Online Library

How does removing the leadership of online hate organizations from online platforms change behavior in their target audience? We study the effects of six network disruptions of designated and banned hate-based organizations on Facebook, in which known members of the organizations were removed from the platform, by examining the online engagements of the audience of the organization. Using a differences-in-differences approach, we show that on average the network disruptions reduced the consumption and production of hateful content, along with engagement within the network among periphery members. Members of the audience closest to the core members exhibit signs of backlash in the short term, but reduce their engagement within the network and with hateful content over time. The results suggest that strategies of targeted removals, such as leadership removal and network degradation efforts, can reduce the ability of hate organizations to successfully operate online.

This paper argues that companies’ efforts to deal with TVEC have been hampered at the outset by a tendency to define TVEC extremely narrowly. Still, only a tiny proportion of content that could reasonably be categorized as TVEC is included in most definitions. An outsized focus on pre-identified Islamic extremists and terrorist groups means that other types of violent extremists and terrorists (e.g., white supremacists, incels), and those unaffiliated with a group (e.g., lone-wolf actors) are overlooked. This paper also explores the idea of ethical obligations and norms as an alternative to a legally required definition.

Canadian right-wing extremism is now recognized as a serious problem and their use of social media to circulate hate, violence, and racism is a growing concern. However, not until circa 2016 did Canadian academics, police agencies, and intelligence agencies view the threat of right-wing extremism as a national security issue within Canada. My dissertation examines the usage of social media by “right-wing extremist”(RWE) groups in Canada to contribute to the collective knowledge pool of Canadian right-wing extremism. It aims to identify hate as an affective form of communication regularly utilized by right-wing extremists through their usages of social media. This dissertation draws upon conceptual resources in media and communication studies to develop an analytical framework to examine how four Canadian RWE Facebook pages, Pegida Canada, Act for Canada, Canada Defence League, and Canada Three Percenters, created a digital space to justify and circulate racism, hate, and violence in social media. I use social network analysis, news event analysis, and frame shift analysis to unpack the digital space that leads to what I label as “malicious enclaves”: a facade of a politically oriented group that establishes a veil of legitimacy to facilitate hateful and violence-endorsing views primarily on digital social media. The social network analysis generates an understanding of how malicious enclaves are connected and interacted with various Facebook pages, the news event analysis provides a glimpse at a two-day data inclusion window to ascertain how the malicious enclaves respond to a pre-defined news event, and finally, the frame shift analysis examines how the malicious enclaves collectively switch their frames to respond to a novel news event. My dissertation demonstrates how the online circulation of grievances around victimization has positioned racism and violence toward hated others, especially Muslims, as an RWE’s defensive response necessary to protect the nation. My research into malicious enclaves unravel an intimate relationship between social media, racist forms of hatred, and violence. Ultimately, it challenges the notion that we need only be concerned about the possibility of spillage from online to offline activity, and it encourages attention to less “spectacular” and visible forms of violence.

In this report, we have sought to understand how violent extremists behave across an increasingly complex online ecosystem and consider the implications for how online violent extremism (VE) activity can be countered. We interrogated the variety of measures, behaviours and technology platforms that are being used by violent extremists internationally. In so doing, we identified gaps in understanding of the complex and expansive contours of the VE online landscape, and the extent to which VE online does, or does not, constitute a distinctive phenomenon that might require a different policy setting. The outcomes of the research will contribute to the undertakings of the Office of the Ambassador for Counter-Terrorism in establishing a first-rate network between Australia and its international partners that enables a ready and trusted exchange of knowledge and communication on VE and terrorism activities to maximise the effectiveness of counters.

Recognizing the correlation between the growing spread of violent extremist and terrorist content on the internet and online platforms and the significant increase in attacks inspired by these posts prompted governments, security agencies, and private companies to launch various countermeasures to reduce the spread and impact of such material. Struggling to adjust to these countermeasures and maintain their online presence, terrorists and violent extremists have migrated from mainstream online platforms to alternative online channels like 4chan, 8chan, Telegram, TikTok, and most recently to the new platform TamTam. This paper describes the migration to and within social media generally, with a specific focus on the newly discovered migration to the platform TamTam and presents the results of our extensive content analysis of hundreds of posts and shares containing terrorist and violent extremist content on this platform. These findings are discussed in terms of ethical and practical implications.