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A new wave of growing antisemitism, driven by fringe Web communities, is an increasingly worrying presence in the socio-political realm. The ubiquitous and global nature of the Web has provided tools used by these groups to spread their ideology to the rest of the Internet. Although the study of antisemitism and hate is not new, the scale and rate of change of online data has impacted the efficacy of traditional approaches to measure and understand this worrying trend. In this paper, we present a large-scale, quantitative study of online antisemitism. We collect hundreds of million comments and images from alt-right Web communities like 4chan’s Politically Incorrect board (/pol/) and the Twitter clone, Gab. Using scientifically grounded methods, we quantify the escalation and spread of antisemitic memes and rhetoric across the Web. We find the frequency of antisemitic content greatly increases (in some cases more than doubling) after major political events such as the 2016 US Presidential Election and the “Unite the Right” rally in Charlottesville. Furthermore, this antisemitism appears in tandem with sharp increases in white ethnic nationalist content on the same communities. We extract semantic embeddings from our corpus of posts and demonstrate how automated techniques can discover and categorize the use of antisemitic terminology. We additionally examine the prevalence and spread of the antisemitic “Happy Merchant” meme, and in particular how these fringe communities influence its propagation to more mainstream services like Twitter and Reddit. Taken together, our results provide a data-driven, quantitative framework for understanding online antisemitism. Our open and scientifically grounded methods serve as a framework to augment current qualitative efforts by anti-hate groups, providing new insights into the growth and spread of antisemitism online.

At the dawn of mass access to the internet, Douglas Rushkof wrote Cyberia: Life in the Trenches of Hyperspace. In his book, he observed a very special moment in our recent history in which it was possible to imagine the path ahead, before most of what daily users of the internet now
experience even existed.

VOX-Pol Blog post.

This article seeks to propose a valuable frame for understanding which processes, either cognitive or practical, take part in the making of a terrorist act within the frame of the onlife region. A term recently coined, onlife, refers to the interacting/indistinguishable domain of online and offline world: this is the environment where today’s global terrorism/extremism flourishes. This region of complexity and the phenomena that entails can valuably explored through the General System Theory (GST). In the first part of the paper how global terrorism is changing, moving into cyber terrorism, at the light of the GST, according to recent theoretical achievements in the field is described in detail. The second part will explore a case study of onlife terrorism perpetrated in New Zealand, in order to focus the passage from the ‘possible’ idea of making a massacre to its effective performance, from onlife radicalization to the onlife event (a livestreamed attack filmed by the author) – through a deliberate use of the internet. At this point, the author will be able to come back to the question posed before, sketching some insights that might be valuable for cyber terrorism as well as for GST, especially for what concerns systemic processes within the moral domain.

Given the rise of media and information technology, the debate over anti-blasphemy laws has become one of international importance. Cutting across different regions and faiths, blasphemy laws have triggered instability, empowered extremists, and increased sectarian violence. With frequently vague wording, they are open to whimsical interpretations, resulting in scores of human rights abuses, and violating international standards of free expression, religion, and belief.

While many religious traditions have taboos against blaspheming the sacred, violence related to allegations of blasphemy is particularly prevalent across Islamic states. In some Islamic states, scores of human rights abuses, committed in the name of fighting blasphemy, constitute obstacles to reform and democracy, and enhance the likelihood of sectarian violence. Blasphemy laws often help majority viewpoints to triumph against those of dissenters. As a result, religious minorities, free-thinkers, and political dissidents in Muslim majority countries are frequently targeted by blasphemy laws, weakening social cohesion and constraining free expression.

Whether online or offline, high-profile allegations of blasphemy have affected foreign relations and have raised new policy stakes for relations between the U.S. and the Muslim world. In the digital age, verbal expressions that were once limited to the immediate geographic vicinity are now broadcast globally at lightning speed. It is thus becoming increasingly important for governments and social media companies to implement policies that protect pluralism and democracy. Social media companies must take action to ensure the protection of both their users and uphold global standards of free speech. The U.S. government also has a duty to encourage pluralism and freedom of expression around the world. There are certain steps the United States should take to oppose anti-blasphemy laws in a broader effort to curb violent extremism and promote the peaceful expression of religious views, which is essential to democratic reform.

The rise of QAnon presents researchers with a number of important questions. While emerging literature provides insights into how QAnon exists online, there is a dearth of theoretical engagement with the questions of why it exists, and what conditions brought it into being. This paper seeks to address this gap by contextualizing QAnon as an ontological phenomenon underpinned by anxiety, and inquiring into the identity formation strategies employed by the movement. Applying the basic precepts of discourse theory and discourse analysis to a representative canon of QAnon content, it finds that, like other formations of collective identity, QAnon is premised on interconnected dynamics of ontological fulfillment that cannot be explained away by pointing to ‘the algorithm’ or ‘madness’. Nor can it be tackled effectively by the content takedowns and de-platforming strategies currently employed. The paper concludes with a call to explore more empathetic engagement with conspiracy adherents, arguing that until we (re)discover a more inclusive, agonistic politics, QAnon and other fantastical conspiracy movements will continue to arise and some may metastasize into violent action. New forms of resilience to (online) polarization can be built on this principle.