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While the radical right is relatively successful on social media, only a fraction of its supporters become activists offline. Why do some individuals become offline activists in radical right organizations, while others prefer to limit their support to online spaces? Following an inductive analysis of interviews with activists and supporters of a radical right organization, this study points to the importance of going beyond classical explanations for activism by focusing on the impact of, and relationship between, group identification and stigma for mobilization. It shows that activists who identify with the organization and consider it stigmatized are motivated to participate in protest actions to speak out in front of this perceived injustice. By contrast, supporters who question the organization’s legitimacy in the face of stigma engage with the organization on social media and are motivated by a desire to keep a low profile and to avoid being openly associated with stigmatized actors.

Exposure to radicalizing information has been associated with support for violent extremism. It is, however, unclear whether specific information use behavior, namely, a distinct pattern of incidental exposure (IE) to and active selection (AS) of radicalizing content, indicates stronger violent extremist attitudes and radical action intentions. Drawing on a representative general population sample (N = 1509) and applying latent class analysis, we addressed this gap in the literature. Results highlighted six types of information use behavior. The largest group of participants reported a near to zero probability of both IE to and AS of radicalizing material. Two groups of participants were characterized by high or moderate probabilities of incidental exposure as well as a low probability of active selection of radicalizing content. The remaining groups displayed either low, moderate, or high probabilities of both IE and AS. Importantly, we showed between-group differences regarding violent extremist attitudes and radical behavioral intentions. Individuals reporting near zero or high probabilities for both IE to and AS of radicalizing information expressed the lowest and strongest violent extremist attitudes and willingness to use violence respectively. Groups defined by even moderate probabilities of AS endorsed violent extremism more strongly than those for which the probability for incidental exposure was moderate or high but AS of radicalizing content was unlikely.

This paper examines the counter-violent extremism and anti-terrorism measures in Australia, China, France, the United Kingdom and the United States by investigating how governments leveraged internet intermediaries as their surrogate censors. Particular attention is paid to how political rhetoric led to legislation passed or proposed in each of the countries studied, and their respective restrictive measures are compared against the recommendations specified by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression. A typology for international comparison is proposed, which provides further insights into a country’s policy focus.

Incels are a sub-culture community of men who forge a sense of identity around their perceived inability to form sexual or romantic relationships. In recent years, there has been a small, but growing, number of violent attacks that have been attributed to individuals who identify as incels. The purpose of this study was to use a large sample of incels from the UK and US to establish (a) their demographic make-up; (b) the consistency of their attitudes and beliefs; (c) their adherence to a common world view, (d) how they network with other incels; (e) whether there are cross-cultural differences between incels from the UK and US in the above; and finally, whether there is a predictive relationship between incel mental health, networking and ideology and the extent of their harmful attitudes and beliefs.

The literature shows that there are two fields that can feed radicalization, online and offline domains. However, the arbitrary separation has been challenged since radicalised individuals use both domains for their activities and they seamlessly move across the two (Pauwels & Schils, 2016; Gill et al., 2017; Whittaker, 2022). Furthermore, most scholars today agree that radicalization is not a linear or a step-by-step process, but rather a multifactorial phenomenon (Frissen, 2021), where different mechanisms operate in different ways for different people in different contexts (Borum, 2011). This report presents the main theories and ways radical groups influence and attract individuals online, and the most common tools and strategies governments use to counter its impact.