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A framework for understanding Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)’s apocalyptic theology as an internal strategy to “coercively radicalize” its captive subjects is presented, by comparison to the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), which shares key stages of captive indoctrination with ISIS. A violent experience of “entry,” religious rules learned in an “assimilation” process, and millenarian “grand narratives” framing violence as purification, are examined. These stages construct an image of group leaders as divinely endowed with spiritual knowledge and access (i.e., charismatic authority). This can create a sense of dependency on the leaders and their instructions, potentially motivating violent and altruistic behavior from initially unwilling subjects.

Facebook serves more than 1.5 billion people globally. Although the majority of people use the site for positive purposes, there are some who use the platform in negative ways. With that in mind, Facebook has created a set of policies – its Community Standards – detailing what type of content people can and cannot post. For instance, Facebook prohibits and removes hate speech and does not allow dangerous organisations (defined as groups that engage in terrorist or organised criminal activity) to have a presence on Facebook. Content that supports or promotes those groups is removed. However, sometimes people post content which other users may consider hateful or extreme, but which does not violate Facebook’s policies.

To counter this type of disagreeable or extremist content, Facebook has publicly stated that it believes counter-speech is not only potentially more effective, but also more likely to succeed in the long run. Counter-speech is a common, crowd-sourced response to extremist or hateful content. Extreme posts are often met with disagreement, derision and countercampaigns.

Combating extremism in this way has some advantages: it is faster, more flexible and responsive, and capable of dealing with extremism from anywhere and in any language; and it retains the principle of free and open public spaces for debate. However, the forms counter-speech takes are as varied as the extremism it argues against. It is also likely that it is not always as effective as it could be; and some types of counter-speech could potentially even be counter-productive. In the light of its belief in the power of counter-speech and the growing interest in a more rigorous and evidence-led approach to understanding it better, Facebook commissioned Demos to undertake this research report, examining the extent to which different types of counter-speech are produced and shared on Facebook.

Casi 1.5 millón de personas emplean Facebook en todo el mundo. Aunque la mayoría de las usuarios utilizan el sitio con fines positivos, algunos emplean la plataforma con malas intenciones. En este sentido, Facebook ha creado las normas de la comunidad, un conjunto de políticas que detalla qué tipo de contenido es apropiado publicar y qué queda prohibido. Por ejemplo, Facebook prohíbe y elimina contenido que incite al odio, que define como “contenido que ataca directamente a individuos en función de su raza, origen étnico, nacionalidad, religión, orientación sexual, sexo, género, identidad de género, discapacidad grave o enfermedades”. A pesar de que la incitación al odio está prohibida, en ocasiones ciertos usuarios publican contenido desagradable o perturbador que no infringe las políticas de Facebook.

Para contrarrestar ese tipo de contenido desagradable o extremista, Facebook ha declarado públicamente que el contenido compensatorio (y las herramientas que su plataforma ofrece para promoverlo) desempeñan un papel fundamental en la lucha contra dichas malas prácticas. Facebook opina que esta forma de atajar el problema no es sólo resulta potencialmente más eficaz, sino que además es más probable que tenga éxito a largo plazo.

Circa 1,5 miliardi di persone utilizzano Facebook su scala globale. Sebbene la maggioranza lo usi a scopi positivi, ce ne sono alcune che usano questa piattaforma in modo negativo. Partendo da questo presupposto, Facebook ha creato delle politiche, ossia gli Standard della Comunità, che elencano quale tipo di contenuto possa essere condiviso, e quale no. Ad esempio, Facebook proibisce e rimuove i commenti che incitano all’odio, definendoli “contenuti che attaccano direttamente una persona (o un gruppo di persone) in virtu’ di: razza, etnia, nazionalità di origine, affiliazione religiosa, orientamento sessuale, sesso, genere o identità di genere, disabilità o malattia”. Nonostante i contenuti che incitano all’odio non siano permessi, a volte le persone condividono contenuti sgradevoli o inquietanti che, tuttavia, non violano le politiche di Facebook.

Al fine di contrastare questo genere di contenuti estremisti e spiacevoli, Facebook ha dichiarato pubblicamente che il counter-speech (N.d.T.: il replicare, il controbattere), insieme ai mezzi che la piattaforma prevede per incoraggiarlo, debba rivestire un ruolo importante. Facebook ritiene non solo che, potenzialmente, tale approccio possa essere più efficace per affrontare il problema, ma che possa anche essere quello vincente nel lungo periodo.

This article will argue that social media in the hands of terrorist groups constitutes a weapon, and has become increasingly capable of contributing to the facilitation of consequential harm against identified targets. In doing so it will first clarify the communicative nature of terrorist action and provide an overview of the various contributions made by jihadist strategists to the evolution of terrorist practice, and in particular the re-emergence of the practice of individual terrorism. It will then identify the intersection of individual terrorism and social media and the development and deployment of a system of social media jihad. 2 The article will explain the mechanisms by which terrorist groups exploit and deploy social media platforms, and inflict various harms, with a specific focus on individual and small cell terrorism in Western jurisdictions. Finally, a brief case study analysis of Anwar al-Awlaki will demonstrate the gravity with which governments have conceived of this problem, in part by highlighting the substantiveness of their responses.

Despite the destruction and chaos sown on the battlefield by the group that calls itself the Islamic State, one could argue that its propaganda efforts toward supporters, sympathizers, and enemies have also had disruptive results. Whether online or on the ground, the group has sought to use propaganda to magnify the effects of its battlefield successes, minimize the consequences of its failures, recruit new adherents, and increase awareness of its ultimate goals.

Given the focus that the Islamic State places on its media activities, it is important for those fighting the group to have a level of familiarity with the breadth, content, and nature of these activities. The goal of this report is twofold. First, it attempts to examine declassified documents captured from the group’s predecessors to provide a baseline understanding of its present-day media structure and operations. Second, through an examination of over 9,000 Islamic State official media products, this report offers detailed insight into what the group is saying and what a study of its propaganda can tell us about its strengths, weaknesses, and struggles.