholder governance. This chapter then maps key stakeholders and technologies in content moderation as they pertain to radicalisation, looking at trusted flaggers, Internet Referral Units, and automated content moderation. After providing an overview of the regulatory context, stakeholders, and technologies in content moderation, the chapter explores normative questions about deplatforming, how transparency hinders research and accountability in content moderation, and explores inconsistencies in the enforcement of content moderation rules, particularly in the case of the far right. By providing an outline of the regulatory context, mapping multistakeholder arrangements in content moderation, and exploring key debates, this chapter provides readers with an introduction to the growing literature on content moderation and countering radicalisation.

Counter-radicalisation is resource-hungry; policy development and implementation, interventions through the criminal justice system, and bespoke one-to-one engagements outside of it are all costly. In contrast, counter narrative campaigns ostensibly offer a simpler proposition. By engaging with various audiences, campaigners from both the state and civil society can seek to reduce the number of people turning to extremism, question their commitment where they do engage, and ultimately hasten their exit. Despite this allure, the reality of counter narrative campaigns is a conceptually confusing landscape, sometimes based on sketchy theoretical understandings and limited evidence on outcomes.

This chapter provides an overview of counter narratives. It begins by setting out some of the alternative conceptualisations, such as counter and alternative messaging. Building on this, it then identifies some of the theoretical underpinnings of different approaches and explores some of the tools that campaigners use in different settings. It then goes on to look in more depth at how counter narrative campaigning has been evaluated previously, and emergent normative questions around the practice.

Institutional ethics review procedures aim – in principle – to minimise harm and evaluate risks, providing an important space to consider the safety of participants and researchers. However, literature has questioned the effectiveness of the process, particularly for reviewing ‘risky’ topics in a risk-averse environment. This article reports the findings of interviews with 21 researchers of the far right and manosphere to understand how early career researchers perceive and engage with the process as a component of risk management. It argues that scholars experience IRBs struggling to meet their normative goal of ‘no undue harm’ due to a focus on legality and liability whilst lacking topical and methodological expertise. The lack of expertise produced misperceptions of risk, establishing institutional ethics as an obstacle rather than evaluative aid, creating holes in the ‘safety net’ that institutional ethics can provide. These findings contribute to concerns raised about the effective management of risk by early career researchers and the ethical review of ‘sensitive’ topics.

While certain areas of the Islamic State’s activities (propaganda, recruitment, etc.) are well researched, there have been few studies covering the efforts of the organization to neutralize deplatformization, even though its inclusion in a unified system makes it possible to successfully fight against the organization. The present study investigated the Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) applied by the Islamic State to maintain its online presence against the deplatforming efforts of law enforcement agencies and social media stakeholders. A closely related topic, namely the key components of the organization’s successful internet activity, is also examined in this article. During the research, authors mapped and plotted one part of the Islamic State’s internet ecosystem to discover the pattern in this interconnected network. Furthermore, the authors elaborated on a volunteer computing based recommendation for paralysing Islamic State-linked websites.

Most analyses of far-right communication on social media focus on one specific platform, while findings are generalized. In this study, I argue that the far right’s use of social media depends on technology affordances – the linkage between platform design and usage – and, thus, might not always be generalizable. After discussing six affordances – persistence, scalability, replicability, connectivity, searchability, and identifiability – I apply them to studies about the far right on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, and Telegram in a systematic literature review. I conclude that most research focuses on aspects linked to connectivity, scalability, and replicability, while persistence, searchability, and identifiability are barely researched so far. I further discuss shortcomings and possibilities for future research to consider aspect of technology affordances.

Online content generated during the [Israel/Palestine] conflict is having a profound impact on individuals, communities, and societies around the world. It is causing violence, fear, suffering, and damaging social cohesion.

The situation raises important questions around how the Call responds to ongoing conflicts and converging crises that cause a spike in and sustained production of TVEC including as part of distributed propaganda campaigns that raise the baseline of online hatred and violent content to dangerous levels.