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Although the misuse of new technologies by terrorist actors has been a major concern for some time, the capabilities offered by (and the availability of) a range of new and emerging technologies – including gaming platforms, unmanned aerial systems (UAS), artificial intelligence (AI) and 3D-printed weapons – have heightened these fears even further. An analysis of how and why terrorists adopt new technologies suggests that it remains highly context specific, with the extent and speed of innovation affected by internal factors (for example strategic, structural and individual factors) and external factors, particularly relationships, resources and the effects of counter-terrorism. In combination, these factors can encourage or inhibit the adoption of new technologies by terrorist actors, resulting in significant variations in the adoption and use of key technologies of concern. Terrorist actors in or affecting Europe have adopted (or are beginning to adopt) many of these technologies. Social media platforms, small or micro platforms, terrorist-hosted websites and gaming or gaming-adjacent platforms are all playing critical roles in the radicalisation and recruitment process. Emerging technologies used in this process include the decentralised web, the dark web and, most recently, generative AI. Although many terrorist attacks in Europe use a low-tech modus operandi, technology plays a key role in their preparation, planning and subsequent promotion. Propaganda and instructional material – typically stored and shared online – play a prominent role in shaping attack targets and methodology. For example, the emergence of 3D-printed weapon usage by terrorist actors in Europe has been fuelled by instructional materials developed by an active online subculture. Other far-right online subcultures have also encouraged the live-streaming of attacks and sharing of manifestos online. Terrorist actors in Europe use a range of licit and illicit activities to fund their attacks and radicalisation and recruitment activities, some of which (but not all) require the use of new technologies. These include mobile payment systems, online exchanges and wallets, crowdfunding, peer-to-peer online funds transfers and the solicitation of donations on social media platforms. Simultaneously, terrorist actors outside Europe, notably ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant)/Daesh, are increasingly encouraging donations via virtual assets, driving a rise in the presence of virtual assets in European terrorist financing arrests and prosecutions. Interviews with national, regional and international experts identified lessons learned and good practices when responding to terrorist misuse of new technologies. These include reducing the lag between terrorist exploitation of new technologies and counter-terrorism responses to it (through horizon scanning exercises and greater information sharing), the criticality of multistakeholder approaches, the importance of identifying and managing human rights-related risks, and the benefits of greater strategic clarity, which can lead to a focus on desired outcomes, rather than the steps required to reach them.

Social media platforms like Reddit, YouTube, and Instagram amplify rapid dissemination of negative sentiment, potentially causing harm and fostering extremist discourse. This paper addresses the NLP challenge of predicting sudden spikes in negative sentiment by fine-tuning multilingual transformer models. We present a structured pipeline emphasizing linguistic feature extraction and temporal modeling. Our experimental results, obtained from extensive Reddit, YouTube, and Instagram data, demonstrate improved forecasting accuracy over baseline methods. Ethical considerations and implications for deployment in social media moderation are thoroughly discussed. The system includes user-centric interactive features such as real-time filtering dashboards, customizable negativity thresholds, and forecasting analytics, providing actionable insights for preventative content moderation. Given its real-time deployment potential and cross-platform applicability, our system offers actionable insights for proactive content moderation.

This paper contributes to platform-comparative research through a case study of Twitter/X, Telegram, and Gettr in the context of German far-right social movements. It introduces the conceptual framework of platform opportunity structures to examine how platforms enable or constrain far-right mobilization. Using community analysis of sharing networks among the same pool of far-right social movement actors, the study explores how technological affordances, governance models, ownership and branding, and user bases and cultures shape platform-specific networking patterns. The findings reveal Telegram as a central platform for the most radical and active communities; Twitter as a site where anti-elite journalists and politicians are salient; and Gettr as a platform to connect to the U.S. far right. While anti-elite and COVID-related conspiracist figures exert influence on all platforms-particularly on Telegram, the prevalence of AfD politicians, pseudonymous amplifiers, and transnational ties to the U.S. far right – especially after Elon Musk’s acquisition of Twitter – are emergent factors. As Twitter shifts toward ‘alternative’ platforms like Telegram and Gettr, offering minimal moderation and security and even ideological branding, this article adds to understanding how dynamic platform opportunity structures shape far-right mobilization online.

This article examines how far-right groups advance political agendas through digital platforms, specifically by embedding reactionary ideology within health and wellness discourse. Our investigation concerns the “Barbarian Right” subculture on X (formerly Twitter), where reactionary content is often intertwined with wellness messaging. Using social network analysis of 42 accounts identified through digital ethnography, we mapped the structure of this community and identified key influencers. Subsequent semiotic discourse analysis revealed ideological practices and their relationship to platform affordances. Our findings reveal a small number of prominent accounts, supported by alternative media outlets that dominate this space. These accounts primarily deliver health advice strategically interspersed with white nationalist messaging. This research offers empirical insights into the growing alignment between far-right and wellness communities, shedding light on potential radicalization pathways and recruitment strategies of the dissident right.

This is the protocol for a Campbell Systematic Review. This review will address two aims: (1) A qualitative synthesis of literature on the composition of online far right propaganda, and (2) A quantitative synthesis of literature examining the impact of exposure to online far‐right propaganda on audiences. These syntheses will be guided by the following specific objectives: (i) What is the content (i.e. themes) of online far‐right propaganda, and how does this differ across ideological subgroups? (ii) What is the structure of online far‐right propaganda, and how does this differ across ideological subgroups? (iii) What is the context of these messages (i.e., where, when and by whom were they posted?) (iv) What impact does exposure to online far‐right propaganda have on audiences with reference to the radicalisation of opinion and/or action?

This study focuses on the role played by search engines in accessing Salafi-jihadi terrorist content on the surface web and beyond. It argues that due to the very nature of the World Wide Web, search engines may be exploited as primary gateways to harmful content, allowing followers of Salafi-jihadi violent extremist groups to find and law enforcement to detect crucial communication channels maintained by terrorist organisations easily. While ‘findability’ has become a key concept in other fields that research how users locate material online, we point out that the obvious functionality of search engines has remained under the radar in the counterterrorism discourse for years, and this gap must now be addressed. In order to decrease the accessibility of terrorist-operated websites (TOWs) serving as the primary nodes that reroute traffic deeper into the ecosystems maintained by violent extremist organisations (VEOs), there is a role to be played by search engines. They dispose of a number of potential tools that can be exploited to limit the visibility of terrorist content on the surface web.