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This study examines videos produced by the al-Hayat Media Center, a branch of the Islamic State’s (IS) larger media campaign aimed more specifically at Western audiences. Using a thematic analysis approach, recurring themes of 10 al-Hayat videos were identified with conclusions made regarding the specificities of the message and the target audience. It was found that al-Hayat videos cater to potential Western recruits and sympathizers by portraying life in the IS as spiritually and existentially fulfilling, while simultaneously decrying the West as secular, immoral, and criminal. By utilizing well-produced propaganda videos that tap into the dissatisfactions of Western Muslims, al-Hayat was shown to deliver a sophisticated and legitimate message that may play a role in the larger radicalization process.

Social media, and Twitter in particular, have become important sources for journalists in times of crises. User-generated content (UGC) can provide journalists with on-site information and material they otherwise would not have access to. But how they source and verify UGC has not yet been systematically analyzed. This study analyzes sourcing and verification practices on Twitter during the Brussels attacks in March 2016. Based on quantitative content analysis, we identified (1) the journalists and news organizations sourcing during the attacks, (2) classified different forms of sourcing and verification requests, and (3) analyzed the sourced UGC. Results show that sourcing on Twitter has become a global phenomenon. During the first hours of the attack, journalists rely on UGC. Their sourcing and verification practices vary widely and often lack basic verification procedures, which leads to a discussion about the ethical implications of sourcing practices.

The apocalyptic narrative of the Syrian civil war promoted by the Islamic State (IS) terrorist group in 2014 had galvanised around a hundred radicals in Malaysia who subsequently migrated to Iraq and Syria. At least forty-five of them propagated their jihadist cause online resulting in the mushrooming of online extremism in the country. The growth spans over five years (2013-2017) in two phases, one led by Muhammad Lotfi Arifin’s network of online followers and the other by Muhammad Wanndy Muhammad Jedi’s online supporters and sympathizers. Lotfi and his network popularised the concept of ‘jihad’ from the perspective of militant groups, while Wanndy lured vulnerable online followers deeper into the later stages of violent radicalisation. The trajectory of Malaysia’s online violent radicalism from Lotfi to Wanndy was coincidental rather than deliberate, signifying the ‘funnel’ process of radicalisation. This process is synced with the terrorists’ switch from online public platforms to encrypted and private ones.

Terrorist groups are increasingly using encryption to plan and coordinate terrorist acts, leading to calls for the banning or backdooring of encrypted messaging apps. This would be misguided. It would not remove the ability of terrorist groups to access this technology and may push them to communicate in ways that are more difficult for Western intelligence agencies to monitor. By creating vulnerabilities in online tools used by a very large number of Americans and other users around the world, it would also expose the broader society to increased security risks.

This paper explores the risk that virtual currencies (VCs) may become involved in the financing of terrorism at a significant scale. VCs and asso-
ciated technologies hold great promise for low cost, high speed, verified transactions that can unite coun- terparties around the world. For this reason they could appear appealing to terrorist groups (as they are at present to cybercriminals). Currently, however, there is no more than anecdotal evidence that terrorist groups have used virtual currencies to support themselves. Terrorists in the Gaza Strip have used virtual currencies to fund operations, and Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) members and supporters have been particularly receptive to the new technology, with recorded uses in Indonesia and the United States.

Most terrorist funding now occurs through traditional methods such as the hawala system, an often informal and cash-based money transfer mechanism, and estab- lished financial channels.1 If VCs become sufficiently liquid and easily convertible, however, and if terrorist groups in places such as sub-Saharan Africa, Yemen, and the Horn of Africa obtain the kinds of technical infra- structure needed to support VC activity, then the threat may become more significant. The task of the law enforcement, intelligence, regu- latory, and financial services communities, therefore, must be to prevent terrorist groups from using VCs at scale. The use of VCs by “lone wolf ” terrorists—a much bigger potential threat because of the small scales of funding needed to execute an attack—represents the kind of problem in intelligence and digital forensics that law enforcement agencies are well equipped to handle, even if they tax existing resources.

Attacking terrorists’ use of virtual currency at scale is a challenging task for many stakeholders. New finan- cial technology firms often lack the resources to comply effectively with oversight obligations, while regulators have tended to devote few resources to non-bank institu- tions. At the same time, different countries have adopted varying approaches to the regulation of virtual curren- cies, posing an enforcement challenge in a globalized field that requires a unified response. Finally, the privi- leging of prevention over management of illicit finance risk in the compliance world has created an incentive structure for banks that does not, ironically, push them toward innovative approaches to countering terrorist financing, including via virtual currencies.

The counterterrorist financing community should adopt three guiding principles that will provide the foundation for policies aimed at countering both the new virtual currency threat and the broader illicit finance danger. First, policy leaders should prioritize the coun- tering of terrorist financing over other kinds of financial crime. Second, the policy and regulatory posture should be oriented toward rewarding and incentivizing innova- tion. Third, policymakers should emphasize and create a practical basis for strengthening coordination between the public and private sectors on terrorist financing. These approaches form the foundation of an effective response to existing and emerging terrorist financing threats and will balance the burden of regulatory com- pliance with the policy need to support innovative new virtual currency technologies.

Anno Bunnik explores the ramifications of Big Data for countering terrorism, extremism, and radicalisation. With the recent rise of jihadists and other extremists groups in the Middle East and Europe, how do state agencies respond through the use of Big Data? This chapter critically engages with questions such as the extent to which Big Data can inform us about and help prevent radicalisation. It deals with the role of non-governmental organisations and the private sector in this regard. Bunnik makes the argument that whilst it is inevitable that Big Data will take centre stage in counter-terrorism, its potential should also be utilised to better understand radicalisation and extremism.