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Why do people engage in violent extremism? Why do people deem killing others as a reasonable way – the only reasonable way – to get their political voice heard? How do driving a cargo truck into crowds on a promenade or shooting at random believers in a mosque come to be seen as legitimate alternatives? The short answer is that we have no answer. However, over the last 20 years, radicalization has been the cornerstone concept used by academics, media and policymakers to describe how ordinary individuals become violent extremists. Radicalization outlines the process of embracing an extremist ideology and justifying or perpetrating violent actions in the name of such ideology. Originally, the purpose of this concept was to investigate the roots behind the series of jihadist terrorist attacks that shook the heart of Western democracies at the beginning of the 21st century. For instance, the train bombings of Madrid (2004) and London (2005) with a combined death toll of 249 civilians were not carried out by Islamists educated under the banner of Al-Qaeda sponsored madrassas but by second-generation immigrants born and raised within the liberal social fabric of the European Union. As a result, these attacks were labelled cases of homegrown terrorism and their causes were linked to the perpetrators “acting out” a violent Islamist ideology. Explanations harkening back to situational factors like group structure and settings were difficult to digest at that time, probably because it would have amounted to admitting that Western societies could prepare the structural soil conducive to jihadist terrorism. More comforting was framing the perpetrators as vulnerable individuals who fell prey to the luring speeches of unscrupulous recruiters (e.g., preachers, combatants) and led the former to reach the “tipping point” and turn the words into actions (Crone 2016).

In this chapter, we explore the communication modes and tactics used by extremists across the ideological spectrum to spread their narratives on social media. We argue that a growing body of evidence suggests that extremist movements across the political spectrum make use of similar communication modes and tactics on social media to reach their objectives. Drawing on specific case studies and examples from extreme-right, conspiracy myth and Islamist extremist campaigns, this chapter highlights how groups and networks adapt to changing circumstances and external pressure by making different strategic choices about whether to use overt or covert, centralized or crowdsourced, influencer-based or network-based and aggressive or optics-focused communication modes. On a tactical level, our case studies provide insights into approaches chosen by extremist movements to radicalize sympathizers, influence mainstream audiences and intimidate political opponents. Throughout these case studies, it becomes clear that extremists are engaged in collective learning in relation to their communication modes and the use of new technologies, with approaches and instructional materials being shared and inspiring extremists across borders.

In the context of far-right terrorism, memes on 4chan play a fundamental role. These memes not only serve as a form of propaganda but also as a tool to radicalize and mobilize users. On 4chan, a site known for its lack of moderation and anonymity, memes are used to spread extremist ideologies in a viral and accessible manner. Memes can destabilize and trivialize serious issues, normalizing hate and violence among users. Furthermore, their humorous and accessible format facilitates the spread of radical ideas, making them more appealing and less confrontational. By becoming an integral part of 4chan’s online culture, these memes not only reinforce extremist ideology but also foster a community where violence and hate become acceptable and common topics. This dynamic highlights the importance of addressing the role of memes in the spread of extremism and the need for strategies to counteract their impact.

No abstract available.

The use of the Internet to spawn hate sites and recruit advocates for hate began as early as the mid-1980s in bulletin boards, and the first acknowledged hate site was Stormfront, in the early 1990s. Since then hundreds of hate sites and other websites advocating terror have been developed, some with stated aims of recruiting young people and influencing extreme action. This article reviews what is currently known about the development of hate sites into sophisticated recruitment and attitude-influencing mechanisms. The questions asked are: how do hate sites recruit members who might normally not be involved in hate and extreme action, how may hate sites radicalize the actions of young people already accepting of the mindset advocated by the website, and how effective is Internet recruitment?

This book explores the social forces among and between online aggressors that affect the expression and perpetration of online hate. Its chapters illustrate how patterns of interactive social behavior reinforce, magnify, or modify this expression. It also considers the characteristics of social media that facilitate social interactions that promote hate and facilitate relationships among haters. Bringing together a range of international experts and covering an array of themes, including woman abuse, antisemitism, pornography, radicalization, and extreme political youth movements, this book examines the specific social factors and processes that facilitate these forms of hate and proposes new approaches for explaining them. Cutting-edge, interdisciplinary, and authoritative, this book will be of interest to sociologists, criminologists, and scholars of media, communication, and computational social science alike, as well as those engaged with hate crime, hate speech, social media, and online social networks.