By Andrew Whiting
Having begun their inquiries in May 2025, the Home Affairs Select Committee last month published their report into combatting new forms of extremism. The report is a welcome addition to the discussion with several important recommendations. The range of expertise the committee engaged with has helped give it good coverage across a range of areas and usefully highlights the need for further research. The primary aim of the inquiry was to address the problem of a ‘growing number of children and young adults who are being radicalised online’. Citing the most recently published Prevent referral statistics the report highlights how 11–15-year-olds have been a growing source of referrals to the counter-terrorism programme and made up the single biggest age group discussed at Channel. Rather than just focusing on age, or age as an isolated issue, the report explores contemporary trends in extremism and the intersections between age, ideology and technology. Here, I have sought to provide a summary of some key findings as well as reflect specifically about the role of Prevent.
Extremism, Ideology and Technology
The report highlighted a more ideologically diffuse extremist ecosystem in which antisemitism and conspiracy theories are cited as having an important narrative shaping role as a ‘risk factor’ and ‘significant driver’ in radicalisation. Another persistent and pervasive feature of online extremism was misogyny, that flourished in spaces within the online ‘manosphere’ and that intersected with other forms of extremism. ‘Com networks’ have emerged as a disturbing online phenomenon that perhaps typify the youth/online/ideology trends outlined in the report. Comprised mainly of teenage boys, these online groups blend gang and cult like behaviour to inflict serious harm on victims and are characterised by nihilistic violence without a clear ideological motivation.
Shifting the focus to technological developments the report highlights the role of artificial intelligence in ‘fuelling the spread of online extremism’ as well as the exacerbating role of algorithms designed to promote online engagement. Assuming it is not the intention of, for example, social media algorithms to promote extremist content online, experts clarified that these are nevertheless exploited by packaging content in a way designed to ‘provoke outrage or fear’ and therefore gain traction online. Both considerations speak to how developments in the online ecosystem have seen young people exposed to more extremism online. However, the report also highlights the ‘legal but harmful’ content that plays a ‘big role’ in exposing children to extreme narratives. Influencers are noted here for their ability to disguise content as empowerment or humour via aspirational storytelling, coded language and memes.
What role for Prevent?
Stemming from findings such as these, one of the most substantial considerations the report addresses is how to deal with these worrying developments and what role Prevent should play. Prevent is part of the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy CONTEST and is designed to work ‘upstream’ to prevent people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. Since the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act (2015) came into effect, a series of ‘specified authorities’ (e.g. schools, hospitals, etc.) have been required by law to refer those that they fear might be vulnerable or susceptible to radicalisation to Prevent (known as the ‘Prevent Duty’). Ideology is ‘baked into’ the UK’s definition of terrorism and subsequently those referring are encouraged to provide a ‘type’ of concern that has traditionally related to the ideological persuasion of the individual (e.g. Islamic Extremism or Far Right Wing).
However, acknowledging that cases of concern were less ideologically clear than perhaps this categorisation implied, Prevent began recording ‘Mixed, Unstable and Unclear’ (‘MUU’) cases in 2018. As the name would suggest, this category was designed for cases where the individual could not be comfortably described as one of the existing ideological categories. This has since been disaggregated to provide a more granular picture, and the most recent statistics include categories such as ‘fascination with extreme violence’ and even ‘no ideology’. Indeed, in the most recent Prevent statistics over 50% of all referrals were ‘no ideology’ cases.
Herein lies one of the big problems highlighted in the report. Prevent is counter-terrorism, the UK’s definition of terrorism includes ideology as a defining feature of terrorism, and guidance provided to Prevent practitioners reinforces the importance of ideology being present for escalation within the programme. Despite this ideological emphasis, which was re-asserted in the most recent Independent Review of Prevent, most of what is coming to Prevent for an initial gateway assessment lacks a clear ideology.
If Prevent adapts to formally take on these cases it is quite an expansion of its remit. This would have the benefit of offering some reassurance that no cases will be overlooked or dismissed for not fitting the ideology/counter-terrorism remit (something that was highlighted by Lord Anderson in his review of the Southport case). This approach must be considered alongside, firstly, the practical question of whether Prevent is well set up to assess and deal with these cases and, secondly, whether expanding the UK’s security apparatus is the most desirable and effective means of dealing with the issues highlighted earlier in the report.
I’m inclined to say that expanding Prevent to address all of this is not the answer for these (and other) reasons. Despite contestation from the Home Office, there are many references in the report from experts who argue that the influx of these sorts of hybrid or ‘no’ ideology cases is a result of there being nowhere else to go with them. Indeed, this is something Sir Shawcross highlighted in his Review of the Strategy in 2023. If this expanded workload has arrived at Prevent’s door because of a ‘category error’ then it is time to seriously consider what effective alternatives are available. The Report’s recommendation in this section is a critical one. Ambiguity and uncertainty serve nobody, so receiving clarity from the Government as to the relationship between non-ideological cases and Prevent is important. A plan to ‘anchor Prevent within the wider safeguarding system’ is also a welcome recommendation. I suspect, however, that what will be required here is an overhaul of this assemblage (perhaps in line with the ‘big front door’ approach suggested by Lord Anderson) with proper resourcing and that adequately promotes alternative support mechanisms so to make clear Prevent is not ‘the only game in town’.
Andrew Whiting is an Associate Professor in Criminology at the Department of Law and Criminology at Royal Holloway, University of London with a research focus on terrorism, extremism and cybersecurity. He is co-author of Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation and Prevent (2024, MUP).
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