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This study explores the politics of naming in the Islamic state (IS) media networks, looking into how sympathisers’ (munāsir-s) virtual identities are socially constructed online. Naming is a discursive practice which is purely ideological in that when sympathisers name themselves online, they re-imagine their roles and the boundaries of their national belonging alongside cultural representations of the organisation. By naming, they reify IS cultural heritage which is recontextualised from the historical legacy of the Prophet and Islamic Conquest. By naming, they also amplify IS hegemonic cultural frames and master narratives. In this sense, naming oneself in the IS virtual ecosystem is a significant rhetorical strategy that may fulfil at least one of the three main cultural functions. Names may (1) imitate historical role models, (2) reconstruct the sense of belonging to homophilic communities (brothers of the same faith) beyond ethno-racial geographies, and/or (3) convey a politically religionist bias in constructing the self vs. the other. The politics of naming is an online social learning process in which collective intelligence instructs sympathisers on how to create accounts with innovative iconic/connotative identifying aliases. In IS social ecology, naming may stand for a ritual call to adventure, the destination of which is already recognised. Sympathisers are interpellated as jihadi subjects to cross the threshold of their ordinary world and embark on a virtual journey to media jihad – hence, their recognition of their new subject positions in support groups and the potential manufacturing of their loyalty and disavowal (al-walā’ wa l-barā’).

This study uses a quantitative natural-language processing tool, the Linguistic Inquiry Word Count (LIWC), to evaluate the content of all Q drops over time, focusing on language themes associated with three core principles of psychological influence: cognitive, emotional, and social processes. Before detailing this study, we situate it within the broader contexts of national security and the social psychology of influence literature.

A growing amount of literature is being devoted to interrogating gendered dynamics in both violent extremism and terrorism, contributing to the integration of international and feminist security. This includes how such dynamics can shape differences in the motivations and participation of women and men. By critically analysing ideological gender constructs in two women-only extremist forums – the Women’s Forum on Stormfront.org and Women Dawah, a Turkish-language pro-Islamic State group chat on Telegram – and employing feminist methodology, this article demonstrates how gendered online spaces influence women’s ‘everyday practices’ within extremist movements. We argue that women-only online spaces not only facilitate gendered practices by allowing women to share everyday experiences, hold ideological discussions, and engage in debate, but also provide an important means to navigate these issues within the movement itself. In fact, women-only forums are actively used by women within extremist movements to exert greater agency in the face of otherwise constraining gendered ideological constructs. In turn, gendered everyday practices are reinforced by virtual communities that strengthen a sense of meaning – and purpose – in the movement, albeit being ideologically confined to the private sphere in many ways. This study sheds light not only on the differences in participation between women and men, but also on how such virtual communities can serve as spaces to frame and reinforce gendered practices in extremist movements. This has key implications for deradicalisation and disengagement strategies, which are at present overwhelmingly gender neutral. We provide evidence of how women navigate agency in these spaces, while challenging the stereotype that women in extremist movements are typically passive actors confined to traditional roles.

The emergence and growth of incel subculture online has triggered a considerable body of research to date, most of which analyzing its worldview or mapping its position and connections within the broader manosphere. While this research has considerably enhanced our understanding of the incel phenomenon, it tends to offer a somewhat static, one-dimensional portrayal of what is—like all online subcultures and communities—a highly dynamic and multi-layered environment. Consequently, we lack sufficiently nuanced answers to what is arguably a critical question for law enforcement and academics alike: is this a violent extremist ideology? Using a uniquely extensive corpus covering a range of online spaces constitutive of the incelosphere spanning several years, we analyze the evolution of incel language across both time and platforms. Specifically, we test whether this language has grown more extreme over time as online spaces shutdown and others emerged. Our findings demonstrate that, while levels of violent extremist language do vary across the incelosphere, they have steadily increased in the main online spaces over the past 6 years. Further, we demonstrate that, while activity on these online spaces is responsive to offline events, the impact of these on violent extremist ideation is not uniform.

This article explores how cyberspace and social media are being used as instruments for the growth of extremist discourse in Malaysia—83% of militant detainees charged under anti-terrorism laws relied on social media platforms to access materials and establish virtual networking with likeminded individuals. The internet also provides a conducive environment for the incubation and growth of extremist discourse, where cyberspace and social media serve as vehicles of propaganda and recruitment—these have been major foci of research by academia and law enforcement alike. This article explores the issue from three angles: (1) the interplay between radicalisation and extremist discourse, particularly violent extremism; (2) the linkages between social media and cyberspace with democracy and postmodern discourse; and (3) the online manifestation of violent extremist groups, thus highlighting three growing threats based on religious, political and health-oriented radicalisation. This article suggests that three factors contribute to the growth of such extremist discourse and “marginalised voices”: (1) a democratic setting and postmodern discourse offer a conducive ecosystem and environment; (2) the use of “democratic rights” narratives to promote extremist discourse, particularly on certain platforms; and (3) the use of extremist discourse as counterpoint and alternative to dominant discourse and culture in mainstream media.