Do CVE counter-messaging campaigns work?

By Alastair Reed, Andrew Glazzard, Samantha Treacy

Ever since the rapid rise of the so-called Islamic State and its effective use of online propaganda to recruit and radicalize individuals, countering the communication strategies of terrorists and violent extremists has been a top priority for governments and policymakers. Early approaches generally fell into two categories: disrupting the flow of propaganda online by identifying and removing violent extremist content from social media and other platforms, and rebutting or undermining the content of extremist narratives. Over the past decade of counter-messaging campaigns, delivering ‘counter’ and ‘alternative’ narratives became a central part of CVE policy widely supported and funded by governments and international organisations, with the majority of them disseminated via social media platforms.

Despite their popularity among governments and policymakers the evidence base for such campaigns remains limited. In a recent paper “A systematic integrative review of counter-messaging communication campaigns targeting terrorism or violent extremism” we sought to investigate their effectiveness by conducting the first ever review of evaluations of ‘live’ CVE campaigns. This review analysed 30 reports covering 25 different live campaigns.

Key Findings

So, what did we find out? Unsurprisingly, a majority of the campaigns were social media based, run across a range of platforms, although some involved off-line components and the few fully off-line campaigns were mostly using radio broadcasts. The campaigns exhibited significant diversity, varying across mediums (TV, radio, social media), approach (“counter” versus “alternative” narratives), target audiences (e.g., youth, broader communities, or networks around vulnerable individuals), and campaign objectives (e.g., prevention, disengagement, or promoting media literacy). This diversity shows that future practitioners can draw on a range of techniques and approaches but need to make choices as to where to focus their effort.

However, the findings on campaign effectiveness and impact were mixed. Some campaigns reported positive outcomes – for example viewers feeling more equipped to challenge extremism amongst their peers or community,  or endorsing working with the police regarding extremism. Although, these results should be interpreted cautiously due to the low or moderate quality of most evaluations, which were therefore at a high risk of bias. Importantly, none of the evaluations measured actual behavioural change. Nevertheless, our review conceded “that there may be some merit in pursuing counter-messaging communications campaigns, potentially as part of a broader suite of approaches to preventing or countering violent extremism that would also involve more offline interventions.” We expressed this cautiously and conditionally because the evidence for effectiveness is so limited.

Weak Foundations

The quality of evaluations of counter-messaging campaigns should be a cause for concern. Of the 30 reports included, only one was rated high quality, 8 were moderate quality but the majority, 21, were low quality. This meant we could not draw definite conclusions about effectiveness. Our review emphasised the need for more methodologically rigorous approaches to evaluating counter-messaging campaigns, in particular “establishing the impact and effectiveness of campaigns in delivering behavioural change”.

The majority of the campaigns relied on social media metrics, combined with other approaches such as comment analysis. Social media metrics, while often a useful metric for reach and engagement, is largely unable to determine behaviour change and actual impact. Encouragingly, we observed a promising trend: four randomized controlled trials (RCTs) were conducted after 2020, signalling a potential maturation in the field of evaluation.

Our review also highlighted the weak theoretical foundations of many campaigns. Sixteen of the 25 campaigns did not report using any theory or guideline to inform their development, suggesting that campaigns are failing to build on the existing body of research and findings. Only two campaigns employed a theory of change. A theory of change sets out the campaign’s objectives and the causal logic through which they aim to be achieved. As well as being essential for aligning campaign design with strategic objectives, they enable evaluators to understand what the campaign is designed to achieve and how. Without a theory of change, campaigns will struggle to show how their messaging will drive the desired behavioural changes.

The paucity of publicly available evaluations is another cause for concern. Over nearly two decades of CVE messaging campaigns, we identified only 30 evaluation reports covering 25 campaigns globally, which must represent only a fraction of the campaigns implemented. This suggests that either many campaigns are not evaluated, or their findings are kept private. Either way, this will continue to limit our ability to understand what works and hence increase the effectiveness of campaigns. Campaigns which fail to show impact or demonstrate negative results, are just as valuable as those which demonstrate success.

The Path Forward

So where does this leave CVE messaging campaigns? Whilst the findings show that the campaigns may have positive impacts, they also tell a story of weak foundations and untapped potential. To advance the field, campaigns must build upon existing research, but we also need more and better evaluations of campaigns. This requires more rigorous methodological approaches and, most importantly, a commitment to making evaluation findings—good or bad—publicly available. Only then can we truly understand what works and how, and ultimately design more effective communication strategies to counter violent extremism.

Alastair Reed is Professor of Security and Strategic Communications at the Centre for Peace and Security, Coventry University

Andrew Glazzard is Professor of National Security Policy and Practice, at the Centre for Peace and Security, Coventry University.

Samantha Treacy is currently a Research Officer in the Department of Psychology at Swansea University, and is also a PhD student within the Department of Criminology, Sociology and Social Policy at Swansea University.

IMAGE CREDIT: PEXELS

Want to submit a blog post? Click here.