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Online radicalisation to terrorism has become a pervasive policy concern over the last decade. However, as a concept it lacks clarity and empirical support. In this article, we add an empirical and theoretical lens to this problem by analysing the trajectories of 231 Islamic State terrorists. We use cluster analyses to create typologies of individuals’ different online and offline antecedent behaviours, including the ways in which they engaged in networks with co-ideologues and how they prepared for their events. The findings suggest four types of pathway within our dataset: 1) The “Integrated” pathway which has high network engagement both online and offline, mostly made up of individuals that plotted as part of a group; 2) The “Encouraged” pathway contains individuals that acted more in the online domain at the expense of offline; 3) Terrorists in the “Isolated” pathway are defined by a lack of interaction across either domain; 4) The “Enclosed” pathway encompassed actors that displayed greater offline network activity, but still utilised the Internet for planning their activity. These typologies help to move beyond the dichotomy of online or offline radicalisation; there remain few individuals that either exclusively use the Internet or do not use it at all. Rather, we can conceptualise Internet usage on a spectrum in which these four typologies all sit.

This study explores how terrorists use financial technologies in their plots. Using a database of 231 US-based Islamic State actors, it analyses how they move money and make purchases, as well as whether the use of technology affects success. Fundamentally, terrorists opt for simplicity; there is little evidence of sophisticated financial plots. Terrorists tend to use the Internet in two ways: to make purchases and to coordinate transactions. Transactions via Money Service Businesses are more likely to be part of successful plots. Finally, the paper discusses factors which explain this simplicity as well as discussing whether this may change moving forward.

This article seeks to re-ontologize online radicalization. Individuals becoming terrorists after being exposed to online content have become a prescient concern for academics, policy makers, and journalists. Existing theoretical contributions to the concept have assumed that there are two ontological domains—online and offline—that can be meaningfully separated. This article will draw from several arguments from other fields which critique this position; the contemporary information environment enmeshes the two inseparably. This argument is then advanced to demonstrate that online radicalization is a redundant concept by drawing on empirical research as well as recent case studies of terrorism. Instead, scholars should consider holistic theories which account for a range of other factors beyond online communication technologies.

VOX-Pol Guest Lecture Series, Autumn 2023

Name: Dr Joe Whittaker

Title: Catch 22: Researcher Welfare and Institutional Ethics within Online Terrorism and Extremism Research

Outline: “Recent years have seen an increase in concern over the welfare of researchers who regularly engage with extremist and terrorist content online. This comprises external (such as death threats, doxing, and trolling), internal (psychological issues surrounding engagement with content), and professional issues. This lecture focuses on an important and understudied aspect of the issue of researcher welfare; the navigation of ethics committees. Drawing on interview-based research with 39 academics, Joe will discuss researchers’ experiences with the ethical application process; how and whether researcher welfare is considered; and the concern that institutions will make it more difficult to conduct research in future. These issues leave online extremism researchers in a “Catch 22” in which they either have little institutional oversight but experience harms conducting their work, or do have oversight, but with more barriers put up.”

VOX-Pol Blog Post.

VOX-Pol Blog Post.