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Deutsche Internetaktivisten sind seit 2005 ein integraler Teil der internationalen jihadistischen Szene geworden, die sich seitdem in einem Prozess stetigen Wandels befindet. Noch nie war es so einfach wie heute, über das Netz und netzbasierte neue soziale Medien auf alle Arten jihadistischer Propaganda zuzugreifen. Die Autoren dieser Sammelstudie befassen sich in erster Linie mit der Situation in der Diaspora – vor allem jener in Deutschland – und suchen das Verhältnis zwischen jihadistischer Aktivität in der virtuellen und in der physischen Realität zu beleuchten und zu klären. Ihre wichtigste Schlussfolgerung lautet: Virtuelle und physische Realität sind auch in der jihadistischen Bewegung eng miteinander verbunden. Internetpropaganda ist gerade dort außerordentlich wirksam, wo sie von aktiven jihadistischen Gruppierungen betrieben wird. Gelingt es, wichtige Aktivisten und Knotenpunkte ihrer Webtätigkeit auszuschalten, können ihre Gegner die Öffentlichkeitsarbeit der Terroristen stark beeinträchtigen. Darüber hinaus lebt das jihadistische Internet vom Vertrauen der Aktivisten untereinander. Gelingt es den Sicherheitsbehörden, durch Infiltration der Webpräsenzen Misstrauen zu säen, lässt die Attraktivität des jihadistischen Netzes schnell nach.

This chapter summarises the findings of a case study on social media activity during the 22 July 2011 terrorist attacks in Norway. Based on these findings and on theories and previous research on the role of social media in situation awareness (SA) configuration during crisis situations, the chapter offers seven recommendations for key communicators in official crisis management and response institutions, journalistic institutions, NGOs and others: (1) acknowledge social media as important and master monitoring and management of features across social media; (2) synchronise communication and establish a standard operating procedure (SOP); (3) establish and make known a joint social media emergency account; (4) participate, interact and take the lead; (5) be aware of non-hashtagged content; (6) implement verification tools and practices and (7) engage with and learn from celebrities. Book edited by Harald Hornmoen and Klas Backholm

This chapter analyses the Norwegian Twitter-sphere during and in the aftermath of the terrorist attack in Norway on 22 July 2011. Based on a collection of 2.2 million tweets representing the Twitter-sphere during the period 20 July–28 August 2011, the chapter seeks answers to how the micro-blogging services aided in creating situation awareness (SA) related to the emergency event, what role hashtags played in that process and who the dominant crisis communicators were. The chapter is framed by theories and previous research on SA and social media use in the context of emergency events. The findings reveal that Twitter was important in establishing SA both during and in the aftermath of the terrorist attack, that hashtags were of limited value in this process during the critical phase, and that unexpected actors became key communicators.
Book edited by Harald Hornmoen and Klas Backholm

There is an inverse relationship between public access to the Internet and the inability of governments and institutions to control information flow and hence state allegiance, ideology, public opinion, and policy formulation. Increase in public access to the Internet results in an equivalent decrease in government and institutional power. Indeed, after September 11, 2001, Internet traffic statistics show that many millions of Americans have connected to alternative news sources outside the continental United States. The information they consume can be and often is contrary to U.S. government statements and U.S. mainstream media reporting. Recognizing this, terrorists will coordinate their assaults with an adroit use of cyberspace for the purpose of manipulating perceptions, opinion, and the political and socioeconomic direction of many nation-states.

This report analyses memes propagated among three online socio‐political groups drawn from sample datasets pulled from social media sites often used by adherents of each group. These groups include those connected to the India‐based Hindutva, US‐based neo‐Nazis and those engaging in pro‐Rittenhouse communications in late 2020. The authors chose the groups based on similarities in their ideological goals, race‐based nationalism and their close association with political violence in their respective countries.

This paper analyzes the meaning of iconography that constitute memes by reviewing a collection of memes propagated on social media related to the Kyle Rittenhouse shooting of protestors in Wisconsin. The authors collected 355 images from 37,774 tweets, supplemented by images found in Facebook groups, militia forums, and right-wing meme repositories related to Kyle Rittenhouse. The paper leads with an introduction to the American “alt-right” movement and the Rittenhouse shootings. The paper’s methodology deconstructs each meme into a set of constituent parts. This provides a process for classifying memes based on their templates, “aesthetic,” branding, events, iconography, and seemingly ambiguous references. This allows researchers to better attribute memes to specific socio-political and cultural groups, analyze the intent of the messaging, and situate memes in the broader knowledge base that, over time, solidifies into its own entity with its own kind of social and political agency.