Online Library

Social media platforms, such as Instagram, are regularly misused for spreading covert (Islamic) extremist propaganda. Affect and emotion are central tools used in extremist propaganda, but there is little research into the combined employment of different social media elements, such as hashtags, visuals, and texts, in the context of propaganda. This study contributes to closing this gap. Using the German group Generation Islam as a case study, we examined the group’s Instagram activity (N = 1,187 posts) over the course of 2 years. To reflect the platform users’ logic, we (a) examined affect in hashtag networks in which users can come across propagandistic content, (b) employed deep learning to examine the emotional valence transmitted in the visuals, and (c) used automated linguistic analysis to describe collective action cues contained within the texts. The results are novel, as they provide nuanced insights into extremist propaganda’s employment of affect and emotions across Instagram’s affordances.

This report examines the patchwork of online text‑based instant messaging applications preferred by jihadist and far‑right extremist groups, with a focus on charting their technical affordances and their host companies’ stances on user privacy, security and regulation. To this end, the report analyses six online messaging services (BCM, Gab Chat, Hoop Messenger, Riot.im, Rocket.Chat and TamTam) that have been or may be used in conjunction with Telegram by extremist groups.

By reviewing studies of how today’s terrorist and extremist groups operate on social media in conjunction with an overview of U.S. government regulation of terrorist content online, this report finds that stricter U.S. regulation of social media providers may not be the most effective method of combating online terrorist and extremist content.

This article presents a systematic linguistic approach to mapping gender differences in the formulation and practice of right-wing ideology. We conducted a set of content- and text-analytical analyses on a 52,760 words corpus from a female-only subforum, dubbed LOTIES (Ladies of the Invisible Empire), compared with a matching corpus of 1.793 million words from a male-only subforum of the Ku Klux Klan’s primary website. Using a combination of computational and noncomputational linguistic methods, we show that the wholesome and avowedly prosocial discourse of the female forum is a gateway to Klan activity and, ultimately, to the Klan’s ideology through a fear-based “all means are necessary” mindset and violent sentiments. The findings also suggest that the female forum’s porousness and emphasis on inclusion and homogeneity may have facilitated the spontaneous “mutation” of the traditional KKK ideology into a generic Far-Right ideology that enjoys broad consensus. Rhetorically, this generic right-wing ideology downplays overt racial and violent elements and eschews theological controversies by relating to Christianity instrumentally as a cultural heritage rather than a religion in the metaphysical sense of the word.

This article aims to address two questions: how does hate speech manifest on North American white supremacist websites; and is there a connection between online hate speech and hate crime? Firstly, hate speech is defined and the research methodology upon which the article is based is explained. The ways that ‘hate’ groups utilize the Internet and their purposes in doing so are then analysed, with the content and the functions of their websites as well as their agenda examined. Finally, the article explores the connection between hate speech and hate crime. I argue that there is sufficient evidence to suggest that speech can and does inspire crime. The article is based in the main on primary sources: a study of many ‘hate’ websites; and interviews and discussions with experts in the field.

This article is concerned with the boundaries of freedom of expression on the Internet and, more specifically, with manifestations of terrorism on YouTube. The article opens with two definitions of terrorism. Section II discusses various responsibilities that businesses have: economic, legal, moral, social and discretionary. Section III addresses the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Unfortunately, not all companies adhere to the principles of Corporate Social Responsibility. Therefore, ethical standards should be anchored in appropriate laws and enforced by responsible governments. Section IV clarifies that incitement to violence is in the focus of attention. The philosophy of John Stuart Mill is instrumental in explaining the difference between advocacy (or preaching) and incitement (or instigation). Sections V and VI examine the influences of Anwar al-Awlaki, the American-Muslim jihadi preacher, and of Anjem Choudary, the British-Muslim jihadi preacher, on their followers. The words of al-Awlaki and of Choudary instigated many of the terrorist activities that the West had seen in recent years. There are direct links between their incitement and extreme violent incidents. Both of them were able to spread their instigation to terror on platforms provided by Google and specifically its subsidiary YouTube. Finally, Section VII probes YouTube and CSR. It is argued that the Internet is international in character, but it cannot be abused to override law. There is not one law for people and another for the Internet. It is further argued that power without responsibility is dangerous and corrosive.