Online Library

We use a postcolonial approach, through which we find that the transphobia espoused online following the attacks was predominantly transmisogynistic, a consequence of the colonial logics around gender which assign the monopoly of violence to white cisgender men. The main themes identified were the erasure of trans identities, particularly transmasculinity, the overlap between transmisogyny and other forms of discrimination, and the demonisation of trans people.

On the heels of reporting that far right extremist militias are once again organizing on Facebook in advance of the 2024 U.S. presidential election, it is urgent for platforms to assess – and immediately act on – threats to the peaceful conduct of elections and the holding and transfer of power.

On March 26th, 2024, a working group of experts met to discuss the relationship between online platforms and election-related political violence. The goal was to provide realistic and effective recommendations to platforms on steps they can take to ensure their products do not contribute to the potential for political violence, particularly in the lead-up and aftermath of the U.S. general election in November, but with implications for states around the world.

Relying on online platforms to “do the right thing” without regulatory and business incentives that reinforce pro-democratic conduct may seem increasingly futile, but we believe there remains a critical role for independent experts to play in both shaping the public conversation and shining a light on where we believe these companies can act more responsibly.

Domestic terrorists pose a significant threat to the U.S., according to the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security. Domestic terrorists often use online platforms—such as social media and gaming—to communicate radical ideas to a wide audience and mobilize likeminded people.

The FBI and DHS have some tools for sharing information with and receiving information from social media and gaming companies on threats related to domestic terrorism. But neither agency has developed strategies and goals related to such information-sharing efforts.

In recent years, radicalization is being increasingly attempted on video-sharing platforms. Previous studies have been proposed to identify online radicalization using generic social context analysis, without taking into account comprehensive viewer traits and how those can affect viewers’ perception of radicalizing content. To address the challenge, we examine QAnon, a conspiracy-based radicalizing group, and have designed a comprehensive questionnaire aiming to understand viewers’ perceptions of QAnon videos. We outline the traits of viewers that QAnon videos are the most appealing to, and identify influential factors that impact viewers’ perception of the videos.

Depuis le début de la vague d’attentats de Daech en Europe et aux États-Unis en 2015, les géants des réseaux sociaux Meta, Google et Twitter se sont investis dans la lutte contre le terrorisme sur leurs services. Cet article interroge la manière dont ces acteurs privés se sont approprié la catégorie contestée de « terrorisme », à travers une analyse de discours d’un corpus de leurs communications officielles. Celle-ci permet de montrer comment ces entreprises tentent, par diverses stratégies, d’évacuer les enjeux politiques intrinsèques à cette notion, avec un succès mitigé.