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Jonathan Russell, Head of Policy at Quilliam, talks to Sky News #digitalview about how everyone, not just governments, can help challenge extremist propaganda.

#digitalview, Sky News (23/01/16)

Quilliam is the world’s first counter-extremism think tank set up to address the unique challenges of citizenship, identity, and belonging in a globalised world. Quilliam stands for religious freedom, equality, human rights and democracy.

Currently, a gap in the literature exists on the link between radicalization processes and
the social psychology of the Internet. While radicalization processes are increasingly
becoming subject to empirical studies, only a subset of these studies have taken into
account online dynamics, and even fewer have approached this issue from a social psychological
perspective. However, the literature on radicalization to violent extremism clearly establishes
the central role of social psychology. It also suggests that the Internet is increasingly salient for
understanding processes of radicalization. It follows then, that understanding radicalization processes
requires an explanation of how the Internet may influence beliefs and behaviours; that is,
of the social psychology of the Internet.
This report outlines the link between the social psychology of the Internet and violent extremism.
It is divided into two parts. The first part, provides a review of the literature on the
social psychology of the Internet, including its potential applications to the understanding of
violent extremism. This section examines both the individual and collective dimensions involved
when individuals reach out and interact online with like-minded virtual peers, and their effects
on individual and collective behaviours. Concepts defined in the literature review are then applied
to analyze fifteen case studies of individuals whose involvement in violent extremist acts
has been confirmed, and where the Internet played a role, small or large, in their radicalization
trajectory. These fifteen cases aim to achieve maximum variance in regard to the role the Internet
played in radicalization processes across individuals. All cases are from open sources, all are
relevant to Canada although some cases selected include individuals active in (or coming from)
other countries. The aim is to provide a clear assessment of the aspects of the literature from the
research field of the social psychology of the Internet that has been shown most relevant to violent
extremism.

The second part of the report builds off the literature review and case study analysis, looking
at programs that aim to counter violent extremism online. This section can be broken down
into two sub-sections. First a review of the literature on countering violent extremism online is

Globalization with advanced information technologies has changed the life of the people in
the world. When something occurs in one part of the world, other part of the world can be
informed easily within seconds. Current information technologies such as internet, social
media, blogs and news channels have enabled the people to create virtual groups all over the
world and to disseminate the information easily.
Most of the states, governments, public and private institutions have been using the advantage
of the information technologies to serve their citizens and customers. Concurrently, criminals
are also using the advantage of information technologies while committing crime. In other
words, everything including crime and criminals has changed their structures to be compatible
with the advanced information technologies.
Recently, lots of terrorist organizations have erupted especially in the Middle East and their
networks are spreading out with the use of technology. Most of the terrorist organizations
have been using the technology for military training of their militants, preparation, and
recruitment processes. Especially the internet is almost a virtual training slot for terrorist
groups. Recent studies (Weimann, 2006; Rothenberger, 2012) have revealed that the internet
is served as the library for the terrorist groups to provide instruction manuals and videos on
technical and tactical areas such as making a bomb, taking hostages, and guerilla combat. As
it has an appropriate space for interaction activities, potential terrorists use the advantage of
interaction face of the internet to learn how to make a bomb and send instant messages to the
instructors teaching illegal issues.
Thus, security forces in the face of all these developments should take the necessary
precautions to fight against the terrorist organizations by standing one step ahead on the use of
technology. Standing one step ahead can only be achieved understanding the phenomena and
ceaselessly updating the knowledge. Otherwise, security forces will fail if they maintain the
use of old technique and tactic to fight against the terrorist groups in this technology epoch.
Based on this point of view, this study will focus on understanding the use of technology to
fight against the terrorism. Furthermore, this study will also investigate some of the terrorist
organizations using the technology actively to commit crime. This study will also attempt to
shed light to the fact that different technologies have been used against the humanity by
terrorist groups although most of the people are not aware of that reality.

