Online Library

Given that terrorism is omnipresent on social media, it is imperative to study how seeing terror content online is related to individuals’ attitudes, behaviors, and emotions. This study investigates how exposure to terrorism on social media associates with terror-related online self-disclosure and how self-disclosure, in turn, relates to fear of terrorism. A quota-based survey of young social media users (16- to 25-year-olds; N = 864) in Germany revealed that exposure to Islamist and far-right terrorism is related to higher online self-disclosure. Political ideology moderated the relationship between exposure to far-right terrorism and online self-disclosure, but not when exposed to Islamist terrorism. Attitudinal differentiation was negatively associated with self-disclosure. Additionally, we found an interaction effect of exposure to Islamist terrorism and attitudinal differentiation on self-disclosure. Finally, the results showed that online self-disclosure was positively related to fear of terrorism. By and large, our findings highlight the relevance of social media for the levels of fear.

Following the January 6 insurrection on the US Capitol, we sought to explore how two social media platforms were being used concurrently to disseminate far-right memes and discourse. Our study employs a mixed-methods approach to collect a large data set of images from 4chan/pol/ and using the “#stopthesteal” hashtag on Twitter between 1 January 2021 and 13 January 2021. Our findings reveal how each platform influenced the usage of memes toward identity building and far-right activism in the days leading up to and immediately after the insurrection. Our findings reveal that Twitter was used to mobilize users leading up to January 6 but led to in-fighting among the pro-Trump crowd in the days after. Meanwhile 4chan/pol users took advantage of the Overton window of the Insurrection to disseminate far-right ideology and attempt to recruit and radicalize disgruntled Trump supporters after the insurrection was deemed a failure.

Previous research has highlighted the prominent behavior of lone wolf terrorists to produce and share a manifesto publicly, outlining their frustrations and motivations for their eventual terrorist attack. This article aims to explore this phenomenon, focusing on the timelapse between when a terrorist manifesto is posted online and when the eventual attack occurs, discussing the time difference between the two events for 12 cases of lone wolf terrorism. The results revealed that the average time lapse between when a manifesto was posted online and when the terrorist attack occurs is one hour, 43 min. Limitations and implications are discussed in detail.

This article presents the results of a case study of the online community Russian Nationalism, one of the most popular Russian nationalists’ online communities on VKontakte in 2012–2016. The article aims to find out where network leaders and common members of nationalist online groups closed on the Russian Internet go and in which thematic communities they continue their activity. Russian Nationalism members’ personal profiles and friendly links on VKontakte were used as data sources. The metrics of social network analysis were used to study Russian Nationalism’s network structure. The study showed that the ban of a massive extreme right nationalist online group leads to an increase in the number of smaller shelter groups that retain their ideological basis, but abandon the clearly expressed hate speech; members of a banned nationalist group flow to groups whose content is both close (militaristic, cultural, and historical) and far (everyday) to the extreme right. The content of the latter can transform in line with the nationalist ideology. The case study of Russian Nationalism shows a high potential for diffusion of extreme right nationalist ideas in the Russian network space, which manifests in their ability to penetrate other thematic and ideological areas of public discourse.

Countering the militancy in Kashmir has become a highly challenging task due to the exploitation of new information and communication technology by insurgent groups. The battlefield is now a multidimensional one, encompassing both physical territory and cyberspace. The overall capabilities of insurgents have been enhanced by tools in cyberspace that are inexpensive, ever more sophisticated, rapidly proliferating, and easy to use. Militants are systematically exploiting the Internet to generate moral support, recruit personnel, and transmit propaganda, leading to the further militarisation of the Kashmiri youth. This paper examines the potentially disastrous consequences of the use of cyberspace by an already strong insurgency in Kashmir. The objective is to understand the most effective means to counter the cyber dimension of the Kashmir insurgency.

Radical ideologies and violent extremism continue to plague Kyrgyzstan and the Central Asia region, with approximately 2,000 Central Asians traveling to Syria and Iraq to join violent extremist groups. As fear of terrorism has grown in the region, the Kyrgyz government has increased scrutiny of Islam, with authorities conducting “appraisals” of clergy leaders, and violent clashes occurring between state police and suspected violent extremists. Despite these crackdowns, however, recruitment into religious-based violent extremist organizations continues both in-person and online. Social media plays a significant role in the dissemination and absorption of radical ideologies and narratives in Kyrgyzstan. Internet sites and mobile phone applications, including those that allow for messaging and content exchange, are actively used by extremist groups banned in Kyrgyzstan, such as the Islamic State (ISIS).