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Gatekeeping is defined as the work of third parties “who are able to disrupt misconduct by withholding their cooperation from wrongdoers.”1 Internet intermediaries need to be far more proactive as gatekeepers than they are now. Socially responsible measures can prevent the translation of violent thoughts into violent actions. Designated monitoring mechanisms can potentially prevent such unfortunate events. This Article suggests an approach that harnesses the strengths and capabilities of the public and private sectors in offering practical solutions to pressing problems. It proposes that internet intermediaries should fight stringently against terror and further argues that a responsible gatekeeping approach is good for business.

Part I defines terror. Next, Part II discusses the role of social networking sites in facilitating terror and argues that principles of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) should dictate censorship of online terror. Part III shows that the great internet companies are slowly coming to understand that with great power comes great responsibility. Part IV then argues that internet intermediaries have a role to play beyond providing a platform to anyone with something to say. Social responsibility dictates some minimal standards of gatekeeping without which mayhem and destruction will ensue unabated. The policy of “anything goes” is self-defeating and irresponsible. Internet companies are expected to show readiness to work with governments to hinder terror activities. The industry should be encouraged to be proactive.

This study investigates the evolving challenges intelligence and law enforcement agencies face in countering Salafi jihadist terrorist activities across digital platforms, focusing on integrating artificial intelligence (AI) and data fusion technologies in open-source intelligence (OSINT) methodologies. Through an analysis of case studies involving ISIS and other non-state actors, the study examines how terrorist organisations adapt their digital strategies to evade detection while exploiting social media platforms, instant messaging applications and websites for recruitment, propaganda, and operational planning. The study demonstrates the necessity of developing advanced technological solutions such as the integration of AI-enhanced OSINT capabilities, combined with data fusion approaches, that can improve analysts’ ability to process multilingual content, identify threat actors who use online anonymity, and detect patterns of terrorist activity across multiple network layers. However, the study also reveals critical ethical and operational challenges in balancing effective counter-terrorism measures with privacy rights and civil liberties. The study concludes that while OSINT, AI and data fusion tools can substantially augment human analysis capabilities, successful counter-terrorism efforts require a carefully calibrated approach combining technological innovation and human expertise.

Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is the first terrorist organization to use the internet efficiently to spread its ideology and recruit followers in the region and abroad: but it is not an anomaly. In fact it is reflective of what we can expect to come from terrorist groups in the future. But technology is just one part of the problem. What will terrorist organizations in seven years’ time look like? Chatham House hosted Jared Cohen and a panel of guest speakers in January 2016 to explore these questions.

Lone-wolf terrorism is a threat to the security of modern society, as was tragically shown in Norway on July 22, 2011, when Anders Behring Breivik carried out two terrorist attacks that resulted in a total of 77 deaths. Since lone wolves are acting on their own, information about them cannot be collected using traditional police methods such as infiltration or wiretapping. One way to attempt to discover them before it is too late is to search for various ‘‘weak signals’’ on the Internet, such as digital traces left in extremist web forums. With the right tools and techniques, such traces can be collected and analyzed. In this work, we focus on tools and techniques that can be used to detect weak signals in the form of linguistic markers for potential lone wolf terrorism.

The purpose of this report is to raise awareness of how the so-called Islamic State (IS) uses digital propaganda to reach followers in the West. Although IS has suffered significant territorial losses, the digital battle is far from over. The big social media platforms are now effective in removing propaganda, but despite this, IS is always finding new ways of producing and spreading its messages. IS ability to adapt to an ever-changing digital landscape is likely to keep the organization alive by enabling communication between supporters worldwide. This report provides an introduction to IS propaganda from different perspectives: the specific language used by IS, the brand IS, the magazines produced by IS and women’s role in IS.

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)’s flagship English-language magazine, Dabiq, is a puzzle. The magazine is not, despite appearances, primarily designed for direct recruiting efforts or inciting violence against the West. In fact, the primary audiences of Dabiq are English-speaking second generation Muslims or converts, Western policymakers, and a third group of current or would-be members of ISIS who are not integrating with the organization itself. The third audience—those members who are failing to function within the organization—is strange to include in an English-language magazine. Why publish organizational weaknesses, in English? One possibility for this puzzle is that the fundamentalist hermeneutics of ISIS is reflected in their own media efforts. One of the assumptions that ISIS holds about their sacred texts is that each text carries a single meaning that reflects the author’s original intent. There might be multiple applications of that intent, but each text can only have one intent, and therefore one meaning. Following this logic, a message meant for one person is unlikely to be of utility for another, and so this may be why ISIS exposes their weaknesses as part of the process of correcting their own members.