Since late 2014, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) social networks on Twitter have been
subjected to periodic account suspensions. In a study of metrics for a network of English language
ISIS supporters active from June to October 2015, suspensions held the size and reach
of the overall network flat, while devastating the reach of specific users who have been
repeatedly targeted.
By analyzing a list of English-speaking ISIS adherents, we found:
• The number of readily discoverable English-speaking ISIS supporters on Twitter is
relatively small, usually fewer than 1,000 accounts.
• Extending the discovery process using advanced social network analysis produced a
network of fewer than 3,000 accounts at any given time.
• ISIS English-language social networks are extremely insular, meaning users mostly
follow and interact with each other.
• The number of users in the network who are based in Iraq and Syria appears to have
declined over time, partly because of suspension activity, but also because of operational
security concerns within ISIS and the deaths of some prominent Syria-based network
participants.
• The average number of Twitter followers any given ISIS supporter could expect was 300
to 400. Average follower counts were periodically reduced by aggressive waves of
suspensions. However, under typical conditions the average remained flat, as seen over a
30-day period beginning in late August, during which relatively few suspensions took
place.
• Over time, individual users who repeatedly created new accounts after being suspended
suffered devastating reductions in their follower counts.
• Network and individual declines persisted even when suspension pressure eased,
suggesting that suspensions diminish activity in ways that extend beyond the simple
removal of accounts.
• The amount of pro-ISIS content available on Twitter was also limited by suspensions,
since all of a user’s tweets are typically deleted when his or her account is suspended.
• ISIS supporters have deployed several countermeasures in an effort to offset the negative
effects of suspensions.
• Countermeasures include the use of applications and simple hacking techniques to
quickly create new accounts for users who have been suspended, as well as elaborate
tactics to rebuild follower networks. Some of these approaches are sophisticated, but they
have had only limited benefits.
• ISIS supporters have also explored the use of other social media platforms as a
supplement to Twitter, but they feel that a robust presence on Twitter and Facebook is
integral to their recruitment and propaganda efforts, and continue returning to those
platforms despite challenges.
Our analysis was based on a list of accounts maintained and promoted by ISIS supporters on
Twitter. The list was primarily billed as a resource for finding other ISIS supporters, but it
included some non-porter accounts, and the user who maintained the list did not follow all of
the listed accounts.

This report presents the analysis of a corpus of academic and grey literature relevant to a key
challenge facing our society. How can media and communications be used to counter identity-based
violence (IBV) or Violent Extremism (VE)?
Part I focuses on “Counter-Narratives”, looking at the evidence relating to strategic policy
communication strategies and counter-propaganda techniques. This reflects literature from
policymakers, think-tanks, and civil society initiatives rather than the academic literature base.
Key findings include the following:
• Current literature and policy concerned with countering propaganda is dominated by the language
of ‘counter-narratives’ but a common understanding of this relatively new lexicon has yet to emerge.
• There is little hard evidence that proves interaction with VE content leads to participation in VE
activities.
• The hypothesis that VE narratives or the real life threat of VE can be countered by an alternative set
of communications is an assumption that remains unproven.
These findings challenge claims that responding to propaganda strategies by firing back
with “counter-narratives” can be effective.
Part II looks at “Alternative Approaches” to the use of the media to counter violent extremism,
drawing on insights from the “media development” and “media assistance” sectors, and research
into whether mass media and new communication interventions can inhibit identity-based violence
in certain crisis situations. Key findings include the following:
• The theoretical foundations for these alternative approaches are supported by a stronger and more
established research base, drawn from the multi-disciplinary fields of development, peace building,
and social cohesion.
• Media projects have less impact if seen to be linked to a political agenda.
• A growing evidence base suggests that radio and television drama addressing issues of identity,
reconciliation and tolerance have a positive an impact on public attitudes and behaviour.
• Media assistance can ensure that local and domestic media can respond appropriately to VE
narratives.
• There is an emerging evidence base regarding the potential for rapid reaction media and
communication strategies in situations where there is a threat of IBV.
These findings suggest that alternative media strategies can help. But the trust and credibility of
information providers is crucial.
The final section “Reflections” concludes that the research landscape is fragmented and disconnected.
but suggests several professional/practitioner sectors and academic disciplines could shed light on
potentially effective media and communication CVE strategies.
More needs to be done to draw the threads together to learn lessons and to identify and prioritise
gaps in our knowledge and understanding.

In this Lowy Institute Analysis, Lauren Williams examines Islamic State’s use of the Western media to disseminate its propaganda. Williams argues mainstream media outlets have a responsibility to treat Islamic State-produced material more critically, expose the weaknesses of its messages, and place greater effort into counter-messaging.

KEY FINDINGS
Islamic State’s media arm has a clearly defined strategy to manipulate the mainstream media to serve its propaganda objectives.
A more critical view of Islamic State’s claims and propaganda is needed to limit the effectiveness of the group’s messages.
The role of the media, as well as the stories of returnees and defectors, as a platform for counter-messaging has been underutilised.