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The purpose of this article is to compare and contrast the US press coverage accorded to female terrorist plotter, Colleen LaRose, with that of two male terrorist plotters in order to test whether assertions in the academic literature regarding media treatment of women terrorists stand up to empirical scrutiny. The authors employed TextSTAT software to generate frequency counts of all words contained in 150 newspaper reports on their three subjects and then slotted relevant terms into categories fitting the commonest female terrorist frames, as identified by Nacos’s article in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (2005). The authors’ findings confirm that women involved in terrorism receive significantly more press coverage and are framed vastly differently in the US press than their male counterparts.

The policy brief makes the case that policymakers and practitioners need to consider who the state defines as ‘extremists.’ In the West, terrorism and violent extremism are seen as the most radical expressions of anti-government resistance. Things, however, look different in the Global South where some governments effectively foster extremists of their own while targeting legitimate and often nonviolent opposition. Echoes of such an approach are also present in Europe where certain (semi-) authoritarian governments securitise their responses to political dissent while seemingly drawing inspiration from more autocratic regimes outside this continent. Thus, in their case, an attempt to counter real or imagined extremism could consequently and likewise lead them to foster extremists of their own.

This paper presents a review of recent academic scholarship and debates on cyber terrorism, and more broadly of what is known about terrorist’s direct use of the Internet as weapon and, less directly, as a communication device. It presents an overview of a field of discourse that has, since its inception, provided a number of foreboding and even doomsday warnings about the future of cyber terrorism, which in the main have failed to come to realization. First, it surveys why these gloomy warnings regarding future proliferation of cyber terrorism have not been born out in practice, and explains that rather than looking for instances of the Internet being used directly as a weapon by terrorists, current debates in academic and policy circles have shifted to trying to measure and ascertain the role that the Internet plays in spreading and supporting extremist discourse to ever wider audiences. It continues by posing a series of questions regarding online audiences that are in need of future research if we are to better understand the role of the Internet in spreading and supporting violent extremist discourse and cultivating terrorism, most importantly the role of audiences as autonomous agents in navigating, reacting and responding to online violent extremist materials.

Research on far-right extremism has grown substantially over the last decade, owing to the rise of Trump, attacks such as the one in Christchurch and Buffalo, as well as the mainstreaming of hate speech and polarization. In addition to research, there have been antifascist activists who have been engaged in doxxing members of the far right who are part of our schools, our militaries, and governments. Releasing the private information of members of far-right movements to the public has created interesting policy and law enforcement dilemmas. With respect to law enforcement, can doxxing be used as a tool to force individuals to disengage from groups? For social media companies, doxxing violates their terms of service, but should an exception be made in these instances since it purportedly serves a public interest? For this paper, we interviewed 10 former members of the far right who have experienced doxxing over the last several years. The paper explores what happened, the immediate and long-term effects of doxxing on their lives, and ongoing challenges of being exposed against their will. We conclude with some policy recommendations related to the costs and benefits of doxxing on these individuals but also society at large.

This article presents the results of a case study of the online community Russian Nationalism, one of the most popular Russian nationalists’ online communities on VKontakte in 2012–2016. The article aims to find out where network leaders and common members of nationalist online groups closed on the Russian Internet go and in which thematic communities they continue their activity. Russian Nationalism members’ personal profiles and friendly links on VKontakte were used as data sources. The metrics of social network analysis were used to study Russian Nationalism’s network structure. The study showed that the ban of a massive extreme right nationalist online group leads to an increase in the number of smaller shelter groups that retain their ideological basis, but abandon the clearly expressed hate speech; members of a banned nationalist group flow to groups whose content is both close (militaristic, cultural, and historical) and far (everyday) to the extreme right. The content of the latter can transform in line with the nationalist ideology. The case study of Russian Nationalism shows a high potential for diffusion of extreme right nationalist ideas in the Russian network space, which manifests in their ability to penetrate other thematic and ideological areas of public discourse.

VOX-Pol Blog post.