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During the 2019 Christchurch attack, the perpetrator livestreamed footage from a helmet-mounted camera. The aesthetic similarity of the attack footage to first-person shooter (FPS) videogames has led to speculation that this might have somehow ‘gamified’ the attack. Generally, the argument for this is that the attack footage (1) imitates or resembles FPS games, gamifying attacks (2) increasing the affective appeal of propaganda by presenting it as play and thereby (3) increasing the salience of these attacks within gaming communities. This article challenges these notions. It argues that the FPS genre should not be associated with such footage due to visual similarity and is better considered in relation to film. The idea that such footage was purposefully shot to look like an FPS is unsupported, and more likely the result of practical considerations. While the framework of gamification might be useful, it should rest on interactivity, rather than aesthetic similarity.

VOX-Pol Guest Lecture Series, Autumn 2023

Name: Kristina Kirk, Principal Advisor, Christchurch Call Unit, New Zealand Government

Title: The Christchurch Call

Outline: This presentation will discuss the establishment and evolution of The Christchurch Call, an initiative arising as a consequence of the livestreaming of an horrific terrorist event in New Zealand in 2019. The Call outlines collective, voluntary commitments from Governments and online service providers designed to address the issue of terrorist and violent extremist content online and to prevent the abuse of the internet as occurred during and after the Christchurch attacks.

Content takedowns have emerged as one of the central pillars in the global fight against disinformation and extremism. Despite their increasing ubiquity as disruptive tools in political processes, their true efficacy remains up for debate. We ‘know’, for example, that takedowns had a strong disruptive effect on Islamic State-supporting networks online, but we do not know whether constraining avenues for expression may ultimately accelerate offline acts of violence. We also know that extreme-right networks have weaponised content takedowns as evidence of victimisation and the steadfast erosion of ‘free speech’, often underpinning calls to (violent) action. There is much to understand about the efficacy of content moderation with regard to accelerationism, democracy and (violent) extremism: this event seeks to address these issues in an open forum for discussion.

Chair: Dr. James Fitzgerald (Dublin City University)

Presentation 1: Moderating Borderline Content whilst Respecting Fundamental Values Dr Katy Vaughan (Swansea University)

Presentation 2: Recommending Instead of Taking Down: YouTube hyper-partisan content promotion amid the 2022 Brazilian general elections Profs. Rose Marie Santini, Débora Salles, & Bruno Mattos (Federal University of Rio de Janeiro)

Presentation 3: Wellness and Conspiracy Theories: The promise and peril(s) of content takedowns Dr. Vivian Gerrand (Deakin University) and Dr. James Fitzgerald (Dublin City University)

Why do people engage in violent extremism? Why do people deem killing others as a reasonable way – the only reasonable way – to get their political voice heard? How do driving a cargo truck into crowds on a promenade or shooting at random believers in a mosque come to be seen as legitimate alternatives? The short answer is that we have no answer. However, over the last 20 years, radicalization has been the cornerstone concept used by academics, media and policymakers to describe how ordinary individuals become violent extremists. Radicalization outlines the process of embracing an extremist ideology and justifying or perpetrating violent actions in the name of such ideology. Originally, the purpose of this concept was to investigate the roots behind the series of jihadist terrorist attacks that shook the heart of Western democracies at the beginning of the 21st century. For instance, the train bombings of Madrid (2004) and London (2005) with a combined death toll of 249 civilians were not carried out by Islamists educated under the banner of Al-Qaeda sponsored madrassas but by second-generation immigrants born and raised within the liberal social fabric of the European Union. As a result, these attacks were labelled cases of homegrown terrorism and their causes were linked to the perpetrators “acting out” a violent Islamist ideology. Explanations harkening back to situational factors like group structure and settings were difficult to digest at that time, probably because it would have amounted to admitting that Western societies could prepare the structural soil conducive to jihadist terrorism. More comforting was framing the perpetrators as vulnerable individuals who fell prey to the luring speeches of unscrupulous recruiters (e.g., preachers, combatants) and led the former to reach the “tipping point” and turn the words into actions (Crone 2016).

Most analyses of far-right communication on social media focus on one specific platform, while findings are generalized. In this study, I argue that the far right’s use of social media depends on technology affordances – the linkage between platform design and usage – and, thus, might not always be generalizable. After discussing six affordances – persistence, scalability, replicability, connectivity, searchability, and identifiability – I apply them to studies about the far right on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, and Telegram in a systematic literature review. I conclude that most research focuses on aspects linked to connectivity, scalability, and replicability, while persistence, searchability, and identifiability are barely researched so far. I further discuss shortcomings and possibilities for future research to consider aspect of technology affordances.

Research examining radical visual communication and its manifestation on the trending platform TikTok is limited. This paper presents a novel methodological framework for studying mobilization strategies of far-right groups on TikTok, employing a mixed-method approach that combines manual annotation, unsupervised image classification, and named-entity recognition to analyze the dynamics of radical visuals at scale. Differentiating between internal and external mobilization, we use popularity and engagement cues to investigate far-right mobilization efforts on TikTok within and outside their community. Our findings shed light on the effectiveness of unsupervised image classification when utilized within a broader mixed-method framework, as each observed far-right group employs unique platform characteristics. While Conspiracists flourish in terms of overall popularity and internal mobilization, nationalist and protest content succeeds by using a variety of persuasive visual content to attract and engage external audiences. The study contributes to existing literature by bridging the gap between visual political communication at scale and radicalization research. By offering insights into mobilization strategies of far-right groups, our study provides a foundation for policymakers, researchers, and online platforms to develop proactive measures to address the risks associated with the dissemination of extremist ideologies on social media.