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This report assesses the ethics and politics of policing online extremist material, using the normative framework of international human rights law, particularly the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, European Convention on Human Rights and
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights – whilst not conducting a legal analysis. It draws where appropriate upon interpretations by the UN Human Rights Committee, UN experts (such as the High Commissioner for Human Rights and special mandate holders), and regional human rights bodies and courts (such as the Council of Europe and the European Court of Human Rights). The report looks at definitions of ‘extremist material’; the types of monitoring and blocking being undertaken by government agencies and the private sector; and considers the roles of these key stakeholders, along with private individuals and civil society groups. It is based on a two-day workshop in January 2015 with thirty expert stakeholders from law enforcement and intelligence agencies, governments and parliaments, civil society, and universities. Short versions of ten papers were presented to stimulate discussion, following an open call for extended abstracts. These are available on the VOX-Pol website: http://voxpol.eu/.

The authors conducted seven follow-up semi-structured interviews with stakeholders from law enforcement, industry, government and civil society; and background policy analysis. The first author also co-organised a workshop on privacy and online policing with the UK’s National Crime Agency in March 2015, and participated in three further workshops where the topics of this report were addressed: two on law enforcement use of communications data, and a third at the United Nations on the relationship between encryption and freedom of expression. Both authors are grateful for the assistance of interviewees, co-organisers, and workshop participants.

The report is produced by the EU-funded VOX-Pol Network of Excellence, and takes particular account of the network’s development of semi-automated search for violent online extremist content and deployment of available tools for search and analytics, including text, video, sentiment, etc., currently employed in other domains for analysis of violent online extremist content. The network’s focus 6 CHECK THE WEB is on making these tools freely available for research purposes to academics, but may also extend to others professionally tasked in this area (such as activists and law enforcement agencies). It is also centrally concerned with the ethical aspects of deployment of such tools and technologies.

Islamic State (IS) terrorist networks in Syria and Iraq pose threats to national security. IS’ exploitation of social media and digital strategy plays a key role in its global dissemination of propaganda, radicalization, and recruitment. However, systematic research on Islamic terrorist communication via social media is limited. Our research investigates the question: How do IS members/supporters use Twitter for terrorism communication: propaganda, radicalization, and recruitment? Theoretically, we drew on microeconomic network theories to develop a theoretical framework for multi-sided Twitter networks in the global Islamic terrorist communication environment. Empirically, we collected 3,039 tweets posted by @shamiwitness who was identified in prior research as “an information disseminator” for the IS cause. Methodologically, we performed social network analysis, trend and content analyses of the tweet data. We find strong evidence for Shamiwitness-intermediated multi-sided Twitter networks of international mass media, regional Arabic mass media, IS fighters, and IS sympathizers, supporting the framework’s utility.

Since late 2014, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) social networks on Twitter have been
subjected to periodic account suspensions. In a study of metrics for a network of English language
ISIS supporters active from June to October 2015, suspensions held the size and reach
of the overall network flat, while devastating the reach of specific users who have been
repeatedly targeted.
By analyzing a list of English-speaking ISIS adherents, we found:
• The number of readily discoverable English-speaking ISIS supporters on Twitter is
relatively small, usually fewer than 1,000 accounts.
• Extending the discovery process using advanced social network analysis produced a
network of fewer than 3,000 accounts at any given time.
• ISIS English-language social networks are extremely insular, meaning users mostly
follow and interact with each other.
• The number of users in the network who are based in Iraq and Syria appears to have
declined over time, partly because of suspension activity, but also because of operational
security concerns within ISIS and the deaths of some prominent Syria-based network
participants.
• The average number of Twitter followers any given ISIS supporter could expect was 300
to 400. Average follower counts were periodically reduced by aggressive waves of
suspensions. However, under typical conditions the average remained flat, as seen over a
30-day period beginning in late August, during which relatively few suspensions took
place.
• Over time, individual users who repeatedly created new accounts after being suspended
suffered devastating reductions in their follower counts.
• Network and individual declines persisted even when suspension pressure eased,
suggesting that suspensions diminish activity in ways that extend beyond the simple
removal of accounts.
• The amount of pro-ISIS content available on Twitter was also limited by suspensions,
since all of a user’s tweets are typically deleted when his or her account is suspended.
• ISIS supporters have deployed several countermeasures in an effort to offset the negative
effects of suspensions.
• Countermeasures include the use of applications and simple hacking techniques to
quickly create new accounts for users who have been suspended, as well as elaborate
tactics to rebuild follower networks. Some of these approaches are sophisticated, but they
have had only limited benefits.
• ISIS supporters have also explored the use of other social media platforms as a
supplement to Twitter, but they feel that a robust presence on Twitter and Facebook is
integral to their recruitment and propaganda efforts, and continue returning to those
platforms despite challenges.
Our analysis was based on a list of accounts maintained and promoted by ISIS supporters on
Twitter. The list was primarily billed as a resource for finding other ISIS supporters, but it
included some non-porter accounts, and the user who maintained the list did not follow all of
the listed accounts.

