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This paper combines corpus linguistics and critical discourse analysis methodologies in order to investigate the discourses and cyber activism of the British right-wing nationalist party, Britain First. A study of a corpus of texts produced by elite members of the group reveals a racist, xenophobic stance which constructs Islam and Muslims as the radical, dangerous ‘Other’. This creates a discourse of fear that threatens the way of life of the indigenous in-group of the British people. An investigation of the cyber activity of the group demonstrates that Britain First is able to achieve a significant amount of following on social media by publishing populist material that veils their true nature or ideological stance.

On March 11, the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World convened a panel to launch two new Brookings papers that break down the ideology and social media methods of the Islamic State to trace how the group rose in influence to become a global jihadi movement.

VOX-Pol Blog post.

The Digital Services Act (DSA) requires designated Very Large Online Platforms and Very Large Online Search Engines (VLOPs and VLOSEs) conduct assessments of the systemic risk of the dissemination of illegal content through their services- and to mitigate such risk where it arises. With regulators, researchers, civil society, and the general public finally due to see the public versions of the first systemic risk assessments conducted by VLOP and VLOSE providers, robust evaluation of the DSA’s systemic risk management approach to the dissemination of illegal content is crucial.  

CERRE’s Benchmarks for Evaluating Management of Risk of Terrorist Content Dissemination issue paper contributes to this evaluation by examining the systemic risk management approach to the dissemination terrorist content. Terrorist content is a specific subset of illegal content under the DSA that is also the subject of a complex nexus of other EU legislation, including the TERREG and several transnational initiatives. The determination of terrorist content poses a significant challenge, as authorities and platforms grapple with the use of sophisticated evasive techniques by terrorist actors, including the use of coded content or “beacons”, while also seeking to respect the fundamental rights of platform users.  

In this issue paper, author  Sally Broughton Micova explores the key definitional issues surrounding terrorist content and maps the ecosystem of actors involved in its risk assessment, mitigation, enforcement, and dissemination. Based on detailed analysis, the paper develops a series of benchmarks and concomitant metrics for the systemic risk evaluation of terrorist content. 

Our country is still in the early stages of the 21st century where technology is advancing on a daily basis allowing the threat of terrorism, both domestic and foreign, to pose a serious risk to both its citizens and its assets if not addressed soon. There are numerous potentially vulnerable sites throughout the country that are still left under guarded and under-protected, specifically my emphasis for this project, the California Independent System Operator (ISO). This multilayered project utilizes public information from the Department of Homeland Security manual. The project also includes information from various national publications of defense principles and security countermeasures, as well as law enforcement protocols in place to deal with these types of security threats and potential breaches, scholarly articles, and industry trade journals.
The California ISO lacks physical and some virtual controls that make it more vulnerable to attacks. Specific recommendations have been made to ensure that the ISO is better protected and can still run an effective business.