Online Library

VOX-Pol Summer School: ‘Topics in Violence Online Political Extremism’
Dublin: July 3, 2014

VOX-Pol Blog post.

On October 27th, 2022, Elon Musk purchased Twitter, becoming its new CEO and firing many top executives in the process. Musk listed fewer restrictions on content moderation and removal of spam bots among his goals for the platform. Given findings of prior research on moderation and hate speech in online communities, the promise of less strict content moderation poses the concern that hate will rise on Twitter. We examine the levels of hate speech and prevalence of bots before and after Musk’s acquisition of the platform. We find that hate speech rose dramatically upon Musk purchasing Twitter and the prevalence of most types of bots increased, while the prevalence of astroturf bots decreased.

Numerous studies have reported an increase in hate speech on X (formerly Twitter) in the months immediately following Elon Musk’s acquisition of the platform on October 27th, 2022; relatedly, despite Musk’s pledge to “defeat the spam bots,” a recent study reported no substantial change in the concentration of inauthentic accounts. However, it is not known whether any of these trends endured. We address this by examining material posted on X from the beginning of 2022 through June 2023, the period that includes Musk’s full tenure as CEO. We find that the increase in hate speech just before Musk bought X persisted until at least May of 2023, with the weekly rate of hate speech being approximately 50% higher than the months preceding his purchase, although this increase cannot be directly attributed to any policy at X. The increase is seen across multiple dimensions of hate, including racism, homophobia, and transphobia. Moreover, there is a doubling of hate post “likes,” indicating increased engagement with hate posts. In addition to measuring hate speech, we also measure the presence of inauthentic accounts on the platform; these accounts are often used in spam and malicious information campaigns. We find no reduction (and a possible increase) in activity by these users after Musk purchased X, which could point to further negative outcomes, such as the potential for scams, interference in elections, or harm to public health campaigns. Overall, the long-term increase in hate speech, and the prevalence of potentially inauthentic accounts, are concerning, as these factors can undermine safe and democratic online environments, and increase the risk of offline harms.

This article examines the digital convergence of distinct extremist milieus involved in the Patriotic Union’s thwarted plot to overthrow the German government in December 2022. By specifically investigating the merging process of involved digital networks of the German Corona-protest and Sovereign Citizens milieu over time, this article analyses the event’s broader implications for the German extremism landscape linked to the transnational evolution of anti-government extremism (AGE). Empirically, this study explores the relationship between issue-driven AGE (Querdenken) and ideologically driven AGE (Reichsbürger) by conducting a longitudinal network analysis of 785,865 Telegram messages from the attempted storming of the Reichstag (August 2020) until the events of December 2022. The analysis reveals a 25.6 percent overlap between Querdenken and Reichsbürger channels, indicating a formation process of a new small, yet notable AGE network. Further, the article finds that the highest spikes of convergence occur in intervals correlating with large-scale offline events, suggesting a feedback loop of offline encounters and online convergence. Thus, this study contributes not only to a dearth of literature on German-centred extremism and transnational debates on their changing nature reflected in the growing body of research on AGE. This study also offers empirical insights into group-level online radicalisation processes.

It is commonly recognized that social media presents vast new opportunities for terrorist groups seeking to radicalize audiences. However, few scholars have studied the actual mechanisms by which radicalizing messages are delivered to those audiences. Within this paper, the author explores one key aspect of the phenomenon of ‘jihadi cool’ – that is, the rendering of pro-Islamic terrorism into something hip and trendy among online audiences. Discussed is the use of political jamming: a subversive, satirical activity that draws on humor to reinforce ideological messages. The opportunity for countering these messages through the same technique is also considered.