Online Library

This thesis aimed to address these limitations by developing a cross-platform analysis framework for online-hate researchers to gain a clearer understanding of the dynamics of the global hate ecosystem. More specifically, the designing of this framework involved examining the main functionalities of existing online-hate analysis frameworks, and the extent to which they address cross-platform hate. The strengths and limitations of these approaches then informed the functional requirements of the cross-platform analysis framework. To demonstrate how the framework can provide novel insights into online-hate research, this thesis also details its application to various case studies, including online hate from white supremacy-supporting users and environments spread during the 2020 US election and the COVID-19 pandemic.

Many countries have formulated strategies to combat radicalization, and regulating and monitoring recommendations on social network platforms is part of these strategies. This article explores the concept of radicalization and the proposed causal link between recommendations and radicalization, highlighting some of the key characteristics of recommendation engines. Based on this background potential risk mitigation measures can be identified that directly affect the recommendation engines. To conclude, some key problems and dilemmas for risk management are discussed.

The dark web and terrorism have become closely intertwined, presenting new challenges to existing security frameworks globally. This brief examines the role of the dark web in enabling terrorist activities, from communication and recruitment to radicalisation and propaganda dissemination. It reviews current literature to highlight the ecosystem of the dark web and its ramifications on national security. The analysis describes the strategies adopted by terrorists in cyberspace, from exploiting mainstream social media platforms to leveraging encrypted channels and clandestine marketplaces. It also highlights the challenges confronting law enforcement and regulatory bodies in monitoring and combating terrorist activities on the dark web, underlining the need for global collaboration. It outlines recommendations for policymakers and security stakeholders to fortify cyber counterterrorism efforts while examining the specific challenges to India.

This article examines the consensus points, evidence base and blind spots of radicalization discourse: namely, the approved ways of talking about radicalization/deradicalization that claim a special scientific or scholarly authority and that have become entrenched as a kind of socially sanctioned common sense embedded in academia, the media and government bureaucracy. Drawing on an analysis of the current 50 most cited journal articles on radicalization and deradicalization, it finds that much of what counts as scholarly knowledge of radicalization and deradicalization lacks a proper empirical foundation and utility for policy makers. It also laments what can be described as “the missing agent” problem in radicalization research, where the dominant focus on putative “risk factors” or “pushes and pulls” of radicalization serves, in effect, to disappear the human agent at the heart of the radicalization process. The article concludes by calling for an empirically-driven approach to radicalization that foregrounds the subjective experiences that animate the process by which people become terrorists or the active supporters of terrorist methods.

While the radical right is relatively successful on social media, only a fraction of its supporters become activists offline. Why do some individuals become offline activists in radical right organizations, while others prefer to limit their support to online spaces? Following an inductive analysis of interviews with activists and supporters of a radical right organization, this study points to the importance of going beyond classical explanations for activism by focusing on the impact of, and relationship between, group identification and stigma for mobilization. It shows that activists who identify with the organization and consider it stigmatized are motivated to participate in protest actions to speak out in front of this perceived injustice. By contrast, supporters who question the organization’s legitimacy in the face of stigma engage with the organization on social media and are motivated by a desire to keep a low profile and to avoid being openly associated with stigmatized actors.

The Digital Services Act (DSA) and the Regulation on Terrorist Content Online (TCO) are both legislative measures enacted by the European Union (EU) which are aimed at regulating digital
services and combating the spread of harmful content online. While both measures are concerned with reducing online harm in the EU, they differ in the nature and extent of: the harm they purport to mitigate; the burden of compliance imposed on platforms undertaking relevant activities; and on the activities which bring platforms in scope. In its concern with a more specific and egregious form of online harm, the TCO generally imposes more stringent requirements on tech platforms and is expressed in more mandatory terms. However, this is not uniformly the case across all the areas which are common to both the DSA and the TCO. In the matter of crisis response in particular, the DSA’s requirements are more exacting and potentially more onerous than those provided by the TCO.