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The use of the internet by extreme right-wing groups is nothing new (see, for example, Conway et al., 2019; Hale, 2012) although its use by extremists has traditionally been in conjunction with activity organised on the ground (e.g. marches, meetings or organised events; Mudde, 2000). While some far-right organisations still operate in this way, the emergence of the Alternative Right (Alt-Right), which operates predominantly online, has redefined far-right extremism and enabled radical white male nationalists to unify (Neiwert, 2017: 258). The affordances of the online environment have similarly united a range of men’s rights groups: from those campaigning against the repression of traditional gender roles to those which define themselves through extreme misogyny, blaming feminism for the perceived emasculation and degradation of men. These collectives are together known as the manosphere (a term coined in 20 09 on the blog The Manosphere).

On October 7, 2023, during the Jewish Sabbath and festival of Simchat Torah, Hamas shocked the world by invading Israel from Gaza across multiple entry points. The results were devastating: the single largest one-day total of murdered Jews since the Nazi Holocaust. Hamas targeted civilian families, assaulted and kidnapped hundreds of other civilians who were taken hostage in Gaza. Evidence suggests that Hamas was preparing for a ‘second phase’ of assaults, targeting the people of Israel. In response to this unprecedented massacre of 1,200 Israelis and the kidnapping of others, Israeli forces invaded Gaza with the stated goal of destroying Hamas.

In the online sphere, the vicious attacks set off a wave of posts, images, memes, cyber terror attacks, and videos on social media, but also on the dark web and adjacent sites. The Simon Wiesenthal Center’s (SWC) Digital Terrorism and Hate Project monitors the social media activities of over 7,000 groups, individuals, and online channels, many who support Hamas and other terrorist groups. This report will explore the explosion of cyberterrorist activity against Jewish and Israeli targets in the wake of October 7th and expose some of the key groups and actors that have caused significant disruption and threats to personal safety.

While the radical right is relatively successful on social media, only a fraction of its supporters become activists offline. Why do some individuals become offline activists in radical right organizations, while others prefer to limit their support to online spaces? Following an inductive analysis of interviews with activists and supporters of a radical right organization, this study points to the importance of going beyond classical explanations for activism by focusing on the impact of, and relationship between, group identification and stigma for mobilization. It shows that activists who identify with the organization and consider it stigmatized are motivated to participate in protest actions to speak out in front of this perceived injustice. By contrast, supporters who question the organization’s legitimacy in the face of stigma engage with the organization on social media and are motivated by a desire to keep a low profile and to avoid being openly associated with stigmatized actors.

Exposure to radicalizing information has been associated with support for violent extremism. It is, however, unclear whether specific information use behavior, namely, a distinct pattern of incidental exposure (IE) to and active selection (AS) of radicalizing content, indicates stronger violent extremist attitudes and radical action intentions. Drawing on a representative general population sample (N = 1509) and applying latent class analysis, we addressed this gap in the literature. Results highlighted six types of information use behavior. The largest group of participants reported a near to zero probability of both IE to and AS of radicalizing material. Two groups of participants were characterized by high or moderate probabilities of incidental exposure as well as a low probability of active selection of radicalizing content. The remaining groups displayed either low, moderate, or high probabilities of both IE and AS. Importantly, we showed between-group differences regarding violent extremist attitudes and radical behavioral intentions. Individuals reporting near zero or high probabilities for both IE to and AS of radicalizing information expressed the lowest and strongest violent extremist attitudes and willingness to use violence respectively. Groups defined by even moderate probabilities of AS endorsed violent extremism more strongly than those for which the probability for incidental exposure was moderate or high but AS of radicalizing content was unlikely.

This paper examines the counter-violent extremism and anti-terrorism measures in Australia, China, France, the United Kingdom and the United States by investigating how governments leveraged internet intermediaries as their surrogate censors. Particular attention is paid to how political rhetoric led to legislation passed or proposed in each of the countries studied, and their respective restrictive measures are compared against the recommendations specified by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression. A typology for international comparison is proposed, which provides further insights into a country’s policy focus.