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Depuis le début de la vague d’attentats de Daech en Europe et aux États-Unis en 2015, les géants des réseaux sociaux Meta, Google et Twitter se sont investis dans la lutte contre le terrorisme sur leurs services. Cet article interroge la manière dont ces acteurs privés se sont approprié la catégorie contestée de « terrorisme », à travers une analyse de discours d’un corpus de leurs communications officielles. Celle-ci permet de montrer comment ces entreprises tentent, par diverses stratégies, d’évacuer les enjeux politiques intrinsèques à cette notion, avec un succès mitigé.

In response to the rise of various fringe movements in recent years, from anti-vaxxers to QAnon, there has been increased public and scholarly attention to misinformation and conspiracy theories and the online communities that produce them. However, efforts at understanding the radicalisation process largely focus on those who go on to commit violent crimes. This article draws on three waves of research exploring the experiences of individuals currently or formerly involved in fringe communities, including the different stages of investment they progressed through, and ultimately, what made people leave. We propose a pathway model for understanding contemporary online radicalisation, including potential interventions that could be safely made at each stage. Insight into the experience of being immersed in these communities is essential for engaging with these people empathetically, and therefore preventing both the emergence of violent terrorists and protecting vulnerable people from being drawn into these communities.

From London to Ontario to Northern Virginia and beyond, young men and women have felt compelled to find belonging in a community ideologically grounded in opposition to the modern world—a community that utilizes violence as a solution to its grievances. Whether the self-proclaimed “Islamic State” (IS) ultimately proves to be a temporary phenomenon or not, IS’s success in engaging Western audiences with deliberate and dangerous propaganda will, without question, be modeled by future non-state (and state) adversaries.
For the United States and other Western governments, the root of the problem is that the potential for non-state actors to execute propaganda campaigns of this scale and effectiveness is new to geopolitics. The information front against terrorist organizations is now of vital strategic significance, and the U.S. government was initially caught unprepared. Foreign policy leaders will not be effective in the 21st century, however, if they do not understand how the nuanced use of media is fundamental to the formation of our foreign policy, and not just in explicating and justifying policies.
While the United States continues to emphasize state-level diplomacy and messaging to global publics, IS represents a case study in the strategic significance of a targeted, audience-centric, modern communication campaign. IS has succeeded not because their audience is predisposed to join, but rather because of their sophistication in shaping information environments which exploit their audience’s vulnerabilities.
Like all sophisticated modern media operations, IS knows how to use media technologies deftly to produce content that is relevant, localized, and targeted to segmented audiences. They are in tune with audience interests and media consumption patterns, and take an audience-first approach in content creation, distribution, and engagement. This is to say: they understand their audiences and local media environments better than we do, and leverage this as an input in their use of media and technology tools. It all works to create a powerful message that is intoxicating to people who are looking for a difference in their lives.
To adapt to this new environment, the United States must recognize that adversary information campaigns have a significant “first-mover” advantage, connecting with their audience first and, in doing so, delegitimizing the U.S. response before it can even launch. To counteract this, the United States must enhance its communication strategy with an understanding of our audience and how U.S. communication capabilities can engage them, improve their lives, and strengthen local media environments to nullify (in this case) IS’s formidable offensive-advantage in this information competition.
Terrorist organizations existed before digital media and will continue to exist. An effective U.S. communication strategy can, however, ensure that the strategic impact of information competitions favors the United States, not its adversaries.

This article constitutes a first step in understanding how Internet memes are used in extreme-right online milieus and formulating appropriate policy responses. First it looks at existing literature on memes as communication units. Secondly, it looks at the particular ways in which transnational extreme-right groups use Internet memes. Thirdly, it discusses the applicability of these memes to resilience-building projects targeting the extreme right. The article’s conclusions discourage the use of Internet memes by state and security actors, while highlighting positive uses by grassroots organisations. Some notes on further necessary research conclude the piece.

VOX-Pol Blog post.

Purpose – Violent extremism has disrupted the social harmony of many countries all over the globe. Pakistan has been marked as an extremist state, becoming one of Pakistan’s biggest challenges. This study aims to look at the strategic communication on countering violent extremism in Pakistan. Violent extremism is likely to increase in the environment marked by a culture of inadequate governance, democratic deficits, corruption, impunity against illegal acts by the nation, violation of human rights, and lack of security.

Study Design/Methodology/Approach – An exploratory research approach has been applied. For this purpose, data has been collected through literature review and electronic databases to determine the communication strategies that may counter violent extremism in Pakistan.  This is a policy paper that outlines the rise in violent extremism worldwide and how these challenges can be rectified by providing solutions.

Findings- This paper highlights the antecedents of violent extremism in Pakistan including poor and inadequate governance, lack of socio-economic opportunities, violation of human rights, lack of justice, and discrimination. The communication strategies that have been used to address violent extremism include target messaging, persuasive and power strategy, use of social media, intergovernmental communication, and education. These strategies may be applied to control violent extremism in Pakistan.

Practical Implications– Counter-violent extremism strategies have been gaining attention from policymakers and practitioners to overcome the challenges for the past few years. This research has highlighted the ways to counter violent extremism that may help policymakers to develop effective strategies and policies in the local context of Pakistan.

Originality/Novelty– This paper has synthesized a model that will help policymakers use strategic communications to counter violent extremism. It emphasized that strategic communication can be a vital element integrated into politics, and action can be taken to handle violent extremism and radicalization.