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The counter-jihad scene can be understood variously as a collection of parties, pundits, and movements all linked by a common belief that the West is being subjected to takeover by Muslims. In this article, I seek to improve academic understanding of this collection of movements, parties, and ideas by analyzing the discourse presented by a collection of online advocates whom I describe as the counter-jihad nebula. The findings suggest a need to at least partially re-evaluate the role of the nebula within the wider counter-jihad scene as well as the relationship between the wider counter-jihad scene and mainstream political discourse as expressed through various media outlets.

This blog post explores the reasons why some online ideological groups take action while others do not and focuses on to what extent the online communications of ideological groups contribute to direct collective action.

In order to address this question, we examined a number of online groups using a variety of criteria, including the way they express their group identity online, the narratives they use to imbue their ideologies with legitimacy, and the goals or actions they advocate. We compared these criteria to the actions that the groups have taken, and goals they accomplished.

Our research also explores communication processes and the use of persuasive narratives in an online setting through a number of case studies. These observations provide insight into the decision-making of groups in an online setting and the ways that narrative and discourse are used to justify taking certain actions.

We discuss here findings from two of these case studies, on the American Resistance Movement (ARM), an online community related to the American Patriot movement and the online hacktivist group Anonymous.

We will set out how the concepts of ideology and identity impact on each case, how these relate to the types of actions advocated and taken, and, briefly, the differing effect of anonymity.

Internettet præsenteres ofte som et farligt redskab i hænderne på terrorister. Det er dog ikke nødvendigvis sandheden. Artiklen trækker på indsigter fra studier af sunniekstremistiske grupper, Anders B. Breivik og Anonymous og diskuterer terroristers anvendelse af internettet i organiseringen og udførelsen af terrorisme. Jeg vil argumentere for, at det anarkiske og anonyme internet fører mistillid og fragmentering med sig, hvilket gør det sværere for grupper at opretholde en fælles strategi og det fælles fjendebillede. Artiklen styrker derfor fortællingen om, at det hovedsageligt er ekskluderede og socialt marginaliserede enspændere, der ender med at planlægge voldshandlinger i isolation bag computerskærmen. I forlængelse heraf vil jeg pege på, at hovedparten af potentielle terrorister drages af fysisk interaktion,
våben og eksplosioner – og ikke udviklingen af komplekse cybervåben.

This paper discusses how cyberspace has become a venue for terrorists groups for recruiting and proliferating propaganda and terrorism. Moreover, this study explores how the low cost Internet infrastructure and social media sites (such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube) have contributed to their networking and operations due to the convenience, in terms of availability, accessibility, message redundancy, ease of use, and the inability to censor content. Concepts such as cyber-weapons, cyber-attacks, cyber-war, and cyber-terrorism are presented and explored to assess how terrorist groups are exploiting cyberspace.

As dozens of British women and girls travel to join Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, there are increasing concerns over female radicalization online. These fears are heightened by the case of Roshonara Choudhry, the first and only British woman convicted of a violent Islamist attack. The university student in 2010 stabbed her Member of Parliament, after watching YouTube videos of the radical cleric Anwar Al Awlaki. Current radicalization theories portray Choudhry as a “pure lone wolf,” a victim of Internet indoctrination, without agency. This article explores how gender factors in her radicalization, to present an alternative to existing theoretical explanations. An engagement with gender reveals its role in Choudhry’s radicalization, first, in precluding her from a real-world engagement with Islamism on her terms, pushing her to the Internet; then in increasing her susceptibility to online extremist messages; finally, in fomenting an eventually intolerable dissonance between her online and multiple “real” gendered identities, resulting in violence. The article emphasizes the transgressive nature of this act of female violence in Salafi-Jihadi ideology; also, the importance of this gendered ideology as the foundation of ISIS recruitment online. It emphasizes the importance of understanding the operation of gender in the Jihad’s production of violence, and roles for men and women alike.

The present report is the first in a series focusing on the capacity of Member States to respond to the challenges posed by the foreign terrorist fighter threat. Foreign terrorist fighters pose an acute and growing threat. They increase the intensity, duration and intractability of conflicts and may pose a serious threat to their States of origin, the States they transit and the States to which they travel, as well as States neighbouring zones of armed conflict in which foreign terrorist fighters are active, such as Jordan, that as a result are affected by serious security burdens and often need to commit massive resources to combat the impact, and which are, therefore, themselves victims of terrorism. The threat of foreign terrorist fighters may affect all regions and Member States, even those far from conflict zones. International networks have been established by terrorists and terrorist entities among States through which foreign terrorist fighters and the resources to support them have been channelled back and forth. In exploring the major risks posed by the foreign terrorist fighter phenomenon, the report assumes that the threat of terrorist acts resulting from a range of terrorist organizations, including, but not confined to, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the Al-Nusrah Front, is rapidly changing and will not be fully geographically contained; that there appears to be virtually no short-term possibility of ending certain threats; and that a significant longer-term risk will derive from “alumni” foreign terrorist fighters upon their return to their own countries or upon their arrival in third countries. The report identifies an urgent need to establish effective flows of information at the national and international levels in the implementation of Security Council resolution 2178 (2014), as noted in Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001) and 2178 (2014), and suggests ways in which that can be done. It draws attention to the significant risks faced by small States due to the possible consequences of returning foreign terrorist fighters, and discusses the human rights implications of possible responses. Future reports will discuss ways to address recruitment, the challenges posed by Internet and communications technologies, exit and entry screening, returning foreign terrorist fighters and other issues. The Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate has identified an initial 67 Member States most affected by the acute and growing threat posed by
foreign terrorist fighters, who are defined in Security Council resolution 2178 (2014) as individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, including in connection with armed conflict. In reviewing the implementation of resolution 2178 (2014) by the first group of 21 States, the Executive Directorate has identified the following priority measures to be taken by States to prevent the movement of foreign terrorist fighters.