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VOX-Pol Blog post.

As the Internet is progressively integrated into industrial and defense-related networks around the globe, it is becoming increasing important to understand how state and sub-state groups can use Internet vulnerabilities as a conduit of attack. The current social science literature on cyber threats is largely dominated by descriptive, U.S.-centric research. While this scholarship is important, the findings are not generalizable and fail to address the global aspects of network vulnerabilities. As a result, this dissertation employs a unique dataset of cyber threats from around the world, spanning from 1990 to 2011. This dataset allows for three diverse empirical studies to be conducted. The first study investigates the political, social, and economic characteristics that increase the likelihood of a state being targeted for cyber threats. The results show that different state characteristics are likely to influence the forms of digital attack targeting. For example, states that experience increases in GDP per capita and military size are more likely to be targeted for cyber attacks. Inversely, states that experience increases in GDP per capita and those that are more democratic are less likely to be targeted for cyber terrorism. The second study investigates the role that international rivalries play in cyber threat targeting. The results suggest that states in rivalries may have more reason to strengthen their digital security, and rival actors may be cautious about employing serious, threatening forms of cyber activity against foes because of concerns about escalation. The final study, based upon the crisis bargaining theory, seeks to determine if cyber threat targeting decreases private information asymmetry and therefore decreases conflict participation. Empirical results show that the loss of digital information via cyber means may thus illicit a low intensity threat or militarized action by a target state, but it also simultaneously increases the likelihood that a bargain may be researched, preventing full scale war by reducing the amount of private information held between parties.

In this paper, I review U.S. constitutional considerations for lawmakers seeking to balance terrorist threats against free expression online. The point is not to advocate for any particular rule. In particular, I do not seek to answer moral or norms-based questions about what content Internet platforms should take down. I do, however, note the serious tensions between calls for platforms to remove horrific but First Amendment-protected extremist content – a category that probably includes the Christchurch shooter’s video – and calls for them to function as “public squares” by leaving up any speech the First Amendment permits. To lay out the issue, I draw on analysis developed at greater length in previous publications. This analysis concerns large user-facing platforms like Facebook and Google, and the word “platform” as used here refers to those large companies, not their smaller counterparts.

VOX-Pol Blog post.

Gaming Community of Practice: The Gaming Community of Practice (GCoP) was formed to foster collaboration, knowledge sharing, and innovation among practitioners in the gaming industry alongside global experts. The group aimed to inform the development of best practices and guidance to prevent terrorists and violent extremists (TVE) from exploiting games, gaming-adjacent services, and the gaming community. Leading members of the Extremism and Gaming Research Network (EGRN) produced a series of outputs based on Working Group meetings to guide online gaming companies in better awareness of TVE threats and how to counter them. Galen Lamphere-Englund worked with GIFCT to produce a report on Prevent, Detect, and React: A Framework for Countering Violent Extremism on Gaming Surfaces as well as an annotated 2024 Resource List: Violent Extremism, Radicalization, and Gaming. Rachel Kowert and Sarah Chittick produced a brief guide for companies on Threat Surfaces in Games: Challenges and Best Practices. The group’s gaming platforms also explored how best expanded threat signal sharing could evolve, which will take form further as GIFCT’s Investigator’s Community of Practice in 2025.

VOX-Pol Blog post.