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This paper outlines the results of a two-month study in which a series of extremist Islmnist websites – registered, hosted or given datacentre services by Canadian internet companies- were empirically observed. The results of this project are inserted into a framework which explores the issue and wrongful application of the “terrorist signifier to substance or nonstate activities, discerns between the purported use of the internet by extremist Islamist organizations for destructive means and the real use of the internet by such groups, and suggests a number of conclusions based on prior administrative responses to the extremist Islmnist use of the internet.

This systematic review unveils significant convergence between cybercriminals and terrorists over the past decade, characterized by substantial overlap in tactics, capabilities, and infrastructure exploitation. Key findings illuminate the adoption of cybercriminal methods by terrorist organizations, the engagement of cybercriminal groups in terrorist activities, the proliferation of enabling technologies such as cryptocurrencies and the dark web, and the role of social media in facilitating knowledge exchange between diverse threat actors. While direct terrorist involvement in profit-driven cybercrime appears limited, the escalating convergence underscores urgent imperatives for enhanced cooperation, legal refinement, the establishment of flexible counter-threat authorities, and collaboration with the private sector. Continuous monitoring of this rapidly evolving landscape is crucial to inform effective policies and interventions in an increasingly interconnected digital world.

In this article we investigate the evolution of ISIS by analysing the text contained in Dabiq, the official
ISIS’ internet magazine in English. Specifically, we used a computerized text analysis pro-gram
LIWC (Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count) to investigate the evolution of the language of the first
11 Issues of Dabiq. First, our analysis showed that affiliation seems to be an increasingly important
psychological motive for the group. Secondly, ISIS has been increasingly using emotions, which
are an important mobilizing factor in collective action literature, in a strategic manner. Thirdly,
ISIS language presents an increasing concern with females. Last but not least, our analysis shows
that ISIS has been increasingly using internet jargon (net-speak), which shows how the group tries
to adapt itself to the internet environment and to connect with the identities of young individuals.

This study explores the significant impact of the internet on terrorism and extremism by focusing on three key areas: cyberterrorism, social media usage, and attack planning. Cyberterrorism has emerged as a major threat, with incidents such as the WannaCry ransomware attack highlighting its potential to disrupt critical infrastructures. The study reveals that the low cost and difficulty in tracing cyberterrorists contribute to its rising prevalence. Furthermore, social media has become a vital tool for extremist groups in that it facilitates global communication, recruitment, and propaganda dissemination. Events such as the Christchurch mosque attacks illustrate the challenges of monitoring extremist content online. The internet also aids in attack planning by providing discreet communication channels, easy access to materials, and simplified travel arrangements, as seen in the 9/11 and Manchester Arena bombings. Additionally, the chapter discusses how technological advancements have enhanced security agencies’ capabilities, leading to more effective prevention and response strategies. The findings highlight the dual role of the internet as both a facilitator of terrorism and a crucial asset in countering these threats.

Pro-Daesh (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, ISIS) groups in Indonesia and the Philippines have come to rely on social media for propaganda, fundraising and disseminating instructional material, but in different ways. While Indonesian online extremism has deep roots, with local networks exploiting various online platforms over the past decade, extremist social media in the Philippines only really took off as a consequence of the May 2017 siege in the southern Philippine city of Marawi by pro-Daesh militants. This paper outlines the evolving use of online platforms by pro-Daesh groups in both countries and how this has enabled extremists to develop and strengthen their networks. Social media and encrypted chat apps have shaped the development of extremism in Indonesia and the Philippines in four main areas: branding, recruitment, fundraising, and the increasing role of women. For groups in the Philippines, direct communication with Daesh headquarters via Telegram facilitated their rebranding as the face of Daesh in Southeast Asia, more than just a local insurgency group. In both countries, social media facilitates vertical and horizontal recruitment, but not lone-actor terrorism. Extremist use of the internet for fundraising is still rudimentary –sophisticated financial cybercrime is still virtually non-existent. In all these aspects, women’s roles have become much more visible. For a long time, women had been barred from accessing extremist public spaces, let alone taking an active role as combatants. But through social media, women are now able to play more active roles as propagandists, recruiters, financiers, and even suicide bombers. This paper briefly discusses government responses to online extremism, noting that there have been mixed results between Indonesia and the Philippines. Indonesian authorities have undoubtedly been the more successful of the two regimes – both in terms of law enforcement and engagement with the tech sector – but its counter terrorism police now face the problem of how to judiciously use their powers in a democratic manner. The Philippines, meanwhile, is still at the starting line in terms of dealing with online extremism, with the military more accustomed to removing threats than trying to understand them.

The apocalyptic narrative of the Syrian civil war promoted by the Islamic State (IS) terrorist group in 2014 had galvanised around a hundred radicals in Malaysia who subsequently migrated to Iraq and Syria. At least forty-five of them propagated their jihadist cause online resulting in the mushrooming of online extremism in the country. The growth spans over five years (2013-2017) in two phases, one led by Muhammad Lotfi Arifin’s network of online followers and the other by Muhammad Wanndy Muhammad Jedi’s online supporters and sympathizers. Lotfi and his network popularised the concept of ‘jihad’ from the perspective of militant groups, while Wanndy lured vulnerable online followers deeper into the later stages of violent radicalisation. The trajectory of Malaysia’s online violent radicalism from Lotfi to Wanndy was coincidental rather than deliberate, signifying the ‘funnel’ process of radicalisation. This process is synced with the terrorists’ switch from online public platforms to encrypted and private ones.