This report presents the analysis of a corpus of academic and grey literature relevant to a key
challenge facing our society. How can media and communications be used to counter identity-based
violence (IBV) or Violent Extremism (VE)?
Part I focuses on “Counter-Narratives”, looking at the evidence relating to strategic policy
communication strategies and counter-propaganda techniques. This reflects literature from
policymakers, think-tanks, and civil society initiatives rather than the academic literature base.
Key findings include the following:
• Current literature and policy concerned with countering propaganda is dominated by the language
of ‘counter-narratives’ but a common understanding of this relatively new lexicon has yet to emerge.
• There is little hard evidence that proves interaction with VE content leads to participation in VE
activities.
• The hypothesis that VE narratives or the real life threat of VE can be countered by an alternative set
of communications is an assumption that remains unproven.
These findings challenge claims that responding to propaganda strategies by firing back
with “counter-narratives” can be effective.
Part II looks at “Alternative Approaches” to the use of the media to counter violent extremism,
drawing on insights from the “media development” and “media assistance” sectors, and research
into whether mass media and new communication interventions can inhibit identity-based violence
in certain crisis situations. Key findings include the following:
• The theoretical foundations for these alternative approaches are supported by a stronger and more
established research base, drawn from the multi-disciplinary fields of development, peace building,
and social cohesion.
• Media projects have less impact if seen to be linked to a political agenda.
• A growing evidence base suggests that radio and television drama addressing issues of identity,
reconciliation and tolerance have a positive an impact on public attitudes and behaviour.
• Media assistance can ensure that local and domestic media can respond appropriately to VE
narratives.
• There is an emerging evidence base regarding the potential for rapid reaction media and
communication strategies in situations where there is a threat of IBV.
These findings suggest that alternative media strategies can help. But the trust and credibility of
information providers is crucial.
The final section “Reflections” concludes that the research landscape is fragmented and disconnected.
but suggests several professional/practitioner sectors and academic disciplines could shed light on
potentially effective media and communication CVE strategies.
More needs to be done to draw the threads together to learn lessons and to identify and prioritise
gaps in our knowledge and understanding.

In this Lowy Institute Analysis, Lauren Williams examines Islamic State’s use of the Western media to disseminate its propaganda. Williams argues mainstream media outlets have a responsibility to treat Islamic State-produced material more critically, expose the weaknesses of its messages, and place greater effort into counter-messaging.

KEY FINDINGS
Islamic State’s media arm has a clearly defined strategy to manipulate the mainstream media to serve its propaganda objectives.
A more critical view of Islamic State’s claims and propaganda is needed to limit the effectiveness of the group’s messages.
The role of the media, as well as the stories of returnees and defectors, as a platform for counter-messaging has been underutilised.

It is now widely understood that extremists use the Internet in attempts to accomplish many of their objectives. In this chapter we present a web-crawler called the Terrorism and Extremism Network Extractor (TENE), designed to gather information about extremist activities on the Internet. In particular, this chapter will focus on how TENE may help differentiate terrorist websites from anti-terrorist websites by analyzing the context around the use of predetermined keywords found within the text of the webpage. We illustrate our strategy through a content analysis of four types of web-sites. One is a popular white supremacist website, another is a jihadist website, the third one is a terrorism-related news website, and the last one is an official counterterrorist website. To explore differences between these websites, the presence of, and context around 33 keywords was examined on both websites. It was found that certain words appear more often on one type of website than the other, and this may potentially serve as a good method for differentiating between terrorist websites and ones that simply refer to terrorist activities. For example, words such as “terrorist,” “security,” “mission,” “intelligence,” and “report,” all appeared with much greater frequency on the counterterrorist website than the white supremacist or the jihadist websites. In addition, the white supremacist and the jihadist websites used words such as “destroy,” “kill,” and “attack” in a specific context: not to describe their activities or their members, but to portray themselves as victims. The future developments of TENE are discussed.