Online Library

Combating ISIS Online Panelists talked about *ISIS’ use of the Internet and social media to recruit supporters. They also addressed the U.S. government’s efforts to combat the terror group online. Other topics included whether internet and social media companies should be forced to identify and/or ban those suspected of promoting terror.

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), or DAISH/DAESH in Arabic is a militant group that has called itself the Islamic State.

Seit 2018 nahm mit den Anschlägen von Pittsburgh, Christchurch, Poway, El Paso, Bærum und Halle eine neue Form des Rechtsterrorismus an Fahrt auf, dessen Modus Operandi aus drei untrennbar miteinander verbundenen Akten besteht: Erstens, ein rassistisches Schriftstück auf einem Imageboard posten, das rechtsextreme Inhalte in nihilistischen Memes verpackt. Zweitens, eine Zielgruppe mit Waffengewalt angreifen, dabei möglichst viele Menschen töten und die Tat live im Internet streamen. Drittens, zur Imitation aufrufen, indem alle Informationen zur Tat leicht zugänglich gemacht werden, damit eine breite Öffentlichkeit (aus Sympathie oder Sensationslust) Videosequenzen und Bilder der Tat reproduziert und das Werk der Täter veredelt.

VOX-Pol Blog post.

This article constitutes a first step in understanding how Internet memes are used in extreme-right online milieus and formulating appropriate policy responses. First it looks at existing literature on memes as communication units. Secondly, it looks at the particular ways in which transnational extreme-right groups use Internet memes. Thirdly, it discusses the applicability of these memes to resilience-building projects targeting the extreme right. The article’s conclusions discourage the use of Internet memes by state and security actors, while highlighting positive uses by grassroots organisations. Some notes on further necessary research conclude the piece.

From London to Ontario to Northern Virginia and beyond, young men and women have felt compelled to find belonging in a community ideologically grounded in opposition to the modern world—a community that utilizes violence as a solution to its grievances. Whether the self-proclaimed “Islamic State” (IS) ultimately proves to be a temporary phenomenon or not, IS’s success in engaging Western audiences with deliberate and dangerous propaganda will, without question, be modeled by future non-state (and state) adversaries.
For the United States and other Western governments, the root of the problem is that the potential for non-state actors to execute propaganda campaigns of this scale and effectiveness is new to geopolitics. The information front against terrorist organizations is now of vital strategic significance, and the U.S. government was initially caught unprepared. Foreign policy leaders will not be effective in the 21st century, however, if they do not understand how the nuanced use of media is fundamental to the formation of our foreign policy, and not just in explicating and justifying policies.
While the United States continues to emphasize state-level diplomacy and messaging to global publics, IS represents a case study in the strategic significance of a targeted, audience-centric, modern communication campaign. IS has succeeded not because their audience is predisposed to join, but rather because of their sophistication in shaping information environments which exploit their audience’s vulnerabilities.
Like all sophisticated modern media operations, IS knows how to use media technologies deftly to produce content that is relevant, localized, and targeted to segmented audiences. They are in tune with audience interests and media consumption patterns, and take an audience-first approach in content creation, distribution, and engagement. This is to say: they understand their audiences and local media environments better than we do, and leverage this as an input in their use of media and technology tools. It all works to create a powerful message that is intoxicating to people who are looking for a difference in their lives.
To adapt to this new environment, the United States must recognize that adversary information campaigns have a significant “first-mover” advantage, connecting with their audience first and, in doing so, delegitimizing the U.S. response before it can even launch. To counteract this, the United States must enhance its communication strategy with an understanding of our audience and how U.S. communication capabilities can engage them, improve their lives, and strengthen local media environments to nullify (in this case) IS’s formidable offensive-advantage in this information competition.
Terrorist organizations existed before digital media and will continue to exist. An effective U.S. communication strategy can, however, ensure that the strategic impact of information competitions favors the United States, not its adversaries.

In response to the rise of various fringe movements in recent years, from anti-vaxxers to QAnon, there has been increased public and scholarly attention to misinformation and conspiracy theories and the online communities that produce them. However, efforts at understanding the radicalisation process largely focus on those who go on to commit violent crimes. This article draws on three waves of research exploring the experiences of individuals currently or formerly involved in fringe communities, including the different stages of investment they progressed through, and ultimately, what made people leave. We propose a pathway model for understanding contemporary online radicalisation, including potential interventions that could be safely made at each stage. Insight into the experience of being immersed in these communities is essential for engaging with these people empathetically, and therefore preventing both the emergence of violent terrorists and protecting vulnerable people from being drawn into these communities.