Online Library

Does the URL referral structure of websites lead users into ‘rabbit holes’ of unreliable content? Past work suggests algorithmic recommender systems on sites like YouTube lead users to view more unreliable content. However, websites without algorithmic recommender systems have financial and political motivations to influence the movement of users, potentially creating browsing rabbit holes. We address this gap using browser telemetry that captures referrals to a large sample of domains rated as reliable or unreliable information sources. Our results suggest the incentives for unreliable sites to retain and monetise users create rabbit holes. After landing on an unreliable site, users are very likely to be referred to another page on the site. Further, unreliable sites are better at retaining users than reliable sites. We find less support for political motivations. While reliable and unreliable sites are largely disconnected from one another, the probability of traveling from one unreliable site to another is relatively low. Our findings indicate the need for additional focus on site-level incentives to shape traffic moving through their sites.

The terrorist attacks in Norway in 2011 and New Zealand in 2019 have revealed that the far-right worldwide uses the memory of the Yugoslav wars for online mobilization. Scholars working on memory activism usually deal with the liberal, self-critical memory emerging from the bottom-up activism of human rights groups while neglecting the activism of the far-right. This article fills the gap by addressing the global circulation of two memes, Remove Kebab and Pepe the Frog, as examples of far-right memory activism. In order to address the transnational circulation of memes as memory activism, this article employs the concept of ‘traveling memory’ while relying on multimodal discourse analysis to unveil the processes of memetic transformation, imitation, iconization and narrativization. The analysis reveals an alternative memory of Yugoslav wars that depicts Serbia as the first case of ‘white genocide’ in Europe, reversing the roles of war criminals and victims while propagating violence and celebrating genocide. The article argues that memory studies can no longer ignore memory production of far-right communities and, at the same time, outlines the method for examining far-right digital memory activism, revealing a whole set of mnemonic practices developed among the anonymous fringe communities of the far-right.

Incels (“involuntary celibates”) are online communities of young men, broadly aligned by anti-feminism, concern over an inability to form sexual relationships with women, and a strong negative focus on their own appearance. Incels have been linked to violent misogyny and several mass killings. Using critical discourse analysis on data from nine different incel online forums, this article explores how incels discussed the Plymouth shooting in August 2021, often reported as an incel attack, looking at the discourses which are invoked to justify or delegitimize violence. As well as violent rhetoric, our research also pays attention to anti-violent rhetoric in incel communities, an area not yet discussed in the literature regarding incels, but which may be invaluable to those hoping to address the issue of incel violence. Our findings identify significant differences in the way the shooting is discussed across different incel forums, and reveal that both pro and anti-violence discourses frequently invoke lookism and mental health to justify victimhood.

The article analyzes the online humorous practices and discursive conventions of a far-right Russian Telegram community during a sociopolitical crisis. A sample of 130 disparagement jokes is examined to find out how existential uncertainty, created by the outbreak of a full-scale war, affects the far-right humorous othering. The jokes were published in a Local Crew channel a month before and a month after two moments of the most acute sociopolitical upheaval, namely, the declaration of mobilization and the attempted coup by the Wagner Group. The findings demonstrate that, after the war started, the community opted for demonizing the single outgroup while attempting to preserve the coherent ingroup by means of building ingroup appreciation within a pro-military nationalist niche. Additional upheavals were framed as irrelevant, compared to the major identity markers and the general crisis of the war, and did not affect either the community’s rhetoric or the othering patterns.

Since the inception of video games, extremist groups have been able create, modify, and weaponise this media for activism and their campaigns. More recently, however, the emergence of gaming-adjacent platforms (most notably Discord, Twitch and Steam) has become a key organisational tool for recruitment and community-building; something that policing communities all over the world have been grappling with, especially in regard to the potential for extremist content to create radicalising effects that lead to political violence. This article explores how policing communities are approaching extremist groups on gaming-adjacent platforms, what strategies they’ve been using, and the effect this has on extremist activism -both in the online, but also more crucially in the offline, space. Using semi-structured interviews with 13 leading P/CVE practitioners, academic and technology industry experts, and content moderation teams, what the article finds is that third-party policing communities are increasingly using more sophisticated tactics to combat extremist content but that these efforts are being increasingly frustrated by the networked nature of extremism and a lack of robust enforcement at platform level. In the future, this research suggests that more transparency about terms of service enforcement from above and mitigation of toxic extremist ‘adjacent’ cultures from below might help foster more resilience against the prevalence of extremism on gaming-adjacent platforms.

The October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel marked a pivotal moment not only in Middle East security policy but also in the global Islamist and particularly jihadi propaganda landscape. This article examines how the ensuing digital “victimhood-revenge” narrative rapidly spread across platforms like TikTok, fueling a new wave of radicalization among adolescents in Europe. Drawing on six European case studies from 2023 to 2025—including foiled and executed attacks in Vienna, Solingen, and Zurich—this article identifies a recurring radicalization pattern involving emotionally  vulnerable, digitally native individuals exposed to algorithm-driven Islamist content in social media, but predominantly on TikTok. The analysis conceptualizes this process through the lens of a “Virtual Caliphate Complex” and explores TikTok’s role as a low-threshold gateway into extremist ecosystems. By analyzing cross-platform mobilization dynamics, aesthetic framing, and the hybridization of lone-actor terrorism with online support networks, the article underscores the urgency of adapting P/CVE strategies to algorithmic environments. The conclusion suggests possible policy emphasis on content moderation, digital literacy, and platform accountability—particularly in the context of the European Union’s Digital Services Act legislation. The article contends that today’s prevailing Islamist radicalization pattern reflects not only ideological motivations but also youth-online-culture dynamics and algorithmic influence.