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This study tracked, recorded and coded the content recommended to 10 experimental or ‘sockpuppet’ accounts on 10 blank smartphones, 5 on YouTube Shorts and 5 on TikTok. On each platform, we set up 5 types of accounts: one 16-year old boy and one 18-year old boy who sought out content typically associated with gender-normative young men (e.g. gym content, sports, video games), one 16-year old boy and one 18-year old boy who actively sought out content associated with the manosphere (e.g. Andrew Tate, anti-feminist), and one blank control account that did not deliberately seek out or engage with any particular content. The purpose of this research was to simulate and explore the digital reality of boys and young men using TikTok and YouTube Shorts, who are most likely to be targeted by the manosphere.

Fan practices and behaviours have increasingly moved beyond fan communities into the political, economic and cultural structures of every day life. The proliferation of social media platforms has allowed both the progressive and reactionary aspects of fandom to converge in the public sphere, drawing on similar techniques, pleasures, and practices in order to interpret the world in a culture where the boundaries between popular and political communication are blurrier than they have ever been. This special issue of Convergence explores the synergies, tensions and conflicts at play in this new cultural terrain. It explores how ‘fan studies can be used to make sense of the seeming growth of conspiracy theory communities and right-wing movements, examines political participation as a form of fandom, and the ways in which social media can be used to organize against discriminatory cultures.

Gaming adjacent platforms have created an expanding ecosystem of online gaming, esport, and social media actors sharing online space, content, communication tools, and users. Esport, in particular, has grown beyond all expectations and is now a global leader in sport fandom and spectatorship. At the same time, the online infiltration and influence of far-right extremism have resulted in increased challenges of online radicalization. Gaming and esport form a foundational part of youth digital culture today, and this has provided a fertile ground for far-right extremist groups to communicate and connect with users globally. This paper uses framing theory and qualitative document analysis to examine how media articles frame the relationship between far-right extremism and esport. The findings enhance our understanding of how narratives of far-right extremist influence in esport and gaming are framed in the media and how this coverage shapes contemporary societal discussion. This is important because as far-right extremism continues to be propagated and performed in esport and gaming spaces, how this is framed to public audiences can have a critical influence on esport and gamer identities, victimization or criminalization of online spaces, and future activities or approaches to counter radicalization within the online environment.

Policymakers, researchers, and responders alike focus on the evolution of terrorist and other groups associated with political violence. This study offers a comparative analysis of the images of ISIS and U.S. far-right groups’ use of flag images, as such emblems contribute to community building, heighten emotional responses, and have political import. It adds to previous work by comparing groups across the ideological spectrum, by recognizing differences in media operations present as groups evolve, and by focusing on visual messaging that is vital for influence in the online environment. Using chi-square analyses, it compares almost 5000 images that include flags from ISIS publications between 2014 and 2020 with 600 images focused on the far-right events at the Unite the Right Rally and the January 6 attack on the U.S. Capitol. Specifically, it looks at the compositional elements of the flags appearing in the images, the immediate media context within the photographic frame, and the broader regulatory, political, religious, and economic situational contexts. The findings indicate that while the far right and ISIS both heavily rely on flags in their visual images, eight key differences emerge as related to the groups, their contexts, and the evolution of the media systems.

The incel (involuntary celibate) community is an extremist online community that practices intense misogyny, racism, and that glorifies – and sometimes practices – violence. Work to understand the dynamics within incel communities has been hindered by the fact that these communities are spread over many platforms and many of the more popular forums of the past have been banned and their content deleted. In this paper, we present two main contributions. First, we introduce a carefully reconstructed, nearly complete archive of incel forums dating back to 2016, including millions of posts that can no longer be accessed. Then we illustrate a technique for identifying community-specific language and using that as a marker of extremism to track radicalization over time.

Background
Despite the prominent role that digital media play in the lives and mental health of young people as well as in violent radicalization (VR) processes, empirical research aimed to investigate the association between Internet use, depressive symptoms and support for VR among young people is scant. We adopt a person-centered approach to investigate patterns of digital media use and their association with depressive symptoms and support for VR.

Methods
A sample of 2,324 Canadian young people (Mage = 30.10; SDage = 5.44 ; 59% women) responded to an online questionnaire. We used latent profile analysis to identify patterns of digital media use and linear regression to estimate the associations between class membership, depressive symptoms and support for VR.

Results
We identified four classes of individuals with regards to digital media use, named Average Internet Use/Institutional trust, Average internet use/Undifferentiated Trust, Limited Internet Use/Low Trust and Online Relational and Political Engagement/Social Media Trust. Linear regression indicated that individuals in the Online Relational and Political Engagement/Social Media Trust and Average Internet Use/Institutional trust profiles reported the highest and lowest scores of both depression and support for VR, respectively.

Conclusions
It is essential to tailor prevention and intervention efforts to mitigate risks of VR to the specific needs and experiences of different groups in society, within a socio-ecological perspective. Prevention should consider both strengths and risks of digital media use and simulteaneously target both online and offline experiences and networks, with a focus on the sociopolitical and relational/emotional components of Internet use.