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This policy brief explores new and innovative communications approaches to reduce the threat from all forms of violent extremism in Europe today based on a precise analysis of the strategic problem and corresponding strategic communications solutions deployable in response. In the context of an ever-evolving violent extremist landscape, including new and emerging forms of violent extremism, unfolding events in Israel and Gaza, and an accelerating digital environment – this policy brief looks at how governments can take a more strategic approach to preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE). Based on a strategic analysis of current events and an informed analysis of previous policy responses, this policy brief offers a new and practical approach to the use of strategic communications aimed at safeguarding all communities from all forms of extremist and violent threats, to turn back the tide of extremist influence for good.

Currently the UK does not have a specific anti-cyberterrorism law, instead relying on existing anti-terrorism laws to deal with cyberterrorism. This approach raises a number of problems insofar as it can lead to legislative uncertainty and unpredictability, as well as impacting on carrying risks of over-criminalisation, a lack of counterbalance, violation of principles of proportionality and arbitrariness. In light of these problems, this article aims to offer a critical evaluation of the UK’s existing legal responses to cyberterrorism with reference to the rule of law and basic human rights principles, mainly focusing on the vague and overly broad definition of terrorism, a tendency towards criminalising a wide range of terrorism precursor offences online, pre-emptive strategies and aggravated punishment of cyberterrorism. Based on this analysis, the article argues that applying the extension of existing anti-terrorism laws to combat low-risk cyberterrorism activities runs the risk of exacerbating harms to the values of the rule of law.

The use of the internet by extreme right-wing groups is nothing new (see, for example, Conway et al., 2019; Hale, 2012) although its use by extremists has traditionally been in conjunction with activity organised on the ground (e.g. marches, meetings or organised events; Mudde, 2000). While some far-right organisations still operate in this way, the emergence of the Alternative Right (Alt-Right), which operates predominantly online, has redefined far-right extremism and enabled radical white male nationalists to unify (Neiwert, 2017: 258). The affordances of the online environment have similarly united a range of men’s rights groups: from those campaigning against the repression of traditional gender roles to those which define themselves through extreme misogyny, blaming feminism for the perceived emasculation and degradation of men. These collectives are together known as the manosphere (a term coined in 20 09 on the blog The Manosphere).

On October 7, 2023, during the Jewish Sabbath and festival of Simchat Torah, Hamas shocked the world by invading Israel from Gaza across multiple entry points. The results were devastating: the single largest one-day total of murdered Jews since the Nazi Holocaust. Hamas targeted civilian families, assaulted and kidnapped hundreds of other civilians who were taken hostage in Gaza. Evidence suggests that Hamas was preparing for a ‘second phase’ of assaults, targeting the people of Israel. In response to this unprecedented massacre of 1,200 Israelis and the kidnapping of others, Israeli forces invaded Gaza with the stated goal of destroying Hamas.

In the online sphere, the vicious attacks set off a wave of posts, images, memes, cyber terror attacks, and videos on social media, but also on the dark web and adjacent sites. The Simon Wiesenthal Center’s (SWC) Digital Terrorism and Hate Project monitors the social media activities of over 7,000 groups, individuals, and online channels, many who support Hamas and other terrorist groups. This report will explore the explosion of cyberterrorist activity against Jewish and Israeli targets in the wake of October 7th and expose some of the key groups and actors that have caused significant disruption and threats to personal safety.

While the radical right is relatively successful on social media, only a fraction of its supporters become activists offline. Why do some individuals become offline activists in radical right organizations, while others prefer to limit their support to online spaces? Following an inductive analysis of interviews with activists and supporters of a radical right organization, this study points to the importance of going beyond classical explanations for activism by focusing on the impact of, and relationship between, group identification and stigma for mobilization. It shows that activists who identify with the organization and consider it stigmatized are motivated to participate in protest actions to speak out in front of this perceived injustice. By contrast, supporters who question the organization’s legitimacy in the face of stigma engage with the organization on social media and are motivated by a desire to keep a low profile and to avoid being openly associated with stigmatized actors.

Exposure to radicalizing information has been associated with support for violent extremism. It is, however, unclear whether specific information use behavior, namely, a distinct pattern of incidental exposure (IE) to and active selection (AS) of radicalizing content, indicates stronger violent extremist attitudes and radical action intentions. Drawing on a representative general population sample (N = 1509) and applying latent class analysis, we addressed this gap in the literature. Results highlighted six types of information use behavior. The largest group of participants reported a near to zero probability of both IE to and AS of radicalizing material. Two groups of participants were characterized by high or moderate probabilities of incidental exposure as well as a low probability of active selection of radicalizing content. The remaining groups displayed either low, moderate, or high probabilities of both IE and AS. Importantly, we showed between-group differences regarding violent extremist attitudes and radical behavioral intentions. Individuals reporting near zero or high probabilities for both IE to and AS of radicalizing information expressed the lowest and strongest violent extremist attitudes and willingness to use violence respectively. Groups defined by even moderate probabilities of AS endorsed violent extremism more strongly than those for which the probability for incidental exposure was moderate or high but AS of radicalizing content was unlikely.