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Deplatforming websites—removing infrastructure services they need to operate, such as website hosting—can reduce the spread and reach of extremism and hate online, but when does deplatforming succeed? This report shows that deplatforming can decrease the popularity of extremist websites, especially when done without warning. We present four case studies of English-language, U.S.-based extremist websites that were deplatformed: the Daily Stormer, 8chan/8kun, TheDonald.win/Patriots.win, and Nicholas Fuentes/America First. In all of these cases, the infrastructure service providers considered deplatforming only after highly publicized or violent events, indicating that at the infrastructure level, the bar to deplatforming is high. All of the site administrators in these four cases also elected to take measures to remain online after they were deplatformed. To understand how deplatforming affected these sites, we collected and analyzed publicly available data that measures website-popularity rankings over time.

We learned four important lessons about how deplatforming affects extremist websites:

• It can cause popularity rankings to decrease immediately.
• It may take users a long time to return to the website. Sometimes, the website never regains its previous popularity.
• Unexpected deplatforming makes it take longer for the website to regain its previous popularity levels.
• Replicating deplatformed services such as discussion forums or live-streaming video products on a stand-alone website presents significant challenges, including higher costs and smaller audiences.

Our findings show that fighting extremism online requires not only better content moderation and more transparency from social media companies but also cooperation from infrastructure providers like Cloudflare, GoDaddy, and Google, which have avoided attention and critique.

Increasingly, global society is focused on the harm caused by material accessed on the internet. Individuals of all ages and backgrounds–policy makers, academics, politicians, mental health professionals, medical professionals and the general public–are seeking to understand the processes that govern the relationship between exposure to harmful content online and later harmful cognitions and behaviors. Several commentators have placed into stark focus several questions surrounding the use (and misuse) of the internet, and prevention of harm from it. Three issues come immediately to mind: First, what can be done to prevent the manifestation of harmful activities stemming from being online? Second, what is the underlying relationship between harmful material accessed online, and harmful behavioral outcomes? And third, what is the best approach (and how to we know what the “best” is) to prevent the manifestation of harmful behavior stemming from harmful content online? Rather than looking at each of these issues as a stovepipe, and seeking to answer each in isolation, in this chapter we adopt an integrationist perspective on the issue of preventing online harm online. Specifically, we will look at the theories of how and why exposure to extreme and harmful material online can cause negative real-world outcomes. We focus on the innovative Google-led program Jigsaw, 1 to explore the many and varied approaches that can be adopted to challenge and counter the issues of extreme and harmful material online. Finally, leveraging new approaches from public health (Su et al., 2021; Shortland et al., 2021), we outline the major ethical, practical, and theoretical issues that pervade technology-based efforts to tackle the issue of extreme and harmful material online.

Since the fall of the Caliphate, the activities and overall threat posed by Western jihadists has undoubtedly diminished. 1 A recent study released by the Program on Extremism, for example, demonstrated a steady decline in jihadist activity in the United States (US) since 2020. In this three-year period, only twenty-nine Americans have been charged, compared to eighty-two in the previous three years. 2 Similarly, Europe has experienced a steady annual reduction in jihadist arrests from 718 in 2016 to 260 in 2021.3 This is the second period since 9/11 where there has been a marked decline in the ability to radicalize and mobilize people to support the jihadi movement or conduct attacks in the West. 4 Whether or not the cycle of (relative) success and decline will repeat itself depends on a number of factors, some of which are harder to predict than others. What is clear for now is that there remains a pool of committed Western jihadists who are working to keep the movement alive in the US and Europe in hope that future opportunities for mass mobilization may arise. This report investigates how Western jihadists and efforts to radicalize Westerners have adapted to the post-Caliphate reality and the current downward trajectory and complements the Program’s recent quantitative analysis of the Islamic State (IS) threat in the US Some Western jihadi strategies have remained the same, such as the calls to conduct lone actor attacks in the West. However, there have been some marked shifts in strategic communications. For instance, in some cases the discourse about Muslim grievances resembles those that were prevalent during the previous lull in Western jihadist activity, such as a refocusing on Muslim prisoners in the West. The report opens with an overview of how Western jihadists have responded to the online post-Caliphate world in which many of the online platforms popular among jihadists have become increasingly proactive in removing jihadist accounts and content. Here, there is evidence of a reversion to an earlier, pre-Caliphate, era of online jihadism in which much activity and file sharing took place on forums rather than mainstream social media platforms.

The terrorist attacks in Norway in 2011 and New Zealand in 2019 have revealed that the far-right worldwide uses the memory of the Yugoslav wars for online mobilization. Scholars working on memory activism usually deal with the liberal, self-critical memory emerging from the bottom-up activism of human rights groups while neglecting the activism of the far-right. This article fills the gap by addressing the global circulation of two memes, Remove Kebab and Pepe the Frog, as examples of far-right memory activism. In order to address the transnational circulation of memes as memory activism, this article employs the concept of ‘traveling memory’ while relying on multimodal discourse analysis to unveil the processes of memetic transformation, imitation, iconization and narrativization. The analysis reveals an alternative memory of Yugoslav wars that depicts Serbia as the first case of ‘white genocide’ in Europe, reversing the roles of war criminals and victims while propagating violence and celebrating genocide. The article argues that memory studies can no longer ignore memory production of far-right communities and, at the same time, outlines the method for examining far-right digital memory activism, revealing a whole set of mnemonic practices developed among the anonymous fringe communities of the far-right.