Online Library

This study examines lone wolf attacks, distinct aspect of terrorism, through contemporary dynamics. Broadly, lone wolves are defined as individuals who experience their radicalization processes independently and are often associated with self-radicalization. However, it would be inaccurate to assume that lone wolves are entirely isolated from social processes. Although they do not act on directives when planning and carrying out their attacks, it is essential to recognize their interactions with others. In particular, the relationships they establish during their radicalization process, alongside personal motivations, are significant. The study explores the idea that traditional group dynamics crucial to radicalization are, for lone wolves, facilitated through online environments. The argument that online platforms serve as a socialization milieu for radicalization forms the core contribution and purpose of this research. Accordingly, the study analyzes how online activities influence the radicalization of lone wolves and evaluates strategies to counteract this phenomenon. Lastly, it engages in a discussion on the relationship between lone wolf terrorism and traditional organizational terrorism.

This systematic review unveils significant convergence between cybercriminals and terrorists over the past decade, characterized by substantial overlap in tactics, capabilities, and infrastructure exploitation. Key findings illuminate the adoption of cybercriminal methods by terrorist organizations, the engagement of cybercriminal groups in terrorist activities, the proliferation of enabling technologies such as cryptocurrencies and the dark web, and the role of social media in facilitating knowledge exchange between diverse threat actors. While direct terrorist involvement in profit-driven cybercrime appears limited, the escalating convergence underscores urgent imperatives for enhanced cooperation, legal refinement, the establishment of flexible counter-threat authorities, and collaboration with the private sector. Continuous monitoring of this rapidly evolving landscape is crucial to inform effective policies and interventions in an increasingly interconnected digital world.

VOX-Pol Blog post.

The exploitation of social media platforms by terrorist threat networks (TTNs) represents a critical challenge to national security that traditional counterterrorism frameworks struggle to address. This study examines how military information support operations (MISO) can be strategically leveraged to counter TTNs’ exploitation of these platforms for radicalization, recruitment, and operational planning. Through analysis of operational data and case studies from 2014–2024, this research demonstrates that current approaches face significant limitations, with response delays averaging 30 days, while terrorist content reaches millions within hours. The study employs a mixed-methods approach combining qualitative analysis of counterterrorism operations with quantitative assessment of social media data to evaluate the effectiveness of current countermessaging efforts. Based on empirical evidence demonstrating a 45% reduction in extremist content through coordinated response efforts, this research proposes establishing a strategic information support operations agency (SISOA) to coordinate countermessaging efforts, supported by advanced analytics and intelligence integration through OSINT, SOCMINT, and PUBINT capabilities. The findings indicate that strategic implementation of MISO, coupled with appropriate organizational structures and ethical guidelines, could significantly enhance counterterrorism effectiveness while preserving democratic values and civil liberties. This framework provides a model for balancing operational requirements with privacy protections in the digital age.

This paper investigates one sub-topic within a right-wing extremist (RWE) movement in India – love jihad, a conspiracy created by Hindutva nationalists alleging that Muslims forcefully convert Hindu women to Islam with allurements of love. Love jihad narratives and digital dissemination tactics serve a nation-building, patriarchal and vote-seeking function for the nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The BJP and allied nationalist and media organisations have led many anti-love jihad campaigns. However, this study investigates how ­non-elite – ordinary – social media users construct love jihad discourse through a discourse analysis of 188 sub-sampled tweets from February to October 2023. The analysis finds relative congruence in how non-elites, elites, media and nationalist organisations frame love jihad. The invoked themes – Muslim exclusionism, patriarchy, nationalism and post-truth politics – are cross-cutting and mutually reinforcing but can also be categorised based on which appears at the forefront. I use this organisation to highlight novel frames within each theme and their implicit and explicit cross-cutting dimensions. Finally, these findings can be situated in broader discussions around the connection between populism and post-truth politics, and call for reconceptualising online social movements.

Numerous studies have reported an increase in hate speech on X (formerly Twitter) in the months immediately following Elon Musk’s acquisition of the platform on October 27th, 2022; relatedly, despite Musk’s pledge to “defeat the spam bots,” a recent study reported no substantial change in the concentration of inauthentic accounts. However, it is not known whether any of these trends endured. We address this by examining material posted on X from the beginning of 2022 through June 2023, the period that includes Musk’s full tenure as CEO. We find that the increase in hate speech just before Musk bought X persisted until at least May of 2023, with the weekly rate of hate speech being approximately 50% higher than the months preceding his purchase, although this increase cannot be directly attributed to any policy at X. The increase is seen across multiple dimensions of hate, including racism, homophobia, and transphobia. Moreover, there is a doubling of hate post “likes,” indicating increased engagement with hate posts. In addition to measuring hate speech, we also measure the presence of inauthentic accounts on the platform; these accounts are often used in spam and malicious information campaigns. We find no reduction (and a possible increase) in activity by these users after Musk purchased X, which could point to further negative outcomes, such as the potential for scams, interference in elections, or harm to public health campaigns. Overall, the long-term increase in hate speech, and the prevalence of potentially inauthentic accounts, are concerning, as these factors can undermine safe and democratic online environments, and increase the risk of offline harms.