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Over the course of the 2016 Presidential campaign, an execrable trend has emerged: reporters who voiced even slightly negative opinions about presidential candidate Donald Trump have been targeted relentlessly on social media by the candidate’s self-styled supporters; reporters who are Jewish (or are perceived to be Jewish) have borne the brunt of these attacks. There is evidence that Mr. Trump himself may have contributed to an environment in which reporters were targeted. Indeed, he repeatedly denounced reporters as “absolute scum,” and said of “most journalists” in December 2015, “I would never kill them, but I do hate them. And some of them are such lying, disgusting people. It’s true.” Accordingly, while we cannot (and do not) say that the candidate caused the targeting of reporters, we can say that he may have created an atmosphere in which
such targeting arose.

The social media attacks on journalists were brutal.

The development of the Internet has revolutionized communications. It has never been easier to speak to wide audiences or to communicate with people that may be located more than half a world away from the speaker. However, like any neutral platform, the Internet can be used to many different ends, including illegal, offensive, or dangerous purposes. Terrorist groups, such as the Islamic State (IS, also referred to as ISIS or ISIL), Al Qaeda, Hamas, and Al Shabaab, use the Internet to disseminate their ideology, to recruit new members, and to take credit for attacks around the world. In addition, some people who are not members of these groups may view this content and could begin to sympathize with or to adhere to the violent philosophies these groups advocate. They might even act on these beliefs. Several U.S. policymakers, including some Members of Congress, have expressed concern about the influence that terrorist advocacy may have upon those who view or read it. The ease with which such speech may be disseminated over the Internet, using popular social media services, has been highlighted by some observers as potentially increasing the ease by which persons who might otherwise have not been exposed to the ideology or recruitment efforts of terrorist entities may become radicalized. These concerns raise the question of whether it would be permissible for the federal government to restrict or prohibit the publication and distribution of speech that advocates the commission of terrorist acts when that speech appears on the Internet. Significant First Amendment freedom of speech issues are raised by the prospect of government restrictions on the publication and distribution of speech, even speech that advocates terrorism. This report discusses relevant precedent concerning the extent to which advocacy of terrorism may be restricted in a manner consistent with the First Amendment’s Freedom of Speech Clause. The report also discusses the potential application of the federal ban on the provision of material support to foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) to the advocacy of terrorism, including as it relates to the dissemination of such advocacy via online services like Twitter or Facebook.

Social media are useful facilitators when recruiting hidden populations for research. In our research on youth and radicalization, we were able to find and contact young people with extreme ideals through Facebook. In this article, we discuss our experiences using Facebook as a tool for finding respondents who do not trust researchers. Facebook helped us recruit youths with extreme Islamic and extreme left-wing ideals. We conclude by discussing the benefits and limitations of using Facebook when searching for and approaching populations who are difficult to reach.

Governments have long worried about terrorists using the Internet to launch cyberattacks, spread propaganda, recruit and radicalise individuals and raise funds. However, the Islamic State’s exploitation of social media has caused a crisis and generated questions about international law’s role in addressing terrorism in cyberspace. This article analyzes international law in connection with potential terrorist cyberattacks and terrorist use of cyber technologies for other purposes. International law is not well positioned to support responses to terrorist cyberattacks, but the lack of such attacks to date undermines incentives for states to develop international law against this threat. In terms of terrorists using the Internet and social media for propaganda, radicalisation, recruiting and fundraising, the crisis caused by the Islamic State’s online activities has not created consensus strong enough to support a prominent role for international law in countering cyber-facilitated terrorism.

This report contains articles presented at the Countering Daesh Experts Workshop convened by The Carter Center Feb. 22–24, 2016, in Atlanta, Ga. The workshop brought together 21 leading scholars and practitioners from 10 different countries to discuss Daesh recruitment strategies and its use of social media technologies to appeal to alienated youth. In addition to developing insights into recruitment and social media use, the workshop aimed to develop nuanced counternarratives that engage religious resources, leaders, and institutions in peacebuilding in their local contexts and to promote a deeper understanding of religion in conflict.

The concept of creating counter-narratives in order to push back against extremist recruitment and propaganda has become well established in recent years. In practice, however, it has proven difficult to curate this content in a systematic way, target it toward at risk audiences, and – most importantly – measure constructive impact on their behaviour. Over the past few years, the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) has developed research and pilot studies conducted with the Against Violent Extremism (AVE) network of former extremists and survivors of extremism that it manages. This research has been conducted in order to test and improve methodologies that help optimise the impact of counternarrative campaigns. This report outlines the key findings and results of three counter-narrative campaign pilot projects curated through the AVE network in coordination with Jigsaw and with additional in-kind assistance or financial support from Facebook and Twitter. Although some details and figures have been omitted for security purposes, the results of the study are presented in full.