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Mass transit systems are relied on a daily basis to transport millions of passengers and bring billions of dollars’ worth of economic goods to market. While some forms of mass transit rely on a fuel, electrified railway systems are dependent on the electric grid. The electric grid is becoming more vulnerable to disruptions, due to extreme weather, changing supply and demand patterns, and cyber-terrorism. An interruption to the energy supply of a railway infrastructure can have cascading effects on the economy and social livelihood. Resilient interconnected microgrids are proposed to maintain reliable operation of electri_ed railway infrastructures. An engineering design framework, and supporting methods and techniques, is proposed for an electrified railway infrastructure to be upgraded from its existing form, to one with resilient interconnected microgrids. The sizing of the interconnected microgrids is performed using an iterative sizing analysis, considering multiple resiliency key performance indicators to inform the designer of the trade-o_s in sizing options. Hierarchical control is proposed to monitor and control the interconnected microgrids. A multi-objective problem cast in the tertiary level of control is proposed to be solved using game theory. The proposed designs are modelled and simulated in Simulink. Four case studies of railway infrastructures in Canada and the United Kingdom are used to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed designs. While results for each case study vary, resilient interconnected microgrids for railway infrastructures demonstrates a reduced dependence on the electric grid. The examples here are all scalable and can perform within the framework of any available energy system. The results are both extremely impressive and promising towards a more resilient and stable energy future for our railway and other critical infrastructures.

From a technical standpoint, Islamic State (IS) videos are demonstrably superior to those of other groups. But as time goes by, their aesthetic is migrating downstream as other groups attempt to copy it. Specifically, IS has turned to video games, regularly mimicking and even directly copying the aesthetic and design of First Person Shooter games, most often Call of Duty, in their videos, and other groups have followed suit. This specific aesthetic offers a way to recruit young, technologically savvy, men while sanitizing the violence they were being recruited to participate in. This study offers an instrument for tracking the IS aesthetic as it moves to other groups as well as its evolution over time, and offers a case study of a specific group that has copied the IS aesthetic, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS.)

• Social media companies should recognise the political importance of counterterrorist financing (CTF) by explicitly reflecting the priorities of the UN Security Council and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in their policies, strategies and transparency reports.
• Furthermore, social media companies identified as being at high risk of exploitation should update their terms of service and community standards to explicitly reference and outlaw terrorist financing (consistent with universally applicable international law and standards such as those of the FATF) and actions that contravene related UN Security Council resolutions and sanctions.
• Social media companies should clearly demonstrate that they understand and apply appropriate sanctions designations; at the same time, policymakers should ensure that sanctions designations include, where possible, information such as email addresses, IP addresses and social media handles that can support sanctions implementation by social media companies. The more granular the information provided by governments on designated entities, the more efficiently the private sector can comply with sanctions designations.
• Social media companies should more tightly control functionality to ensure that raising terrorist funding through social media videos, such as big-brand advertising and Super Chat payments, is disabled.
• Researchers and policymakers should avoid generalisations and make a clear distinction between forms of social media and the various terrorist-financing vulnerabilities that they pose, recognising the different types of platforms available, and the varied ways in which terrorist financiers could abuse them.
• Policymakers should encourage both inter-agency and cross-border collaboration on the threat of using social media for terrorist financing, ensuring that agencies involved are equipped with necessary social media investigative capabilities.
• International law enforcement agencies such as Interpol and Europol should facilitate the development of new investigation and prosecution standard operating procedures for engaging with operators of servers and cloud services based in overseas jurisdictions to ensure that necessary evidence can be gathered in a timely fashion. This would also encourage an internationally harmonised approach to using social media as financial intelligence.
• Policymakers should encourage the building of new, and leveraging of existing, public–private partnerships to ensure social media company CTF efforts are informed and effective.

This briefing outlines research uncovering thousands of users viewing extremist content in Arabic language across mainstream social platforms including Facebook and YouTube. The findings emerged as world leaders, policymakers, and technology companies gathered in Jordan earlier this month to discuss counter-terrorism and extremism as part of the Aqaba Process and the convening of the Global Internet Forum for Countering Terrorism (GIFCT).

Researchers identified:

• More than 77 pieces of Arabic content promoting influential Islamist extremists from al-Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) as well as affiliates for both organizations, and precursors to both groups on both YouTube and Facebook;
• More than 275,000 users have watched the videos on both Facebook and YouTube;
• The research finds evidence of Islamist extremist supporters sharing content between sites, spreading the content further than their primary YouTube Channels and/or Facebook pages and groups. Approximately 138 individual users have shared links from the YouTube to their networks on Facebook.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the design, application and findings of a case study in which the application of a machine learning algorithm is utilised to identify the grievances in Twitter in an Arabian context. To understand the characteristics of the Twitter users who expressed the identified grievances, data mining techniques and social network analysis were utilised. The study extracted a total of 23,363 tweets and these were stored as a data set. The machine learning algorithm applied to this data set was followed by utilising a data mining process to explore the characteristics of the Twitter feed users. The network of the users was mapped and the individual level of interactivity and network density were calculated. Findings The machine learning algorithm revealed 12 themes all of which were underpinned by the coalition of Arab countries blockade of Qatar. The data mining analysis revealed that the tweets could be clustered in three clusters, the main cluster included users with a large number of followers and friends but who did not mention other users in their tweets. The social network analysis revealed that whilst a large proportion of users engaged in direct messages with others, the network ties between them were not registered as strong. Borum (2011) notes that invoking grievances is the first step in the radicalisation process. It is hoped that by understanding these grievances, the study will shed light on what radical groups could invoke to win the sympathy of aggrieved people. In combination, the machine learning algorithm offered insights into the grievances expressed within the tweets in an Arabian context. The data mining and the social network analyses revealed the characteristics of the Twitter users highlighting identifying and managing early intervention of radicalisation.

Online Terrorist Propaganda, Recruitment, and Radicalization is most complete treatment of the rapidly growing phenomenon of how terrorists’ online presence is utilized for terrorism funding, communication, and recruitment purposes. The book offers an in-depth coverage of the history and development of online “footprints” to target new converts, broaden their messaging, and increase their influence. Chapters present the emergence of various groups; the advancement of terrorist groups’ online presences; their utilization of video, chat room, and social media; and the current capability for propaganda, training, and recruitment.

With contributions from leading experts in the field-including practitioners and terrorism researchers-the coverage moves from general factors to specific groups practices as relate to Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and numerous other groups. Chapters also examine the lone wolf phenomenon as a part of the disturbing trend of self-radicalization. A functional, real-world approach is used regarding the classification of the means and methods by which an online presence is often utilized to promote and support acts of terrorism.

Online Terrorist Propaganda, Recruitment, and Radicalization examines practical solutions in identifying the threat posed by terrorist propaganda and U.S. government efforts to counter it, with a particular focus on ISIS, the Dark Web, national and international measures to identify, thwart, and prosecute terrorist activities online. As such, it will be an invaluable resources for intelligence professionals, terrorism and counterterrorism professionals, those researching terrorism funding, and policy makers looking to restrict the spread of terrorism propaganda online.