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The internet permeates all aspects of modern life and violent extremism is no exception. Although the level of importance is sometimes disputed, few would deny the role that online communication has in driving people towards violent extremist groups. While there are various perspectives on the exact nature of this process, it is increasingly agreed upon that it is rare for individuals to radicalise entirely in absence of any outside communication. Radicalisation remains a social phenomenon and the fact that some of these social interactions have migrated online does not change this. Extremists do not simply produce and disseminate propaganda and then move straight to offline recruitment, they utilise peer to peer messaging applications contained within social media platforms to engage in direct personal contact with potential recruits to their cause. Sometimes these online conversations completely displace offline recruitment.

Extremist propaganda is often removed and there are examples of nascent efforts to counter this throught the creation of counter-narrative campaigns. Counter-narratives, and offline counter-recruitment programmes such as EXIT and Channel, counter efforts of extremists to promote propaganda online and recruit in the offline world. This highlights the fact that there is a crucial piece missing in our efforts to counter recruitment to extremist groups; the proactive utilisation of peer to peer messaging systems online to engage with those expressing extremist sympathies.

Over the course of ISD’s management of the AVE network we encountered a number of isolated attempts to engage directly with extremists online, from former extremists infiltrating extremist forums to Twitter conversations between activists and extremist sympathisers. However none of these efforts had been attempted at scale none had had testing and success
metrics built in from the start. As such, any evidence gained as to their effectiveness was anecdotal at best.

The academic community studying terrorism has changed dramatically in the past decade. From a research area which was investigated by a small number of political scientists and sociologists, employing mainly descriptive and qualitative studies that resulted in limited theoretical progress as noted by Schmid and Jongman (1988) as well as Crenshaw (2000), it has in a short time become one of the more vibrant and rapidly developing academic realms as scholars from different branches of the social sciences have engaged in an effort to unravel this phenomenon, introducing new theoretical outlooks, conceptualizations and methods.

The descriptive and explanatory potentials of Social Network Analysis (SNA) in the study of violent political groups attracted some of the new students of terrorism shortly after the September 11th attacks (Van Meter 2001, Carly et al. 2002, Krebs 2002). Yet, even though their studies showed strong potential as they provided significant insights about the structures and internal processes of terrorists groups, the use of SNA in the study of political violence has remained quite limited, and still amounts to only a small fraction of the research in the field. Our experience in presenting SNA of violent groups in various platforms and events has led us to conclude that this is a result of two factors, which sustain each other. The majority of political violence students have very limited acquaintance with the rationale, and the main concepts and methodological tools of SNA; hence, many of them are still reluctant to exercise SNA in their studies and consequently tend to express doubt regarding its efficiency and relevance for the study of complex social phenomena.

This essay is not methodological per se in the sense that our goal is not to provide a methodological introduction to SNA. We do strive however to provide a clear presentation of the advantages of this realm for the study of terrorism and related fields, as well as the main relevant methodological tools and concepts, by utilizing pertinent and intelligible examples. These illustrate how network analysis complements conventional approaches to the study of political violence and how it can provide important information about the characteristics of the group structure (and how it influences members motives, behaviors and the outcome of their actions), recruitment processes, evolution, and of the division of political and social power among its members. We hope this will encourage more scholars to incorporate SNA into their studies, and consequently will further our understanding of the processes, causes and implications of political violence.

The internet has profoundly changed the way we communicate, including how jihadist groups seek to reach Western audiences with their propaganda strategies. Cases of believed online-radicalization call for a re-evaluation of radicalization processes, previously thought to depend on face-to-face interactions. Based on the Hoffman-Sageman debate on whether top-down or bottom-up processes drive terrorism, this essay explores both social movement and organizational approaches to understand online-radicalization. Do jihadist organizations such as Al-Qaeda and IS act as ‘fishermen’, actively engaging in the radicalization processes of individual recruits, or is radicalization driven by social group dynamics with little organizational involvement? Essentially, the larger question is: What role do organizational structures play for radicalization in times of ‘virtual jihad’? Bottomup radicalization processes are facilitated online, because the conditions for Sageman’s ‘bunch of guys’ are replicated by the characteristics of virtual communication: an echo chamber effect causes frame-alignment through repetition and enables ‘digital natives’ to communicate claims that resonate with other ‘digital natives’. Top-down structures are influential, because organizations continue to employ sophisticated propaganda development, preachers and special recruiters or ‘fishermen’. The article finds evidence for both schools of thought and concludes that the internet facilitates both types of radicalization mechanisms. Only a holistic strategy will be successful in battling online radicalization and must include both targeting direct channels through which the organizations execute control over recruits, and breaking the echo chamber created by social movement dynamics in the virtual world. While countermeasures need to include the provision of alternative social narratives and the utilization of ‘digital natives’ to make counter-messages more effective, organizational structures need to be tackled simultaneously, not only by identifying and arresting preachers and recruiters, but also through stronger internet governance tools and collaboration with social media companies.

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)’s flagship English-language magazine, Dabiq, is a puzzle. The magazine is not, despite appearances, primarily designed for direct recruiting efforts or inciting violence against the West. In fact, the primary audiences of Dabiq are English-speaking second generation Muslims or converts, Western policymakers, and a third group of current or would-be members of ISIS who are not integrating with the organization itself. The third audience—those members who are failing to function within the organization—is strange to include in an English-language magazine. Why publish organizational weaknesses, in English? One possibility for this puzzle is that the fundamentalist hermeneutics of ISIS is reflected in their own media efforts. One of the assumptions that ISIS holds about their sacred texts is that each text carries a single meaning that reflects the author’s original intent. There might be multiple applications of that intent, but each text can only have one intent, and therefore one meaning. Following this logic, a message meant for one person is unlikely to be of utility for another, and so this may be why ISIS exposes their weaknesses as part of the process of correcting their own members.

This article offers a bottom-up understanding of the media strategy employed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) as it relates to the production and dissemination of its hostage execution videos. Through an empirical analysis of sixty-two videos of executions produced by ISIL in the year following its establishment as the “Islamic State” in 2014, this study examines the videos as a major component of ISIL’s media strategy. Through these media products, ISIL seeks to spread a political message aimed at both local and global, ingroup and outgroup consumption through audience segmentation, while striving to influence both local and global audiences through the use and production of graphic violence. This article also discusses the strategy governing the production and release of ISIL’s execution videos; how it relies on the global media to transmit its intertwined political and religious agenda in the digital media age.

This paper explores various Social Network Analysis (SNA) techniques in order to identify a range of potentially ‘important’ members of Islamic Networks within Dark Web Forums. For this experiment, we conducted our investigation on five forums collected in previous work as part of the DarkWeb Forum portal and built upon the tool support created in our previous research in order to visualise and analyse the network. Whilst existing work attempts to identify these structures through state-of-the-art Computational Linguistic techniques, our work relies on the communication metadata alone. Our analysis involved first calculating a range of SNA metrics to better understand the group members, and then apply unsupervised learning in order to create clusters that would help classify the Dark Web Forums users into hierarchical clusters. In order to create our social networks, we investigated the effect of repeated author resolution and various weighting schemes on the ranking of forum members by creating four social networks per forum and evaluating the correlation of the top n users (for n = 10; 20; 30; 40; 50 and 100). Our results identified that varying the weighting schemes created more consistent ranking schemes than varying the repeated author resolution.