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Today, the Commission presents guidelines and principles to increase the proactive prevention, detection and removal of illegal content inciting hatred, violence and terrorism online. The increasing availability and spreading of terrorist material and content that incites violence and hatred online is a serious threat to the security and safety of EU citizens.

This study, commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for
Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the LIBE Committee,
provides an overview of current approaches to countering terrorist narratives. The
first and second sections outline the different responses developed at the global
and European Union levels. The third section presents an analysis of four different
approaches to responding to terrorist narratives: disruption of propaganda
distribution, redirect method, campaign and message design, and government
communications and synchronisation of message and action. The final section
offers a number of policy recommendations, highlighting five interrelated ‘lines of
effort’ essential to maximising the efficiency and effectiveness of counterterrorism
and countering violent extremism strategic communication.

This report contains findings from a study that investigated extreme far right groups’
usages of social media. This was a collaborative project building on an existing
partnership between the Departments of Linguistics and Criminology at Swansea
University, and on the development of a new partnership with the social media
analytics company ‘Blurrt’ (www.blurrt.co.uk). The project was funded by the
CHERISH-DE multidisciplinary research centre at Swansea University
(http://www.cherish-de.uk/) and the School of Arts & Humanities at Edith Cowan
University (https://www.ecu.edu.au/schools/arts-and-humanities).
This report provides an overview of the aims, methodology and key findings of this
project. The project was conducted between January and August 2017. It drew upon
data from two social media platforms (Facebook and Twitter), collected over a 10-
week period (January-April 2017), and concerned two extreme far right groups:
Britain First and Reclaim Australia. Further publications will be appearing in due
course and those interested in hearing more about the project should contact the
report’s authors (details on p.23).

Analyses of extremist video messages typically focus on their discursive content. Using the case of ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), this study instead draws upon the emerging subfield of genosonic analysis to understand the allure of extremist videos, as well as the ineffectiveness of US video messages designed to ‘counter violent extremism’ (CVE). Through a genosonic analysis of three high-profile ISIL videos and five popular US State Department CVE videos, the study advances two concepts – sonorous communality and sonic unmaking – to help explain ISIL’s appeal. The lack of equivalent dimensions in US CVE videos renders them sonically sterile in comparison to those of ISIL. The implications of this analysis for scholarship and practice conducted at the intersection of media, war and conflict are discussed.

Gatekeeping is defined as the work of third parties “who are able to disrupt misconduct by withholding their cooperation from wrongdoers.”1 Internet intermediaries need to be far more proactive as gatekeepers than they are now. Socially responsible measures can prevent the translation of violent thoughts into violent actions. Designated monitoring mechanisms can potentially prevent such unfortunate events. This Article suggests an approach that harnesses the strengths and capabilities of the public and private sectors in offering practical solutions to pressing problems. It proposes that internet intermediaries should fight stringently against terror and further argues that a responsible gatekeeping approach is good for business.

Part I defines terror. Next, Part II discusses the role of social networking sites in facilitating terror and argues that principles of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) should dictate censorship of online terror. Part III shows that the great internet companies are slowly coming to understand that with great power comes great responsibility. Part IV then argues that internet intermediaries have a role to play beyond providing a platform to anyone with something to say. Social responsibility dictates some minimal standards of gatekeeping without which mayhem and destruction will ensue unabated. The policy of “anything goes” is self-defeating and irresponsible. Internet companies are expected to show readiness to work with governments to hinder terror activities. The industry should be encouraged to be proactive.

The Online Civil Courage Initiative’s core partner, ISD, has been tracking both positive and negative
responses to terror attacks in the UK this year, to understand how to improve counterspeech in the
UK. This report contains advice for NGOs working towards challenging hate speech and extremism
online with recommendations/suggestions for how they can respond speedily and effectively in the
aftermath of an attack, and improve understanding on the coordinated efforts (online raids) that are
designed to undermine positive speech.